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THE POLITICS OF REGIONALISM  
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Christopher Mulaudzi

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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	African Development Bank
ANC	African National Congress
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Conference
CBI	Cross Border Initiative
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
COMESA	Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa
CPS	Centre for Policy Studies
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa
EEA	European Economic Area
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FISCU	Finance and Investment Sector Co-ordination Unit
FLS	Frontline States
FTAS	Free Trade Areas
GNP	Gross National Product
IDC	Independent Development Corporation
IFIS	International financial institutions
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
LHWP	Lesotho Highlands Water Project
MAMU	Macro-economic Analysis and Monitoring Unit
MCB	Motor Company of Botswana
MDC	Maputo Development Corridor
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Area
NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPDS	Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
OSEO	Office for Serious Economic Offences
RECS	Regional economic blocs
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
SACU	Southern African Customs Union

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SAPES	Southern Africa Political Economic Series
SAPP	Southern African Power Pool
SAPS	Structural adjustment programmes
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Studies
SPA	SADCC Programme of Action
WTO	World Trade Organisation

# 1 Introduction

Mainstream perspectives on regionalism in Africa suggest that this important contemporary political dimension is characterised mainly by failed or weak regional organisations, and poor levels of integration. While this is not entirely inaccurate, it ignores the fact that regional co-operation and integration in Africa are expressed not only via state-to-state interaction but also via informal cross-border trade and migration. The literature also ignores some relatively successful projects that have enhanced regional co-operation and integration in southern Africa. Similarly, theories of regionalism do not sufficiently recognise that southern Africa is dominated by a single state, namely South Africa. This study tries to fill these gaps. It also grapples with the economic and political challenges facing southern African states in their attempts to achieve regional integration, and examines the role of states and markets in deepening integration in the region.<sup>1</sup>

## 1.1 The structure of the study

Section 2 focuses on the theoretical aspects of regionalism, types of regionalism, the emergence of regionalism as policy, the rationale for creating regional blocs, and the context in which regionalism has developed in Africa.

Section 3 examines the origins of Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the reason for its existence. It also looks at SADC's structure, and how this has affected its implementation of regional projects. It examines three projects undertaken to enhance regional co-operation and integration, and argues that these have succeeded largely because they are bilateral in nature and have involved not only the governments concerned but the private sector as well.

Section 4 looks at the SADC region from an economic perspective. It examines the role played by the South African private sector to facilitate and deepen regional integration, the motives for these investments, and whether market forces, concerned as they are with profit, can help SADC to achieve its goal of development integration. The reaction of other African states to South African investments in the region is also examined.

Section 5 scrutinises SADC from a political perspective. It examines its role in attempts to stop the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and defuse the Zimbabwean land crisis. It argues that SADC's concern with 'consensus' politics has left the organisation unable to take decisive action against self-interested member states and leaders. This section concludes by arguing that despite the rhetoric of commitment to a common political identity in the region, SADC has a long way to go towards forging such an identity in practice.

Section 6 concludes the study by looking at the economic and political challenges facing the region in its attempt to forge a regional development agenda. It examines the impact of macroeconomic instability on the regional economy, and the way in which high levels of debt among member states are preventing SADC from pursuing its integration goals. It also argues that, unlike Europe, southern Africa has only one dominant economic power, which implies that a regional integration strategy should be informed by the economic realities of the region.

## 2 The origins of regionalism as a policy

In Africa, as in other parts of the world, regionalisation has become an important process, and a key element in domestic as well as continental politics. The time when programmes aimed at regional construction could easily be dismissed as utopian or as being driven by hegemonic ambitions is fast disappearing. This trend was particularly pronounced when the end of colonialism in the 1950s and 1960s raised expectations that cross-border and pan-African solidarities would develop. The newly independent states found it hard to accept restraints on their sovereignty, while Cold War politics encouraged arrangements based on ideological divides. The only notable exception to this trend was Europe, where regional integration made spectacular progress because its French, German and Italian architects were able to turn the constraints of bipolarity into a source of opportunity.<sup>2</sup>

At the outset, it is important to distinguish between the two main types of regionalism, and the context in which they emerged. The 'old' regionalism, also known as 'first wave' regionalism, emerged in the 1950s and stagnated in the 1970s.<sup>3</sup> It was sparked by the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, largely in response to the perceived need to create a buffer against the Soviet threat. De Melo and Panagariya argue that this is why the United States supported regionalism in western Europe.<sup>4</sup> Although the United States was averse to trading blocs, western European governments were required to lower barriers to intra-regional trade if they wanted to receive American assistance.<sup>5</sup> Conversely, according to Lee, the failure of regionalism outside Europe was due to a lack of support from the United States.<sup>6</sup> Hettne argues that first wave regionalism failed because of a slowdown in integration in western Europe and the creation of Third World free trade areas. Thus regional integration did not lead to development, but to centre-periphery structures at the regional level, as well as interstate conflict.<sup>7</sup>

Hettne observes that there are notable differences between the old and new regionalisms. The old regionalism was imposed 'from above', focused on economic and security imperatives, and was dominated by states as main actors. By contrast, the new regionalism is not solely driven by the state but also involves many other institutions, organisations, and movements.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, notes Shaw, literature on the new

regionalism is rooted in non-state or semi-state examples in the global South, such as export processing zones, growth triangles in Asia, and development corridors in southern Africa.<sup>9</sup> Whereas the old regionalism was introverted, the new regionalism is more extroverted and reflects the growing interdependence of states in today's global economy. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of the new regionalism is that it takes place in a multipolar rather than a bipolar world order.

Hettne points out that the new regionalism was facilitated by the end of Soviet communism as well as American economic hegemony. The changed attitude in developing countries towards neoliberal economics and associated political systems also helped to create an environment conducive to regionalism.<sup>10</sup>

Regionalisation increasingly led to the creation of new economic groupings such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) in the Americas, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Asia. In Europe the expansion and deepening of EU integration prompted the formation of the European Economic Area (EEA). In Africa, members of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) signed the 1991 Treaty of Abuja, which sought to create a transcontinental African Economic Community (AEC), and a continental common market by 2025.<sup>11</sup> The likelihood of this goal being realised is not the subject of this study, and will not be discussed here.

## 2.1 Regionalism in Africa

In Africa, as in other parts of the world, the origins of regionalism were more political than economic.<sup>12</sup> Regionalism was widely viewed as the only way in which the continent could arrest its further marginalisation in the world economy.<sup>13</sup> The 1958 All African People's Conference in Accra, Ghana, marked the adoption of regionalism as a strategy for fostering economic and political development. African leaders had hoped that the creation of regional blocs would rescue the continent from colonial and later neocolonial influences, and enable it to engage effectively with the economically powerful countries of the developed world. This was further endorsed in the OAU charter when this organisation was founded in 1963. The 1980 Lagos Plan of Action sought to create a common market for Africa by the year 2000. As a result, several regional economic blocs (RECs) were founded throughout Africa. They were to begin by establishing free trade areas (FTAs), then common markets, and finally economic unions. This led to the formation of regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), established in 1980 and transformed into SADC in 1992.<sup>14</sup>

There is considerable debate about the degree to which the formation of African regional blocs was influenced by external actors. It is widely agreed that the creation of

the EU in the late 1950s sparked an interest in regionalism among countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), as well as the former Soviet states. The latter saw joining the EU as a way of arresting economic decline and enhancing security. The threat of CEE countries and former Soviet states being given preferential access to EU market resulted in other countries attempting to establish regional integration arrangements with the EU.<sup>15</sup>

On the other hand, the collapse of communism as an alternative mode of production left most developing countries facing a donor community that was increasingly intolerant of heterodox development strategies. This resulted in a growing hegemony of free market ideology, and individual developing countries, except for the largest, found themselves with little bargaining power. The adoption of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) by many African states partly reflects their lack of alternatives. A further vehicle for enforcing the neoliberal orthodoxy has been the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In this context, the formation of regional groupings is regarded as the only way in which developing countries can increase their global bargaining power. Regional blocs are also seen as the only way of increasing the specialisation, complementarity, and comparative advantages of co-operating states.<sup>16</sup>

Many analysts believe that the nature and pace of regional integration in the third world are determined by the major industrialised nations and international financial institutions (IFIs). This view is borne out by the following chilling message by the former American deputy secretary of commerce, Robert Mallet, to southern African leaders during the World Economic Forum meeting in Durban, South Africa, in July 1999:

The global economy is here ... unlike Europe, you don't have 40 years to get your act together ... Unless there is a realisation that the region has to be integrated ... you are not going to make it ... investors are going to decide [that] Africa is just not ready ... We cannot remain in this posture of standing in the morass saying it is difficult to move because this is southern Africa.<sup>17</sup>

For its part, the World Bank believes that regional integration can contribute to poverty reduction by strengthening links between the poorest landlocked countries and their more prosperous neighbours, and by helping to establish a basis for faster economic growth. The Bank's strategy is guided by the principles of 'open regionalism', and it regards the participation of the private sector and civil society as crucial for development.<sup>18</sup>

Similarly, rich nations in the global North and IFIs are giving massive amounts of aid to organisations such as the SADC to fund market integration, which has not been spectacularly successful in the region and elsewhere in Africa, largely because the necessary preconditions have been absent. However, according to Lee, market

integration efforts are being supported because, besides fulfilling WTO obligations, they will create bigger markets in Africa for North America and the EU. The ultimate goal, which ranks high on the agendas of the United States and the EU, is the conclusion of free trade agreements with African countries.<sup>19</sup>

Simon argues quite plausibly that most Northern donors are enthusiastic about regional integration and programmes such as the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) because they provide regional leaders with a new area of interest, thus distracting them from potential regional conflicts. This has the effect of entrenching the policies advocated by donors. Seen from this perspective, these institutions are a new incarnation of conventional regionalism, espousing predominantly state-driven visions of responsive neoliberal development.<sup>20</sup>

SADC's blueprint for integration and economic development, the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), sees globalisation as providing major new opportunities for southern Africa's economic revival. In terms of this vision, the economic revolution marking the new millennium could provide the context and means for Africa's rejuvenation. It states that Africa has 'no alternative' but to try to integrate with the world economy.<sup>21</sup> Consider, for example, the following statement by Michel Camdessus, former managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), during the 2003 G8 summit in Evian, France:

The African heads of state came to us with the conception that globalisation was not a curse for them ... but rather the opposite ... You can't believe how much of a difference this makes.<sup>22</sup>

### **3 The Southern African Development Community (SADC)**

SADC has succeeded the SADCC, which was established in Lusaka, Zambia, in April 1980,<sup>23</sup> largely to unite the so-called Frontline States (FLS) – states bordering on South Africa – against the then apartheid regime. Other objectives were to reduce the region's economic dependence on South Africa, create genuine and equitable regional integration, mobilise resources for implementing national and interstate policies, and secure international co-operation and assistance for the strategy of economic liberation. The organisation's objectives were to be pursued via co-operation in key sectors such as infrastructural development, as set out in the SADCC Programme of Action (SPA). SADCC reflected the spirit of pan-Africanism, and its preoccupation with regional integration and the recovery of African 'dignity and status' in global affairs. In order to enhance ownership of SADCC among member states, a decentralised structure was adopted in terms of which different areas of activity were allocated to each member state.<sup>24</sup>

In August 1992 regional heads of state signed a treaty turning SADCC into SADC, and – as the transition from a ‘consultative conference’ to a ‘development community’ suggests – transforming the basis of co-operation among member states from a loose association into a legally binding arrangement. Post-apartheid South Africa joined the organisation in 1994, and Mauritius joined it in 1995, followed by the Seychelles and the DRC in 1997.<sup>25</sup> SADC’s central objective is to promote economic co-operation and integration so as to stimulate economic growth and reduce the region’s dependence on the export of a few primary commodities. Regional development, security, and unity have also remained important items on its agenda.<sup>26</sup>

### 3.1 Home-grown organisation or foreign creation?

There has been considerable debate about whether the SADC is a home-grown organisation or a foreign creation. In a study sponsored by the SADC, Mandaza and Tostensen argue that, despite the involvement of foreigners, SADC has African origins.<sup>27</sup> Lee, on the other hand, argues that the idea of a regional organisation for southern Africa was mooted by a Briton, David Anderson, then managing director of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation, who successfully presented the idea to Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Seretse Khama of Botswana in 1978.<sup>28</sup> The degree to which SADC’s formation was influenced by external actors is not the subject of this study. Suffice to say that, from the outset, it was largely dependent on foreign aid, with 86 per cent of its project funding coming from foreign donors and IFIs.<sup>29</sup> As a result, its use of resources has reflected donor rather than indigenous priorities. Critics argue that SADC’s dependence on aid has made it more amenable to the imposition of programmes such as the 1993 Cross Border Initiative (CBI), spearheaded by the World Bank and co-sponsored by the World Bank, the IMF, the African Development Bank (ADB), and the EU.<sup>30</sup> This has also been manifested, they argue, in SADC’s hasty adoption of market integration as a development strategy before laying the foundation for such a transformation.<sup>31</sup>

SADC is marked by striking disparities among its members, and has not always succeeded in fulfilling its stated aims of reducing the region’s dependence on South Africa and stimulating more equitable economic growth. Indeed, the organisation has yet to prove that it can deliver on its stated goals of regional development and integration.<sup>32</sup> Two main reasons can be cited for this failure. Firstly, given SADC’s decentralised approach, inherited from its predecessor, each member state was made responsible for a particular sector and charged with implementing projects in that sector throughout the region. The assumption that a country charged with co-ordinating a particular sector was best suited to do so later proved to be untenable, as most projects implemented were given a national rather than a regional character.<sup>33</sup> Secondly, SADC has worked through a relatively powerless Secretariat whose personnel has largely been seconded by member states, a situation that has worked against the birth of a common regional identity and has resulted in a failure to deliver on targets.<sup>34</sup>

Indeed, a striking feature of SADC's transformation into a 'development community' is how little has changed in terms of the organisation's modus operandi. Consider, for example, the fact that only 14 out of 23 SADC protocols have been ratified and entered into force. Member states have also been reluctant to align their national laws with regional instruments and agreements.<sup>35</sup>

During the SADC summit in Mauritius in August 2004, President Festus Mogae of Botswana highlighted the organisation's lack of commitment to implementing its programmes when he noted indignantly that the SADC 'is weakest in getting things done'. He noted, for example, that four years after the approval in 2001 of a plan for restructuring the many SADC sectors into three directorates, the heads of the directorates had yet to be recruited.<sup>36</sup>

Among other things, the RISDP calls for 100 per cent connectivity to the regional power grid for all member states by 2012, a liberalised regional transport market by 2008, and harmonised water sector policies and legislation by 2006.<sup>37</sup> The document is couched in impressive language, but is not very concrete. While its goals are laudable, it lacks attainable and clearly prioritised targets, concrete cost estimates and time frames, and practical implementation plans. It also does not assign responsibilities to specific actors, but refers only vaguely to participation by member states and the private sector.<sup>38</sup>

To be fair to SADC and its predecessor, some of the latter's development programmes were sabotaged by the apartheid government's efforts to destabilise neighbouring states, thus undermining their ability to support the liberation movement. The destabilisation campaign included support for RENAMO in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola, as well as armed attacks on ANC installations in neighbouring states.<sup>39</sup> The campaign had devastating results, and cost the region an estimated US\$115 billion. Unlike the Asian 'tigers' of South Korea and Taiwan, whose security was funded by the United States, SADC had to finance its own security.<sup>40</sup> However, it has successfully implemented some infrastructure projects involving roads, dams, and hydroelectric power stations.

### **3.2 Regional infrastructural development projects**

As in other regions, SADC has initiated a number of regional development projects, given further impetus by globalisation. Current projects include nine cross-border development corridors, three of which are at an advanced stage.<sup>41</sup> Owing to space constraints, only three prominent projects will be discussed here: the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), and the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC).

### 3.2.1 *The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP)*

Southern Africa is a water-scarce region. If water is not appropriately managed, three or four of the strongest economies in the region will experience serious water shortages by 2030. The region's population is growing at a rate of 3 per cent, and urbanising at a rate of 5 to 8 per cent, resulting in a steadily growing demand for water. The 1995 SADC Protocol on Water is an attempt to encourage the 'equitable and reasonable use of regional waters' by all states in the region.<sup>42</sup> It calls for the integrated management of scarce water resources, among other things by exchanging hydrological, hydrogeological, water quality, meteorological, and ecological information, thus enabling joint decision-making on allocating and protecting scarce water resources.<sup>43</sup>

The LHWP is a bilateral arrangement between South Africa and Lesotho that predates the signing of the SADC Water Protocol. However, it dovetails with SADC's regional integration plans and is seen as a model for future projects in the form of dams and hydroelectric power plants that could meet future regional water and energy demands.<sup>44</sup> The goals of the LHWP are to transfer 70 cubic metres of water per second into South Africa's Vaal River system, which serves that country's economic heartland, and to generate enough hydroelectric power to meet Lesotho's domestic needs.<sup>45</sup> Given that it is a bilateral project only, the LHWP has been implemented relatively quickly, and is playing a meaningful role in integrating Lesotho with South Africa in economic terms. Thus, as Tevera and Zhou remind us, projects such as the LHWP and agreements on shared watercourses can be strong catalysts for regional integration.<sup>46</sup>

### 3.2.2 *The Southern African Power Pool (SAPP)*

SADC has achieved notable successes in the energy sector, with 42 projects implemented at a cost of US\$530 million. A key project in this sector is the SAPP. Established in 1995, it is aimed at connecting the power grids of all SADC member states, and extending electricity to rural and underserved communities.<sup>47</sup>

A major element of the scheme is the rehabilitation of the hydroelectric plant at the Cahora Bassa Dam on the Congo River and the power lines linking it to Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Undertaken largely by the South African private sector, the project is aimed at boosting the entire regional power grid.<sup>48</sup> Once this has been done, it is estimated that the region will produce enough power to supply the entire continent, plus a surplus for export to Europe.<sup>49</sup>

### 3.2.3 *The Maputo Development Corridor (MDC)*

The MDC, which involves the rehabilitation of road and rail links between the Mozambican port of Maputo and South Africa's economic heartland of Gauteng, is the most prominent spatial development initiative in southern Africa.

Cross-border initiatives are not new, and the MDC itself can be seen as a reconstruction of the micro-regional relations that have existed between South Africa and Mozambique since the late 1800s.<sup>50</sup> Tevera and Chimovu note that, while SADC has not made a coherent policy statement on cross-border development initiatives, it regards them as an important means of encouraging micro-regionalism in southern Africa.

Designed as a mixed industrial and agrotourism project, the MDC will, according to South Africa's Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), eventually benefit South Africa, Mozambique, Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe. However, thus far the benefits have been primarily confined to South Africa and Mozambique – and primarily the former. South African interests in the initiative are twofold. First, it wants access to the port of Maputo, which is closer to Johannesburg than Durban. Second, and perhaps more important, Pretoria is keen to boost the development of the economically marginal and impoverished Mpumalanga province, which borders on Mozambique.<sup>51</sup>

The dominant neoclassical paradigm, supported by the World Bank and some western governments, holds that large developmental projects such as the MDC and the LHWP will benefit local communities. However, the radical political economy thesis challenges the conventional wisdom that large projects necessarily bring with them socioeconomic and environmental benefits for affected communities.<sup>52</sup> In the context of this debate, it is noteworthy that the MDC has not benefited poor communities in its vicinity. By imposing new social and infrastructural costs on what was once provided free of charge, the corridor has actually increased the cost of living of ordinary people in both countries. For example, the privately operated toll road between Witbank in South Africa and Maputo has had major cost implications for peasant farmers, who now have to pay toll fees when they access agricultural inputs or travel to markets.<sup>53</sup> The MDC has also not succeeded significantly in creating jobs. Thus far, an investment of R67 billion has generated only 63 000 jobs – translating into a cost of R1 million per job. This is not sustainable, or replicable by other SADC member states. Thus this highly intensive development strategy may not be suitable for regional economies whose factor endowments are cheap labour and raw materials.<sup>54</sup>

Whether the MDC will contribute to SADC's objectives of regional economic co-operation and integration on the basis of 'balance, equity and mutual benefit' remains to be seen. The project does seem to resonate with SADC's aim of moving towards regional co-operation in all economic sectors as well as the free movement of factors of production, trade, and investment across natural borders.<sup>55</sup> While the MDC was conceptualised and implemented outside the SADC framework, the organisation has since adopted the project as a model for future regional transport corridors.<sup>56</sup> While this project has brought Mozambique and South Africa closer together, there are fears that projects like these could undermine regional unity as they introduce subregions and micro regions within broader ones.<sup>57</sup>

Matlosa argues that while development corridors may reduce spatial imbalances in relatively developed states such as South Africa, they may have a polarising effect on less developed countries such as Mozambique. There have been complaints of southern domination because more than 70 per cent of industrial activity in Mozambique is confined to the Beira and Maputo regions. These regional disparities may cause political problems in Mozambique, especially since the northern areas of Manica, Nampula and Zambezia are largely opposition strongholds, while the relatively prosperous regions of Gaza, Maputo and Inhambane are strongholds of FRELIMO, the ruling party.<sup>58</sup> Regional efforts aimed at reducing disparities among different SADC states are discussed in section 5.

The old SADCC encouraged regional co-operation and integration by co-ordinating various interstate projects in a decentralised way. While, as these three examples show, some notable successes have been achieved, the sectoral co-ordination approach has imposed limits on deeper co-operation and integration. By contrast, projects of a bilateral nature, or those involving the private sector, have been implemented fairly rapidly.

#### **4 SADC in economic perspective**

The most pronounced economic realities in SADC are South Africa's economic hegemony, and the extreme inequalities within and among member states. These factors present major challenges to market integration, and regionalism in general. South Africa is SADC's most industrialised member, and generates no less than 71 per cent of regional GNP.<sup>59</sup> This section examines the role played by South Africa, and especially its private sector corporations, in the unfolding picture of trade and investment in Africa. It argues that South African investments in Africa dovetail with and are inspired by the 'African Renaissance', which projects South African capital as a catalyst for integration and economic growth.<sup>60</sup> It also argues that South African investments have proceeded amid increasing nervousness about the country's real motives for its ventures into the continent. It also argues that while South Africa has not explicitly stated its hegemonic ambitions, its standing as a middle power, along with international expectations of its role, has left it with no choice but to position itself as an influential player in regional and international politics. The section also assesses the impact of South African investments on the region, and considers whether they are meeting their stated objective of reviving African economies.

##### **4.1 The African Renaissance and South African investments in southern Africa**

In 1993 Nelson Mandela declared that a democratic South Africa would forge closer economic relations with other southern African states in a way that would end its

economic domination of the region.<sup>61</sup> Since joining SADC in 1994, South Africa, has, largely through its thriving private sector, actively invested in various countries in the region. South African investors comprise a broad and diverse spectrum, including parastatals as well as small, medium, and large private enterprises. In 2001 South Africa was the second biggest investor in the SADC region, with investments worth R14.8 billion and multistate deals of some R27 billion. Among the biggest deals done in the region in 2001 and 2002 were investments of \$1.1 billion by SASOL in the Pande and Temane gas fields in Mozambique; \$860 million by BHP Billiton, the Independent Development Corporation (IDC), and Mitsubishi in the expansion of the Mozal aluminium smelter project; \$142 million by the mobile communications company Vodacom in Tanzania; and a further \$139 million in the DRC. Sun International has spent \$56 million on hotels in Zambia; Pretoria Portland Cement has spent \$53 million on mergers and acquisitions in Zimbabwe; the power parastatal ESKOM has invested \$6 billion in the Inga hydroelectrical project in the DRC; and South African Airways has spent \$20 million on a stake in Air Tanzania. South Africa is one of the biggest trading partners of many African countries. However, trade balances remain skewed in its favour.<sup>62</sup> In terms of net value, mining and industrial investments have dominated. South African investment in the sensitive agricultural sector in the region has been relatively small, but has led to significant job creation.<sup>63</sup>

Prior to the 1994 elections in South Africa, the ANC issued a statement meant to guide the country's future foreign policy in Africa. A passage on its projected relations with the region is worth quoting as it enables us to understand the reasoning behind South Africa's investments in southern Africa:

The region sustained us during our struggle and, with our own, its people's blood was spilled to end apartheid. Our destiny is intertwined with the region's; our peoples belong to each other ... We are convinced that the long-term interests of the South African economy will best be served by an approach to regional co-operation and integration which seeks to promote balanced growth and development.<sup>64</sup>

Since then, South Africa's Africa policy has coalesced around the notion of an African Renaissance. Devised by the South African president, Thabo Mbeki, it involves five areas of engagement with the African continent: the encouragement of cultural exchanges; the emancipation of African women from patriarchy; the mobilisation of the youth; the broadening, deepening, and sustaining of democracy; and the initiation of sustainable economic development. Through his advocacy of the renaissance concept, Mbeki has sought to place South Africa at the forefront of solving Africa's problems. According to Taylor and Williams, the renaissance appears to be about maximising South Africa's strategic options on the continent. One of its key elements is to deepen regional co-operation and integration so as to reduce the disadvantages created by small markets.<sup>65</sup>

According to Taylor and Nel, one notable feature of the renaissance concept is that it conforms to the dominant neoliberal discourse, and does not call for a different world order. Thus the renaissance is about promoting western political and economic values on the one hand while trying to change the rules of the world economic system to ensure greater equity on the other.<sup>66</sup>

In an analysis that resonates with Taylor and Nel's, Vale and Maseko have noted that Mbeki's vision of the renaissance reflects a 'globalist' response to the continent's problems:

The African Renaissance suggests a continental effort led by South Africa to advance the familiar 'end of history' thesis ... South Africa's African Renaissance is anchored in a chain of economics, which, with time, might become the African equivalent of the Asian Tigers ... the East Asian economic miracle ... has offered hope to the people of Africa ... the African Renaissance posits Africa as an expanding and prosperous market alongside Asia, Europe and North America in which South African capital is destined to play a special role through the development of trade, strategic partnerships and the like ... in exchange for acting as the agent of globalisation, the continent will offer South Africa a preferential option on its traditionally promised largesse of oil, minerals and mining.<sup>67</sup>

That Mbeki's vision of an African renaissance should be seen in this light is indeed not surprising. This is because, in the words of Taylor and Williams, South Africa is 'the closest thing Africa has to a superpower', and is therefore expected to play a leading role in solving the continent's problems.<sup>68</sup> This sense of South Africa's exceptionalism is not promoted by outsiders only. As one South African businessman has noted, South Africa has an important role to play in Africa because 'every continent needs an America'<sup>69</sup>. This phrase conjures up visions of a neighbourhood bully. However, the parallels being drawn between South Africa and the United States are subtler. It is widely accepted that the economic growth of Western Europe after World War 2 and the Asian economic miracle resulted directly from American investment in and aid to those regions, and the opening of its markets to their exports.<sup>70</sup>

## 4.2 Explaining South African investment in Africa

Establishing South Africa's real motives for investing in Africa is a complex undertaking. However, there are three main explanations. One school of thought, led by Tevera and Chimhowu, suggests that its investments in ventures such as the MDC provide it with an 'indirect sense of moral restitution'.<sup>71</sup> This should be seen against the fact that the destabilisation campaign waged by the apartheid regime cost southern Africa billions of dollars. Indeed, the tone of the ANC statement quoted earlier suggests that many ANC leaders, most of whom were exiled in the region, feel a strong emotional

and intellectual attachment to Africa. The moral restitution narrative is strengthened by the South African government's adoption in 2001 of the African Renaissance Fund and International Co-operation Fund Act, which provides funding for co-operation with other African countries. Among other things, the fund is aimed at promoting democracy, good governance, and socioeconomic development and integration throughout Africa.<sup>72</sup>

Other analysts are more cautious, and argue that the South African government is not selflessly aiming to uplift the regional economy. McKinley, for example, argues that by extending the mandate of state-owned enterprises such as the IDC and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) to fund projects elsewhere in the region, it intends to maintain hegemonic control over the regional economy. He contends that South Africa's R1 billion 'economic rescue' package to Zimbabwe in 2000 was not an act of generosity but part of a wider plot to secure this country's strategic interests, and to position it as a sub-imperial power in the region.<sup>73</sup> This perspective resonates with Colin Stoneman's observation that 'it is unrealistic to expect nations ... to behave altruistically'<sup>74</sup> It can also be read with Bond's view that South Africa is seeking to position itself as the main third world arbiter of globalisation in matters such as trade, finance, aid, sustainable development, racism, non-alignment politics, and many others.<sup>75</sup>

A third group of analysts contends that South Africa's foreign policy in Africa is primarily informed by its domestic realities. South African policy-makers agree that the country cannot be an island of prosperity in a sea of poverty. According to this thesis, it is in South Africa's interest to promote private sector investments and peace in southern Africa, since an economically prosperous Africa would reduce the illegal flow of people to South Africa.<sup>76</sup> The need to do this has become acute because, despite being a regional powerhouse, South Africa has lost one million jobs since 1994, and 53 per cent of its citizens live in poverty.<sup>77</sup> This partly explains South Africa's continued support for the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) also comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland. Lesotho and Swaziland are almost completely dependent on South Africa, and derive more than 50 per cent of their revenues from the SACU development fund.<sup>78</sup>

Goldstein reminds us that the investment behaviour of South African companies is typical of developing country multinationals. Following the liberalisation of the South African economy, local companies have faced growing domestic competition from international competitors, and their profits have declined. Therefore, their investment drive in neighbouring states has been motivated by the belief that they will face less competition from local firms, and can use their superior resources to position themselves advantageously in the region even in relation to international subsidiaries.<sup>79</sup> Many South African businessmen regard Africa as a huge and largely untapped market which, though turbulent at times, provides good returns on investment.<sup>80</sup>

To be fair, South Africa's role as a leading African power is also informed by and dovetails with external expectations. Its role in the region resonates with the American foreign policy strategy of identifying and supporting certain states as more important than others. These 'pivotal' states are regarded as particularly relevant for regional and international stability. Thus, South Africa, like Nigeria in West Africa, is seen as a country destined to lead southern Africa.<sup>81</sup> Other Africans have also encouraged this notion. For instance, in his address to the South African parliament in 1997, the late Julius Nyerere called upon South Africans to 'take up their responsibilities' in Africa.<sup>82</sup>

Perhaps we should conclude this section with Horvei's succinct characterisation of South Africa's dilemma in respect of Africa: 'If it ignores the region, it is seen as callous; if it becomes actively involved, it is seen as returning to the domineering ways of the past.'<sup>83</sup>

### 4.3 Does South Africa want to be a regional hegemon?

A striking feature of the relations between South Africa and other African states is that, despite the former's transition to democracy, the latter have retained some of the wariness and hostility which they displayed towards the apartheid government. The reasons for these attitudes are varied. Some see South African capital as a threat to their relatively small private sectors. According to this view, South African investments are seen as tantamount to a 'recolonisation' of the continent.<sup>84</sup>

Reflecting on the cool relations between South Africa and its neighbours, Vale and Maseko have noted that:

the assumption that what is good for South Africa is good for Africa has often conjured up some uncomfortable historical encounters between Africa and South Africa's powerful establishment, encounters which, despite the miracle attached to South Africa's transformation, have scarred Africa's psyche.<sup>85</sup>

Africa's wariness about South Africa's commitment to regional equitable development is not entirely baseless. To illustrate South Africa's questionable commitment to overcoming the trade imbalances between it and its neighbours, a few examples are worth noting. In 1999 the South African government and South African trade unions forced Hyundai and Volvo to close their plants in Gaborone, where they were assembling cars for a largely South African market, and move them to South Africa. Fearful that these plants could set a precedent that might be emulated elsewhere in the region, the South African government increased tariff barriers for cars imported from Botswana. South African trade unions, also fearful that more vehicle manufacturing or assembly plants could relocate to Botswana, where labour is cheaper and less protected than

in South Africa, joined the anti-Hyundai coalition by persuading Botswana workers not to work for the Motor Company of Botswana (MCB). It was also alleged that the South African authorities had manipulated taxation to create additional artificial barriers against Hyundai. Thus South Africa's resentment of 'peripheral development' in Gaborone resulted in the loss of 450 jobs. This was done despite an assertion by South Africa's minister of trade and industry, Alec Erwin, that 'it is in our interest that our neighbours begin to industrialise and grow'.<sup>86</sup> Thus, to the ANC government, regional industrialisation is desirable only if it does not threaten the interests of South African corporations and the trade union movement.

Simon offers another explanation for South Africa's behaviour in undermining successful industrialisation ventures in Botswana while investing in heavy infrastructure and iron smelting plants in Maputo. He argues that Mozambique has great historical and contemporary significance as an export route for South African industry, which requires a sound industrial infrastructure. It has cheaper gas resources, land, and labour, and is also a major source of legal and illegal immigrants, which South Africa hopes to curb by investing and creating jobs in Mozambique. Botswana, on the other hand, is a minor source of immigration, and its motor industry poses a direct threat to South Africa's manufacturing industry.<sup>87</sup> These disparities are worsened by the fact that SADC itself lacks a regional industrialisation strategy. For example, the 1996 SADC Protocol on Trade, which calls for the creation of a regional FTA by 2006, lacks measures to ensure the equitable spatial location of industry across the region, and particularly to counter industrial polarisation.<sup>88</sup>

At the SADC economic summit in Cape Town in May 1996, President Robert Mugabe publicly criticised South Africa for raising duties against imports of Zimbabwean clothing and textile products, despite South Africa's massive balance of trade surplus. The Zimbabwean leaders asserted that 'South Africa cherishes the notion that because it is the most developed country in the region it can use the other SADC countries as receptacles for its goods while protecting its industries'.<sup>89</sup>

The behaviour of the South African government post 1994 has made some regional leaders nostalgic for the days when the country was not a SADC member. Others have also argued that South Africa seems intent upon enhancing international rather than regional integration. A case in point was the decision by the South African government to negotiate a separate FTA with the EU, which is widely perceived as inimical to SADC's regional agenda.<sup>90</sup> According to Vale and Maseko, many South African government officials display a belief, also common among many South Africans, that their country has 'everything to teach Africa and Africa has nothing to teach South Africa'.<sup>91</sup>

The expansion of South African business into Africa has resulted in the closure of various local enterprises. Besides this, South African businesses operating outside South Africa often source goods in South Africa rather than locally, thus further contributing

to trade imbalances in the region.<sup>92</sup> For example, President Levi Mwanawasa of Zambia has criticised the South African retailer Shoprite Checkers for importing bananas from South Africa instead of buying them from Zambian farmers who, in his view, produce better bananas than their South African counterparts.<sup>93</sup>

These examples suggest that the rhetoric of 'new regionalism' and development through co-operation needs to be treated with caution. Perceived national self-interest is still the driving force and determinant of state behaviour. In this sense, there appears to be very little to distinguish the 'new' from the 'old' regionalism.<sup>94</sup>

It is widely acknowledged that the market-driven approach to Africa's rebirth has yet to achieve the intended goals of reducing unemployment, and creating a thriving African middle class. These misgivings are strengthened by the fact that South African investments have resulted in the creation of very few and mainly short-term jobs.<sup>95</sup> Deepening poverty has driven many Africans to South Africa. The following section briefly discusses the illegal movement of people to South Africa.

#### **4.4 Immigration and xenophobia in South Africa**

The vision of a southern Africa in which South Africa's economic strength is spread throughout the region for the benefit of all has yet to be realised.<sup>96</sup> One result of this is that the search for a better life in the region has spawned new patterns of migration to South Africa. As Vale reminds us, despite the many sacrifices Africa's people have made in the cause of South Africa's liberation, and despite the reality that migrants have helped to build the South African economy, foreigners, mostly black Africans, have been subjected in 'liberated' South Africa to a regime of 'violent othering'. The brutality visited upon black African immigrants has been reminiscent of the worst excesses of the country's apartheid past.<sup>97</sup> The following story is instructive.

In September 1998, three migrants to South Africa were savaged by a mob on a train: one, a Mozambican, was thrown out of the train while the other two, both Senegalese citizens, were electrocuted as they climbed on the roof trying to escape the crowd. This violence was visited by members of a crowd who had gathered in Pretoria to protest under the banner of an organisation called 'Unemployed Masses of South Africa' ...<sup>98</sup>

In October 1998, 18 people suffocated in an unventilated container in which they were being smuggled to South Africa. Each had paid R200 to the smugglers. In the same month, another Mozambican immigrant was killed and eaten by wild animals while crossing the border between South Africa and Mozambique.<sup>99</sup>

Foreign Africans in South Africa are not only badly treated because of this country's high unemployment rate; many South Africans also feel superior to other Africans.

In this discourse, foreigners, mainly black, are a threat to the integrity and survival of South Africans.<sup>100</sup> These feelings of resentment have rarely been extended to immigrants from Eastern Europe or Asia.

The high levels of migration to South Africa have also derailed the signing of the SADC protocol on the free movement of people in the region. The South African government has been the most vehement opponent of this initiative. Botswana and Namibia, being relatively prosperous, have also been extremely nervous about signing it. The South African government has argued that it is premature to open up borders before there is a 'greater economic parity in the SADC region'.<sup>101</sup> And, as Madakufamba succinctly puts it, while South Africa would rather 'wait' for greater economic parity in the region, a thornier question emerges as to why it has taken the SADC so long to implement the SADC trade protocol, which is fundamental to the levelling the economic playing field.<sup>102</sup> Indications are that the wait is likely to be longer still. These developments pose a serious threat to the creation of a common southern African regional identity.<sup>103</sup>

South Africa's relations with other regional states are complex. Its investments in the region reflect a genuine attempt to lead Africa's rebirth, and improve its negative image on the continent. However, these attempts have not always been successful, and its pursuit of its national interests has made other African states doubt its commitment to regional integration.

## **5 SADC in political perspective**

The regional political landscape is marked by differences in political systems and forms of government that pose a challenge to regional co-operation and integration. Thus SADC encompasses democratic states such as Botswana and South Africa, a disintegrating state such as the DRC, and authoritarian regimes such as Zimbabwe.<sup>104</sup> This section argues that these challenges seriously threaten efforts to deepen co-operation and integration in southern Africa. Its main theme is that SADC's legal structure is hampering rather than advancing the organisation's attempts to create a regional agenda, because it allows member states to retain their sovereignty and pursue national rather than regional interests.<sup>105</sup> It also argues that SADC's guiding principle of taking decisions by 'consensus' implies that substantial criticisms by some member states are frowned upon.<sup>106</sup> This, and the fact that the colonial past is still fresh in the memories of many, has given rise to the norm of solidarity among member states, which has caused the organisation to overlook systematic human rights abuses in states such as the DRC and Zimbabwe.

## 5.1 SADC and the crisis in the DRC

The end of apartheid presented SADC with the challenge of finding a new *raison d'être*, based on an inclusive regional political identity. It also meant that there would be a clash of values between the revolutionary authoritarianism of states such as Angola and Zimbabwe on the one hand, and the respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law advocated by South Africa and smaller states such as Botswana on the other.<sup>107</sup> The notion of a common regional identity was first tested in the course of a personality clash between Nelson Mandela, then South African president, and Mugabe. This came to a head in 1996 with the creation of the SADC's security arm, the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS). The issue was whether the OPDS, then chaired by Mugabe, should operate under the aegis of the SADC summit, or independently. Mugabe wanted the body to be autonomous, and have its own summit. Mandela objected to this, and threatened to withdraw from SADC.<sup>108</sup>

SADC's criteria for admitting new members state that applicants should be 'geographically proximate' to the SADC region, and 'must be a democracy which observes the principles of human rights and the rule of law'. However, this did not deter it from admitting the decidedly undemocratic DRC in 1997. Similarly, the Seychelles is closer to India than to the SADC region.<sup>109</sup> It is difficult to explain these contradictions. However, there seemed to be two motivations for admitting the DRC. Firstly, Mandela hoped that it would be easier to control the DRC's Laurent Kabila inside the SADC.<sup>110</sup> Secondly, some SADC role players were attracted to the DRC's economic potential,<sup>111</sup> and some heads of state are believed to have reaped huge personal benefits after their military intervention in that country in 1998.

Another example of SADC's lack of resolve was its failure to react to the August 1998 military intervention in the DRC by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe 'on behalf' of the OPDS in order to prevent its invasion by Uganda and Rwanda. A few months later, Zimbabwe, the DRC, Angola and Namibia signed their own defence pact, which excluded the other SADC member states.<sup>112</sup> This happened despite the fact that 'the peaceful resolution of conflicts' in the region is one of SADC's major stated objectives.<sup>113</sup> Ironically, at that time SADC was chaired by Mugabe. This episode resonates with MacLean's observation that the OPDS is not an effective mediator because it lacks the necessary internal cohesion and capacity. Another reason for SADC's failures in this area is that it relies on anachronistic state-to-state strategies to deal with conflicts, perpetuated in some instances by leaders who have vested interests in them.<sup>114</sup>

To this can be added Rothberg's observation that SADC remained silent because some leaders of intervening states in the DRC conflict sought a direct share in revenues from the Congo's mineral and other resources. This has been blatant in the case of Zimbabwe; it is believed that Mugabe and his ministers, generals, relatives, and other associates have amassed huge personal fortunes from Congolese resources.<sup>115</sup>

The lack of political will among some regional elites to address contentious issues has been well documented. For example, Lesotho, while chairing the OPDS, made three unsuccessful attempts to send a fact-finding mission to the DRC. For its part, the DRC paid little heed to the request for meetings, and postponed others at short notice. Even when the DRC was nearly plunged back into civil war after an attempted coup in Bukavu in June 2004, the SADC showed no interest in resolving the conflict.<sup>116</sup> Mediation efforts were left to South Africa, whose president, Thabo Mbeki, has made resolving the crisis in the Great Lakes region a major foreign policy preoccupation. The South African government has allocated some R100 million to the peacekeeping efforts, and hosted negotiations between the main combatants at the Sun City resort in early 2002.<sup>117</sup> The motivations for South Africa's efforts at peace-building and investments under the African Renaissance project have been discussed in detail in the previous section.

The diverse and often ambivalent interests of many SADC member states calls into question the validity of claims that SADC is a 'community', which implies that it is a united entity. This does not bode well for the implementation of a common regional agenda. The 'highly personalised' nature of regional politics partly explains Mbeki's caution and perceived reluctance to actively promote the SADC regional agenda.<sup>118</sup>

## 5.2 SADC and the Zimbabwe land crisis

We (SADC) are democrats, and we want democracy to work according to the will of the people in our region in each one of our countries ... We are disappointed by the partisan and biased manner in which a sector of the international media has misrepresented the land policy of ... Zimbabwe which seeks to effect a just and equitable redistribution of land ...<sup>119</sup>

Few events in recent years have excited world opinion as much as the downward spiral of Zimbabwe under Mugabe, and the presidential contest between him and the opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai. The launch of NEPAD in 2001 raised hopes that SADC would condemn the abuse of human rights in that country. Indeed, the NEPAD base document declares that 'African people have begun to demonstrate their refusal to accept poor economic and political leadership ... there is a new resolve to deal with conflicts and censure deviation from the democratic norm'. This springs from the view that 'development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance ... Africa undertakes to respect the global standards of democracy ... political pluralism, allowing for the existence of several political parties and workers' unions, fair, open, free and democratic elections periodically organised to enable the populace choose their leaders freely'.<sup>120</sup> However, SADC has yet to apply these values to Zimbabwe.

Observers have offered various explanations for the organisation's failure to adopt

a firmer line on Zimbabwe. One explanation is based on the region's colonial legacy. According to this rendition, because Britain, Zimbabwe's former coloniser, is one of Mugabe's most vocal critics, allowing the latter to be ostracised would allow western powers to do as they please with other African leaders. This has allowed SADC leaders to sidestep thorny issues such as democracy and accountability in Zimbabwe.<sup>121</sup> Indeed, the theme of solidarity features strongly in SADC's anthem: 'towards our people's unity and harmony ... let us ... raise the banner of solidarity ...'<sup>122</sup>

Similarly, some regional leaders are still calling on member states to stand together in the face of perceived western interference in the region's affairs. Consider, for example, the following remarks by president Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania at a recent SADC summit in Mauritius:

We are tired of being lectured on democracy ... in democracy ... no one size fits all ... multiparty democracy and elections must never be a cover for the destabilisation of our countries. Let the SADC speak with one voice, and let the outside world understand that ... we are spiritually anchored in the land.<sup>123</sup>

Opposition to external interference has also led some regional leaders to talk, often without elaboration, as though there is an African version of human rights and democracy. Thus Mkapa's statement can be read together with that of South Africa's deputy minister of foreign affairs, Aziz Pahad, that 'we have our own understanding of human rights, democracy, and good governance ...'<sup>124</sup>

SADC's silence on the situation in Zimbabwe has confirmed Taylor's observation that regional leaders have failed to differentiate between colonial legacies in the region and the survival strategies of corrupt and undemocratic autocrats. In the case of Zimbabwe, Mugabe has successfully rebuffed non-African initiatives by presenting himself as an African 'standing up to' the colonials, and has tended to be more receptive to African inputs.<sup>125</sup> However, despite this 'receptiveness' to African initiatives, SADC leaders have failed conspicuously to use their leverage to resolve the Zimbabwean impasse.<sup>126</sup>

Black and Wilson, building on the colonial legacy thesis, note that the absence of tough action against Zimbabwe is rooted in the 'liberationist identity' of many ruling parties in the region, such as South Africa's ANC. Taking punitive measures against Mugabe would mean lining up, apparently in league with western imperialist forces, against another former liberation movement that had earned the right to rule through armed struggle.<sup>127</sup> Mandela suffered a cruel rebuff when he called for the imposition of economic sanctions against the Nigerian regime of Sani Abacha after its execution of the opposition leader Ken Sarowija in 1995. Mandela's call was at variance with the norm of 'African solidarity', in terms of which African countries support each other at international fora such as the UN.<sup>128</sup> Other SADC states ostracised Mandela, and failed to support Cape Town's bid to host the 2004 Olympic Games.<sup>129</sup> This lesson was not

lost on Mandela's successor, Mbeki, who has adopted a more cautious approach to the situation in Zimbabwe.

According to Brian Kagoro, SADC's reaction to both the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections in Zimbabwe has been to 'hear no evil and see no evil'. More telling was the fact that Zimbabwe's elections were declared 'free and fair' despite violating some of the SADC's Parliamentary Forum's minimum conditions for free and fair elections.<sup>130</sup> Thus the Catholic archbishop of Bulawayo, Pious Ncube, has commented as follows on the attitude of African leaders towards Zimbabwe: 'All they do is back each other and drink tea.'<sup>131</sup>

SADC's reluctance to take punitive action against recalcitrant members is also reflected in its recently adopted guidelines for conducting democratic elections in the region. Their most glaring flaw is that, in keeping with other regional instruments, such as the NEPAD peer review mechanism, they do not prescribe any punitive measures against members found to contravene the guidelines.<sup>132</sup>

The Zimbabwean crisis poses a challenge to SADC's strategic goal of deepening integration and co-operation on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit, aimed, in turn, at attracting FDI. The IMF has labelled Zimbabwe as the world's fastest shrinking economy.<sup>133</sup> Lee has noted that investors are hesitant to invest in the region as a result of the breakdown of law and order in that country, as they consider the region to be politically unstable.<sup>134</sup> This has also jeopardised the NEPAD's credibility.<sup>135</sup>

Two conclusions can be drawn from this narrative. Firstly, decision-making by consensus effectively means that national governments have reserved the right to weigh treaty commitments against national interests, and subordinate the former to the latter. Secondly, the fact that the organisation has not found the breakdown of law and order in Zimbabwe to be a violation of Article 33 of its founding treaty, which calls on member states to impose sanctions on any member state that contravenes the organisation's objectives,<sup>136</sup> suggests that SADC has a long way to go before reaching its objective of greater regional integration. Indeed, it is debatable whether regional elites are committed to a common regional agenda.

## 6 Regional integration: challenges and prospects

Three broad issues are discussed in this section. Firstly, it deals with the way in which SADC's attempts to strengthen regional integration are threatened by macroeconomic instability in the region, and argues that the impact of SAPs and the reduced role of the state in economic development will hamper SADC's developmental integration model. Secondly, it examines the organisation's failure to advance towards a common political system, despite endless declarations espousing a commitment to common democratic

values, which suggests that national elites in the region are not keen to promote a regional agenda. It argues that regional integration can only occur if SADC works instils a common commitment to key political values, and takes decisive action against states whose leaders violate these values and other SADC principles. Thirdly, it argues that European integration was promoted by two or more regional powers, while southern Africa has only one dominant state, namely South Africa. Central to this argument is the question of whether one hegemonic power can effectively promote regionalism, and in what context such integration can occur.

## 6.1 Conditions for integration

### 6.1.1 *Economic stability*

SADC argues that macroeconomic stability is essential for regionalism to be effective. While some SADC members tried at one stage to achieve macroeconomic stability through SAPs, most regional economies have demonstrated high levels of macroeconomic instability. Achieving macroeconomic stability is a major challenge to the region. Harvey believes this can be done by creating a SADC Regional Agency of Restraint designed to constrain macroeconomic extravagance. He believes this will be essential for sustaining a free trade area. It would have to be created by voluntary negotiated agreement, with credible sanctions against breaking its rules.<sup>137</sup> Creating such an agency will probably be difficult, for two reasons. Firstly, SADC has shown an aversion to creating mechanisms for sanctioning members that fail to observe its objectives. Secondly, even if such punitive measures existed, organisational norms show that the political will needed to enforce such agreements is lacking.

A 1998 study by the SADC Finance and Investment Sector Co-ordination Unit (FISCU) suggests that, for some time to come, SADC member states will remain committed to achieving national as opposed to regional goals, given their reluctance to cede sovereignty and transfer even minimal macroeconomic policy-making from the national to the subregional level.<sup>138</sup> The FISCU study calls for the harmonisation of national and subregional macroeconomic policies, leading to the creation of a region-wide Macroeconomic Analysis and Monitoring Unit (MAMU). Such a body could only gain legitimacy if it was fully supported by all SADC members.<sup>139</sup> Similarly, it is difficult to see how the envisaged regional development fund,<sup>140</sup> which, like the system used by the EU, is aimed at subsidising poorer members, will work if some member states view it as a direct threat to their sovereignty.

Another problem that threatens to derail attempts at regional integration and removing regional disparities is the fact that most SADC states lack the economic independence needed to realise their professed goal of developmental integration. This problem is made more acute by the fact that most SADC member states are debt-ridden and their

economic policies are determined by IFIs, which have encouraged them to downsize the state. Indeed, some of the policy dictates of the IFIs dovetail with SADC's strategy of development integration. Examples are currency convertibility, the free movement of capital, and the removal of bureaucratic controls. However, the preoccupation with downsizing the state is incompatible with the broad assumptions of the strategy of development integration, which requires relatively high levels of state intervention in the economy. Without this, the SADC's intention to develop and integrate basic infrastructure will be almost impossible to achieve. Furthermore, the emasculation of the state through SAPs will reinforce existing links with western industrialised countries rather than those among the SADC economies;<sup>141</sup> a situation SADC has sought to reverse.

### 6.1.2 *Political stability*

Peace and stability in the region depend on the achievement of regional integration. As noted in the previous section, continuing conflicts in the DRC and the turmoil in Zimbabwe do not bode well for achieving this goal. Similarly, the dearth of democratic reforms in states such as Angola and Swaziland means that democracy has yet to be fully institutionalised in the region. The SADC's OPDS lacks clear and unequivocal guidelines on how the SADC should respond to domestic developments in member states that behave in ways contrary to the spirit of the SADC Treaty.<sup>142</sup> Schoeman reminds us that one of the reasons for the EU's apparent success is the similarity of the political systems of member states, which in turn promotes uniformity and effective participation in an institution such as the European parliament, which is directly appointed by EU member states. By contrast, the marked differences among political systems in the region makes it difficult for SADC to encourage democracy, good governance, and a respect for human rights. It also works against the promotion of a sense of regional identity, loyalty, homogeneity, and participation in the region.<sup>143</sup>

## 6.2 **Can one hegemon deepen regional integration?**

Michael Baun has noted that the signing of Maastricht Treaty in 1991, which transformed the European Community into the EU, and allowed the creation of a common monetary union in Europe, was made possible by tough bargaining by two powerful states, Germany and France, which both viewed the agreement as a means of securing vital national interests.<sup>144</sup> Similarly, Jeff Faux has argued that American national and corporate interests lay behind the United States government's enthusiasm for signing NAFTA in 1994.<sup>145</sup>

As noted in section 3, South Africa is the richest and most powerful state in southern Africa, and is therefore the only one which, if the European and North American models are to be followed, has sufficient clout to drive the integration agenda. It is

expected to influence its neighbours through broad economic and political linkages.<sup>146</sup> According to Oden, regionalism in southern Africa can be deepened if South Africa is willing to play the role of 'benevolent hegemon' by creating mutually beneficial relationships with its neighbours, and see such partnerships as being in line with its long-term national interests. However, this will require other members accepting it as a benign hegemon.<sup>147</sup> As discussed in section 3, South Africa is already playing such a role by contributing more than 90 per cent to the SACU Development Fund and the African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund. The question is whether non-SACU members would be amenable to a mendicant relationship with South Africa.

Angola is perhaps the only other SADC member state that could influence the rate of regional integration. Relations between Angola and South Africa have a complex history. Their different approaches to conflict resolution have been the main reason for tensions between the two states.<sup>148</sup> Grobbelaar et al have noted that relations between them are akin to Franco-German relations before the EU was founded. A focus on regionalism would also promote Angola's bid for recognition as the region's second-ranking economic power after South Africa.<sup>149</sup> Whether these two states can forge closer ties aimed at deepening regional integration without provoking widespread resentment in the region remains to be seen.

SADC's key challenge is to ensure that the macroeconomic policies of its member states are harmonised. For regionalism to work effectively, regional elites have to show their willingness to pool their sovereignty and ensure that agreements are binding on all member states. Similarly, the region can only meet its developmental goals if it can reduce its mendicant economic relations with the West.

## 7 Conclusion

This study has dealt with the challenges to and prospects for regional integration in southern Africa. It has examined the history of regionalism, and the way in which southern Africa has responded to the worldwide shift towards regional trading blocs. Southern Africa faces many economic and political challenges, which have had the cumulative effect of making regional integration proceed at a relatively slow pace. While SADC's record of economic integration is far from spectacular, its successes in respect of development corridors and power grid interconnections are good examples of regional co-operation and development. According to the dominant neoliberal paradigm, market forces are agents of economic development as well as integration. This has cast South African corporations in the role of agents of development in the region. Private sector investments dovetail with SADC's goal of deepening economic co-operation and integration through cross-border investment and trade. The extent to which this can be achieved is bedevilled by two main problems. Firstly, South

African investments in the region have proceeded amid growing resentment of what is widely seen as the country's ambition to become a regional hegemon. Secondly, market forces are concerned with profit, not social development, and are therefore not suited to the role of deepening economic development. This means that SADC's goal of developmental integration can only be realised via decisive state interventions in the region's economies.

Politically, regional elites have shown a penchant for platitudes promoting regional solidarity against perceived external threats. However, their involvement in conflict resolution in the DRC and Zimbabwe has been disappointing. This calls into question SADC's commitment to strengthening political integration and establishing common political values. It is therefore not surprising that the organisation has an unflattering track record when it comes to promoting good governance, democracy, and human rights. Thus the creation of and adherence to a common, legally binding political system to which all member states can subscribe remains crucial if the organisation is to succeed in deepening economic and political integration. To create such a system would necessarily involve creating a supranational institution to which member states could cede some element of their national sovereignty. This will not only restore SADC's credibility, but will also ensure that the enthusiasm with which NEPAD was met internationally is restored and sustained.

## Endnotes

1. Grant & Soderbaum (eds), *New Regionalisms in Africa*, Ashgate: Aldershot, 2003, p 1.
2. D C Bach (ed), *Regionalisation in Africa: Integration and Disintegration*, James Currey, Oxford, 1999, p 1.
3. B Hettne & F Soderbaum, Theorising the rise of regionness, *New Political Economy*, 5(3), 2000, p 457.
4. J De Melo & A Panagariya, *The New Regionalism in Trade Policy*, Washington DC: World Bank, 1992, p 1.
5. M C Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in southern Africa*, Cape Town: UCT Press, 2003, p 28.
6. Ibid, p 28.
7. B Hettne, The new regionalism: implications for development and peace, in B Hettne & A Inotai (eds), *The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security*, Helsinki: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics, 1994, p 1.
8. B Hettne, Prologue to the five volumes, in B Hettne, A Inotai & O Sunkel (eds), *Globalism and the New Regionalism*, Vol 1, Macmillan, London, 1999, p xvii.
9. T Shaw, New regionalism in Africa in the new millennium: Comparative perspectives on renaissance, realisms and/or regressions, *New Political Economy*, 5(3), 2000, p 403.
10. B Hettne, Prologue to the five volumes, p xvii.
11. Bach (ed), *Regionalisation in Africa*, p 2.
12. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in southern Africa*, p 29.
13. Shaw, New regionalism in Africa in the new millennium, p 399.
14. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, p 29.
15. Ibid, p 30.
16. J Weeks, Regional cooperation and southern African development, *Journal of southern African Studies*, 22(1), March 1996, p 100.
17. Quoted in Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in southern Africa*, p 119.
18. M Schiff & A Winters, *Regional Integration and Development*, Washington DC: World Bank, 2003, p 15. According to this view, the benefits of regionalism depend on 'finding the best partners'. This view argues that for developing countries to benefit from regionalism they have to forge relations with rich countries rather than with poor ones. This preference for North-South relations over South-South relations is based on the premise that a rich country is likely to be a more efficient supplier of most goods and a source of greater competition for local producers.
19. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in southern Africa*, p 39.
20. D Simon, Regional development: Environmental practices in southern Africa, in Grant & Soderbaum (eds), *New Regionalisms in Africa*, p 70.
21. [www.sadc.int/index.php?action=a01001&page\\_id.risdp](http://www.sadc.int/index.php?action=a01001&page_id.risdp)
22. Quoted in P Bond, The George Bush of Africa: Pretoria chooses sub-imperialism, 13 July 2004, [www.fpiif.org/pdf/papers/0407bushafrica.pdf](http://www.fpiif.org/pdf/papers/0407bushafrica.pdf)
23. The SADCC's founding members were the heads of the independent states of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

24. [www.sadc.int](http://www.sadc.int). See also I Mandaza & A Tostensen (eds), *Southern Africa in Search of a Common Future: From the conference to a community*, Gaborone: SADC, 1994, pp 11–15.
25. [www.sadc.int](http://www.sadc.int). See also Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, pp 44–55.
26. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in southern Africa*, p 44.
27. Mandaza & Tostensen (eds), *Southern Africa in Search of a Common Future*, p 17.
28. From its formation in 1980, the SADC was staffed mainly by British nationals with a Zimbabwean national, Arthur Blummeris, as its first executive secretary until his death in 1984 (Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, p 48).
29. *Ibid*, p 48.
30. *Ibid*, p 93. The major objectives of the CBI are to dismantle barriers that have resulted in high cross-border transition costs by reforming and eliminating intra-regional tariffs, liberalising exchange and payments systems through investment; and promoting a new integration approach based on competition and efficiency of regional markets with low tariffs vis-à-vis third parties.
31. *Ibid*, p 48. Integration theory states that market integration can only be implemented effectively if the following conditions, among others, exist: similar levels of industrial development, regional macroeconomic stability, and significantly different factor endowments among member countries. Member countries must be willing to cede some element of their sovereignty to a supranational body that has enforcement authority.
32. J Sidaway & R Gibb, *SADC, COMESA, SACU: Contradictory forms of regional integration*. In D Simon (ed), *South Africa in Southern Africa: Reconfiguring the Region*, Oxford: James Currey, 1998, p 66. See also B Tsie, *States and markets in the Southern African Development Community (SADC): Beyond the neoliberal paradigm*, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 22(1), March 1996, p 84.
33. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in southern Africa*, p 50.
34. Sidaway & Gibb, *SADC, COMESA, SACU: Contradictory Forms of Regional Integration*, p 166.
35. U Mans, *Civil society in the European Union*, *SADC Barometer*, Issue 4, January 2004, [www.saiia.org.za](http://www.saiia.org.za).
36. [www.sadc.int/index.php?action=a2001&news\\_id=166&language\\_id=1](http://www.sadc.int/index.php?action=a2001&news_id=166&language_id=1).
37. [www.sadc.int/index.php?action=a1001&page\\_id=risdpc](http://www.sadc.int/index.php?action=a1001&page_id=risdpc).
38. [www.sadc.int/index.php?action=a1001&page\\_id=risdpc](http://www.sadc.int/index.php?action=a1001&page_id=risdpc).
39. Mandaza & Tostensen (eds), *Southern Africa in Search of a Common Future*, p 16.
40. *Ibid*, p 16; C B Thompson, *Regional challenges to globalisation: Perspectives from Southern Africa*, *New Political Economy*, 5(1), 2000, p 42.
41. Shaw, *New Regionalism in Africa*, p 403.
42. *Ibid*, p 160.
43. *Ibid*, p 161.
44. D Tevera & P Zhou, *The SADC Water Protocol*. In D Tevera & S Moyo (eds), *Environmental Security in Southern Africa*, SAPES Trust, Harare, 2000, p 159.
45. K Matlosa, *The Lesotho Highlands water development project: Socio-economic impacts*. In Tevera & Moyo (eds), *Environmental Security in southern Africa*, pp 176–177; Shaw, *New regionalism in Africa in the new millennium*, p 403.

46. Tevera & Zhou, *The SADC Water Protocol*, p 159.
47. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in southern Africa*, p 52.
48. Shaw, *New regionalism in Africa in the new millennium*, p 403.
49. V Lopes & P Kundishora, *The Southern African power pool: Economic dependency or self-sufficiency?* In Tevera & Moyo (eds), *Environmental Security in southern Africa*, p 210.
50. F Soderbaum & I Taylor, *Regionalism and Uneven Development in southern Africa: The Case of the Maputo Development Corridor*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003, p 4.
51. D Tevera & A Chimovu, *Situating the Maputo Development Corridor*. In Soderbaum & Taylor (eds), *Regionalism and Uneven Development in Southern Africa*,
52. Matlosa, *The Lesotho Highlands water development project*, p 176.
53. D Tevera & A Chimovu, *Situating the Maputo Development Corridor*, p 198.
54. *Ibid*, p 203.
55. *Ibid*, p 39.
56. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in southern Africa*, p 152.
57. Tevera & Chimovu, *Situating the Maputo Development Corridor*, p 39.
58. Matlosa, *The Lesotho Highlands water development project*, pp 200–201.
59. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in southern Africa*, p 62.
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61. N Mandela, *South Africa's future foreign policy*, *Foreign Affairs*, 72(5), 1993, p 86.
62. D Games, *The experience of South African firms doing business in Africa*, pp 12–13.
63. N Grobbelaar, *Every continent needs an America: The experience of South African firms doing business in Mozambique*, Business in Africa Report No 2, SAIIA, 2004, p 2, [www.saiia.org.za](http://www.saiia.org.za)
64. Thompson, *Regional challenges to globalisation*, p 44.
65. *Ibid*, p 267.
66. I Taylor & P Nel, *New Africa, globalisation and the confines of elite reformism: Getting the rhetoric right, getting the strategy wrong*, *Third World Quarterly*, 23(1), 2002, p 169.
67. P Vale & S Maseko, *South Africa and the African Renaissance*, *International Affairs*, 74(2), 1998, p 279.
68. I Taylor & P Williams, *South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes crisis: African Renaissance meets vagabondage politique?* *African Affairs*, 100, 2001, p 266.
69. Grobbelaar, *Every continent needs an America*, p 5.
70. Grobbelaar, *Every continent needs an America*, p 5.
71. D Tevera & A Chimovu, *Situating the Maputo Development Corridor*, p 36.
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73. D T McKinely, *Commodifying oppression: South African foreign policy towards Zimbabwe under Mbeki*, [www.sarpn.org.za/documentsdoo0263.index.php](http://www.sarpn.org.za/documentsdoo0263.index.php), March 2003, pp 4–9.
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76. C Landsberg, *South Africa: A pivotal state in Africa*, *Synopsis*, 7(1), April 2004, pp 1–2, [www.cps.org.za](http://www.cps.org.za)
77. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in southern Africa*, p 62.

78. Ibid, p 76.
79. A Goldstein, Regional integration, FDI and competitiveness: The case of SADC, *OECD African Investment Roundtable*, 19 November 2003, pp 21–23.
80. Vale & Maseko, South Africa and the African Renaissance, p 279.
81. R S Chase, E B Hill, & P Kennedy, Pivotal states and US strategy, *Foreign Affairs*, 75(1), 1996, pp 34–45. A pivotal state is seen as one that affects regional and international stability. A pivotal state is so important regionally that its collapse would spell transboundary mayhem: migration, communal violence, pollution, disease, and so on.
82. Vale & Maseko, South Africa and the African Renaissance, p 283.
83. T Horvei, Powering the region: South Africa in the Southern African power pool. In Simon (ed), *South Africa in Southern Africa*, p 162.
84. J Daniel, V Naidoo & S Naidu, Post-apartheid South Africa's corporate expansion into Africa, *Traders: Africa's Business Journal*, Issue 1, August–November 2003.
85. Vale & Maseko, South Africa and the African Renaissance, p 279.
86. K Good & S Hughes, Globalization and diversification: Two cases in Southern Africa, *African Affairs*, 402, 2002, pp 50–51. Hyundai had relocated to Botswana in a classical globalisation scenario, because of the enabling environment—the strong currency, no foreign exchange restrictions, tax holidays, and the country's political and social stability. The other motivator was the favourable access to the South African market from within the protected tariff framework of SACU. Thus, by 1995, Hyundai exports rose by 300 percent from the previous year to 15,066 units. To be fair to the South Africans, the Botswana government had not entered into direct partnerships with Hyundai and Volvo corporations but only and indirect relationships through the Motor Company of Botswana (MCB). The MCB was owned and managed by two controversial Zimbabwean entrepreneurs, Billy Rauntenbach and Nissin Franco whose Johannesburg based company, *Wheels of Africa*, was involved in shady business deals throughout the SADC region. The MCB was poorly managed and revealed little of its financial records. Matters came to a head when following a raid by SA's Office for Serious Economic Offences, OSEO, at the Johannesburg offices of *Wheels for Africa*, Rautenbach was accused of 'bankrolling the war in the DRC. The OSEO investigation, plus the cancellation of Rautenbach's mining deals in the DRC, led to the collapse of *Wheels of Africa* and the subsequent closure of Hyundai in Botswana. According to Lee, pp 75–76 argues that other regional industrialisation initiatives scuppered by South Africa include a fertiliser factory in Swaziland, a plant for assembling television sets in Lesotho, and a Citroen assembly plant in Namibia.
87. Simon, *Regional Development*, pp 77–78.
88. K C Dunn & J J Hentz, Regionalization, the state and human security development in Africa: Thoughts for advancing the debate. In Grant & Soderbaum (eds), *New Regionalisms in Africa*, p 189.
89. Quoted in A F Cooper & I Taylor, Made in Africa versus out of Africa: Comparing South Africa's non-leadership in the 1996 crisis in Eastern Zaire, *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 39(1), March 2001, p 35.
90. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in southern Africa*, p 63.
91. Vale & Maseko, South Africa and the African Renaissance, p 283.
92. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, p 142.

93. Mwanawasa goes bananas over SA food chain, [http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set\\_id=1&click\\_id=68&art\\_id=qw1090503722992B251](http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=68&art_id=qw1090503722992B251).
94. Simon (ed), *South Africa in Southern Africa*, p 78.
95. Grobbelaar, *Every continent needs an America*, p 63.
96. P Vale & K Matlosa, *Beyond the nation-state*, *Harvard International Review*, 17(4), Fall 1995.
97. P Vale, *Migration, xenophobia and security-making in post-apartheid South Africa*, *Politikon*, 29(1), 2002, pp 7–8.
98. Quoted in Vale, *Migration, xenophobia and security-making in post-apartheid South Africa*, p 8. For a detailed discussion on the predicament of illegal immigrants in South Africa see Human Rights Watch, *Prohibited persons: Abuse of undocumented migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees in South Africa*, Human Rights Watch, New York, 1998.
99. Vale, *Migration, xenophobia, and security-making in post-apartheid South Africa*, pp 8–9.
100. *Ibid*, p 13.
101. M Madakufamba, *Economic refugees: Southern Africa's new Achilles heel*, *New York Amsterdam News*, 88(47), 20 November, 1997, p 3.
102. *Ibid*, p 3. It is also estimated that approximately 125 000 illegal immigrants, mostly Zimbabweans, enter Botswana every month. This has created tensions between the two countries, particularly after Botswana started to resort to novel methods such as flogging to discourage the illegal crossing of its borders with Zimbabwe.
103. S J MacLean, *Peace-building and the new regionalism in Southern Africa*. In N Poku (ed), *Security and Development in Southern Africa*, Praeger, London, 2001, p 128.
104. MacLean, *Peace-building and the new regionalism in Southern Africa*, p 153.
105. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in southern Africa*, p 65.
106. Sidaway & Gibb, *SADC, COMESA, SACU*, p 167.
107. P Fabricius, *Recent developments in peace and security in the SADC region*. In South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), *SADC-EU Relations: Looking back and moving ahead*, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 2002, p 39.
108. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, p 65; Fabricius, *Recent developments in peace and security in the SADC region*, p 39.
109. Sidaway & Gibb, *SADC, COMESA, SACU*, p 170.
110. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, p 66.
111. Sidaway & Gibb, *SADC, COMESA, SACU*, p 170.
112. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in southern Africa*, p 66.
113. For the objectives of the OPDS, see [www.sadc.int/index.php?action=a1001&page\\_id=risd](http://www.sadc.int/index.php?action=a1001&page_id=risd)
114. S J MacLean, *New regionalism and the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Networks of plunder and networks for peace*. In Grant & Soderbaum (eds), *New Regionalisms in Africa*, 2003, p 123.
115. R Rothberg, *Africa's mess, Mugabe's mayhem*, *Foreign Affairs*, 79(5), 2000, p 53.
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118. Quoted in Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, p 66.
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123. [www.sadc.int/index.php?action=1001&page\\_id=sadcnews](http://www.sadc.int/index.php?action=1001&page_id=sadcnews)
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### **Websites of newspapers, research institutes and intergovernmental organisations**

- [www.cps.org.za](http://www.cps.org.za) (Centre for Policy Studies)
- [www.dfa.gov.za](http://www.dfa.gov.za) (Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa)
- [www.eu.eu](http://www.eu.eu) (The European Union)
- [www.iol.co.za](http://www.iol.co.za) (Independent Newspapers)
- [www.iss.co.za](http://www.iss.co.za) (Institute for Security Studies)
- [www.sadc.int/](http://www.sadc.int/) (Southern African Development Community)
- [www.sadc.int/](http://www.sadc.int/) *SADC Today* (Several volumes of the newsletter) .
- [www.saiia.org.za](http://www.saiia.org.za) (*The South African Institute for International Affairs*)
- [www.suntimes.co.za](http://www.suntimes.co.za) (*Sunday Times*, Johannesburg)
- [www.commissiononglobalization.org/homelinks/afairglobalisation.pdf](http://www.commissiononglobalization.org/homelinks/afairglobalisation.pdf) (World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization)