Trilateral Cooperation in a Changing International Development Landscape

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This special edition of Global Dialogue, focused on trilateral cooperation in a changing global development landscape, forms part of a research project undertaken by the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), with the financial support of the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DFID). The research project sought to provide critical insight into the international politics of development diplomacy and its implications for South Africa. This special edition on trilateral cooperation is essentially a collection of some of the short articles produced during the project cycle, and forms part of a series of publications by the IGD focused on this important area of academic inquiry. The publication also includes summaries of presentations given at the various development diplomacy symposia and workshops in Pretoria and Cape Town in 2015 and 2016.

Development diplomacy and cooperation in today's evolving international landscape has become an integral part in finding solutions for global, regional and national problems. As such, it influences diplomatic agendas ranging from peace and security to environment, trade, health and migration. In 2007, the ruling party in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC), undertook to formalise its development cooperation agenda through the launch of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). Despite South Africa having a history of development cooperation under the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF), the unveiling of a state agency was seen as strengthening Pretoria's role as both a provider and receiver of development assistance. In 2015, the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, had mentioned during the Department's budget speech that the formal adoption of SADPA would be presented to Parliament for review and ratification.

The IGD, in partnership with the DFID, hosted a number of symposia and development diplomacy workshops on trilateral cooperation in both Pretoria and Cape Town. These offered conceptual and empirical analyses on research conducted by a range of scholars on trilateral cooperation, including a presentation on the key findings of a research report commissioned by the national treasury and co-authored by Mr Daniel Chiwandamira.
on South Africa’s trilateral cooperation. The report thus gave a comprehensive review of all of South Africa’s trilateral cooperation between 2004 and 2014. This was one of the first public platforms on which the key findings were disseminated to a wider audience of practitioners and non-practitioners involved in development cooperation broadly, and trilateral cooperation, specifically.

The symposia managed to raise an informed community of practitioners and non-practitioners interested in genuine engagement on the topic of trilateral cooperation and resulted in interactive and informative discussions. As countries such as South Africa continue to increase their involvement in development diplomacy, this is an area of research which must continue to be explored, especially given its potential for fostering global partnerships and financing the post-2015 development agenda.

The discussions also incorporated important insights into how Parliament can enhance its oversight role in terms of this new tool of foreign policy; and how South Africa’s development agenda fits into the regional, continental and multilateral development agendas. Perspectives from emerging powers Brazil, India and Mexico were also provided and focused on their experiences of development cooperation within their respective development agencies.

The workshops also unpacked the global development architecture which included the contours of development diplomacy in the 21st century; assessed South Africa’s role as a development actor, which is becoming an important area of inquiry; identified the push and pull factors that shape South Africa’s development diplomacy agenda; reflected on the experience of South Africa’s development diplomacy cooperation agenda; and considered the extent to which the pending SADPA can strengthen South Africa’s role as a development actor.

This collection of work will be an important resource for both practitioners and non-practitioners committed to ensuring that the road to 2030 sees significant strides in ending poverty and addressing inequality in ways that consider the livelihoods of future generations. It will also be important reading material for students of various social science disciplines as they seek to locate South Africa and the African continent in a changing global development landscape.
Introduction

International development cooperation has traditionally been channelled from the geo-political North to the South, but developments in South–South cooperation and the appreciation of shared developmental experiences among developing countries is beginning to change the development cooperation landscape. Trilateral development cooperation in particular has the potential to bring together partners from developed, emerging and developing countries in realizing more effective development cooperation. South Africa continues to invest in developmental cooperation agreements on the rest of the continent, including agreements of a trilateral nature. It is expected to consolidate these efforts in the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), which will take the place of the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF). This policy brief argues that South Africa is best placed to pursue the opportunities of trilateral development cooperation, enhancing the benefit of cost-effective partnership arrangements.

The Geo-politics of Development Cooperation

To effectively gauge how trilateral development cooperation differs from existing means of channelling development aid, such as bilateral or multilateral mechanisms, it is necessary to briefly examine these long-standing arrangements. Within receiving states, traditional development aid has been used to try and bridge the gap between government spending on addressing socio-economic challenges and the magnitude of challenges themselves. Traditionally, this aid has been channelled from the geo-political North to the South with a propensity for former colonial powers to provide aid to their former colonies. There is a general agreement among international relations scholars that the billions in financial aid directed towards Africa in the form of aid is contentious, with abject poverty continuing to haunt significant parts of the African continent.

Development assistance has been widely criticised for its links to reforms that included austerity measures, deregulation, trade liberalization and privatisation. Aid from traditional donors has too often been premised on these conditions with the observation that there are often adverse social and economic effects as a consequence of development assistance.

The world’s main donors, grouped under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), are still predominantly comprised of countries from the North. Over the last four decades, the narrative of South–South Cooperation has become pronounced. In the main, it is informed by the understanding that developing countries are likely to impart related developmental experiences to each other and perhaps cooperate at a more balanced level.

While the narrative of ‘aid’ and ‘aid effectiveness’ has traditionally been used in reference to development aid channelled from the geo-political North to the South, terms such as ‘development cooperation’ and ‘development assistance’ are increasingly expressed in the global discourse. The so-called emerging powers in the global system, especially the BRICS group of nations that include Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, are central in the formation and reshaping of this narrative.

Traditionally, multilateral development assistance, through development finance institutions, such as the World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), as well as bilateral development assistance through country agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DFID), remain the focus within the framework of aid relations. For South Africa, aid disbursements under the ARF, soon to become SADPA, demonstrate that countries of the South remain central in development cooperation for South Africa and indications are that this will continue in future partnerships.

The idea of trilateral development cooperation introduces a further dimension in the channelling of development assistance to beneficiary countries. This includes relations between three
parties within the development cooperation framework, and usually comprises a developed country or multilateral agency, an emerging country, such as China, India or South Africa, and a developing country as the recipient country.

The Changing Development Landscape: Trilateral Development Cooperation

Platforms for trilateral development cooperation can be traced to the increased interactions between nations of the South that have their roots in the 1955 Bandung Conference. The Conference saw Africans and Asians come together to express unified positions and consolidate cooperative relations.

The OECD defines trilateral development cooperation as arrangements between an OECD–DAC country or a multilateral institution, partnering with a 'pivotal' country (or emerging power), to implement development cooperation programmes in a third beneficiary country.

These partnerships are growing remarkably in frequency and scale. According to a paper on Sino-South African Cooperation in Development Assistance to Africa, North–South–South cooperation, often take the form of an initiative by a country from the South which cooperates with a Northern donor, to capitalize on their financial, logistical and technical resources for the support of a country in need. When priorities match those of the Northern donor, a Southern country often provides technical support.

It is in this context that South Africa has also become more involved in trilateral development cooperation. For example, South Africa actively utilized engagement with Japan, a key member of the OECD–DAC, to secure financial support for eight peacekeeping training centres in Africa. A similar arrangement where a bilateral engagement became the springboard for the pursuance of trilateral cooperation saw South Africa engage the UK to secure continued support for some of its Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) initiatives in Sudan. The growth in trilateral cooperation flows from an eagerness by the countries of the North to demonstrate partnership with countries of the South, which are also beneficiaries of the aid, while countries of the South, particularly those considered ‘emerging powers’, have become increasingly committed to international development cooperation. As these arrangements grow however, it will be important to guard against developmental agenda-creep when involved in these cooperation agreements. In other words, the most resourced partner should not dictate the development cooperation agenda, rather the three stakeholders should strive for a true partnership.

The conventional definition of trilateral development cooperation is, however, limited given that South–South–South arrangements are also an emerging form of trilateral cooperation. This sees an arrangement where all the key partners in development cooperation are countries of the South.

South Africa has become increasingly engaged in trilateral development assistance with other partners in the geo-political South. The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) Annual Reports 2011/2012 and 2011/2013 highlight the following:

- South Africa financed the deployment of Cuban doctors – through the Cuban Medical Brigade Project, in Sierra Leone – for a period of three years. South Africa funded a similar project in Rwanda, with doctors providing medical assistance to Rwandan citizens who survived the 1994 genocide.
- South Africa funded Vietnamese experts who were assisting Guinean farmers with agricultural know-how to improve food security.
- South Africa engaged with Guinea-Bissau and Cuba to manage and advance the three trilateral PCDR programmes in Guinea Bissau, namely a university teaching hospital project, a community based malaria project and the Cabral Museum Project.

The OECD definition, however, does make provision for institutionalized cooperation such as in the forum for the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum. This arrangement takes the form of cooperation beyond aid by including political dialogue, economic relations, science and technology and other policy sectors. Established in 2003, IBSA has been an important platform for advancing trilateral cooperation. It has over the years promoted sectoral cooperation in the three countries through 16 Working Groups (reduced to 14), which were established to deepen mutual knowledge and explore common interests. Six of the working groups are prioritised – with Trade and Investment, Tourism, and Transport and Infrastructure championed by South Africa.

Agriculture and Environment are championed by Brazil, and Science and Technology, Information Society and Health are championed by India – as decided by the 20th IBSA Focal Point Meeting on the margins of United Nations General Assembly in September 2012. The IBSA trilateral forum thus illustrates the varied opportunities for trilateral cooperation amongst these countries of the South.

As an institution, IBSA is well placed to advance trilateral cooperation agreements. Already, it has the IBSA Facility for
Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (IBSA Fund),

established in March 2004. Located within the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the IBSA Fund is a lauded initiative to channel funds and use expertise from the three countries to implement South–South cooperation initiatives through the multilateral system for the benefit of countries of the South.

South Africa contributed approximately R9 million (US$1 million) in the last financial year (2013) to the IBSA Fund with each of the countries having made a commitment to contribute from the 2006–2007 financial year. As a body, the IBSA Fund has up to now partnered bilaterally with developing countries on projects that address poverty and hunger. There is, however, an opportunity to source other resources, from pivotal countries outside IBSA, to support ongoing or new initiatives by entering into trilateral arrangements.

Trilateral development cooperation affords cost-effective opportunities for IBSA countries, developed donor states and other emerging states as they share resources and bring their comparative advantages to the table. For the beneficiary country, there is the opportunity to capacitate existing domestic priorities, rather than being dictated to with regard to the priorities. It also affords a level of coordination among donors within the beneficiary state. At the same time this presents a possible challenge in the extended period of time it may take to coordinate and conclude negotiations on cooperation agreements, given that there are three partners involved.

Consolidated development cooperation efforts, following the establishment of SADPA, should promote a more focused approach, with outgoing resources being channelled from a single source in government. It will further present South Africa with the opportunities to expand trilateral development arrangements. In its presentations of plans for the agency, DIRCO recently stated that an agreement has in principle been reached with 15 development agencies for trilateral cooperation in the future. As the framework for SADPA was developed, international development partners that include the Australian Government’s overseas aid programme (AusAID); the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); DFID; the New Zealand Government’s international aid and development programme (NZAID); the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and USAID were engaged. IBSA partners and other stakeholders – the World Bank; the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the OECD – were also engaged.

The development agencies are likely to be part of the 15 with whom agreement has been reached for trilateral cooperation.

Implications of Trilateral Development Cooperation for South Africa

South Africa’s engagements on the continent have been cautiously welcomed by other countries, as has the country’s foreign policy commitment to promote the African Agenda in world affairs. There is the understanding that South Africa should not act as ‘Big Brother’ on the continent – muscling ahead as the continent’s key representative on global affairs, flooding its neighbours with its produce, or being the key decision maker on peace and security issues.

For South Africa, SADPA presents an opportunity to depoliticize its engagements on the continent. Trilateral development cooperation, in particular invites other partners to the table with beneficiary countries, thereby pacifying apprehension of South Africa’s ‘Big Brother’ ambitions. The examples of trilateral cooperation mentioned earlier, included the partnering with Cuban and Asian partners, demonstrate that trilateral development cooperation can be arranged in support of socio-economic developments as well as in efforts to address peace and security issues. These arrangements therefore present the opportunity to trilaterally assist in addressing varied challenges faced by beneficiary countries.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Africa’s Pursuance of Trilateral Development Cooperation</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sharing of knowledge and developmental experience and technical expertise with other developing countries. It is an opportunity to extend South-South cooperation</td>
<td>Cost-effective through the use of emerging country resources.</td>
<td>Period of time it may take to coordinate and conclude negotiations on cooperation as opposed to bilateral engagements.</td>
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<td>Beneficiary countries afforded the opportunity to capacitate existing domestic priorities</td>
<td>Managing existing relationships between the potential partner and the beneficiary as well as guard against developmental agenda creep.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building and consolidating stronger relations.</td>
<td>Opposition by beneficiary country of engaging with an ‘intermediary’ country.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive reflection on foreign policy.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

South Africa’s development cooperation has been primarily focused on bilateral development assistance under the ARF. Trilateral development cooperation presents an opportunity to further enhance cooperation with both developed and developing countries and depoliticize engagements on the continent. It also affords an opportunity for South Africa to partner with other states in building its resources for international development cooperation, reflecting positively on its foreign policy. Firstly, this could see the country become central in managing effective development programmes, not only by funding, but by sharing knowledge, developmental experience and technical expertise with other developing countries. Secondly, South Africa would be able to expand its involvement in development cooperation agreements, because trilateral arrangements allow for a wider spread of resources. Finally, this could support the further strengthening of broader international relations.

The opportunities in a South–South–South arrangement present further prospects for being exposed to shared developmental experiences. With continued apprehension concerning development aid from the North, it is on the North–South–South partnerships that South Africa will have to tread carefully. It will have to manage sensitive, existing relationships between a potential partner and the beneficiary country as well as guard against agenda-creep.

Policy Considerations

○ The South African Government should invest more in extending development cooperation through trilateral arrangements as these arrangements are cost-effective, and present the opportunity to bring together partners with their comparative advantages in expanding involvement in international development cooperation.

○ The South African Government should position SADPA to play a key role in this distinct form of development cooperation on the continent ensuring that it distinguishes itself from conditions-based development assistance. In seeking partnerships, the country should guard against the old developmental agenda creeping into its expanded efforts.

○ The South African Government should strengthen efforts to continuously engage other emergent donors, particularly those that share similar challenges, experiences and considerations and that are themselves expanding their involvement in international development cooperation. Efforts to partner in trilateral development cooperation arrangements with these emergent donors will enhance opportunities to share developmental experiences. Where partnering already exists as with the institutionalized cooperation provided by the IBSA Fund, it will be useful to explore the possibility of IBSA itself advancing trilateral development cooperation. The IBSA Fund could approach other emergent donors to partner in the implementation of projects that address poverty and hunger.

Notes

1. There are currently 26 members of the DAC, namely: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union.


10. Ibid., pg 21.

Introduction

Development assistance is changing partly because of efforts in search of more efficient and effective ways of aid delivery linked to development effectiveness discussions taking place under the auspices of the High-Level Panel on Development Effectiveness. It is also partly being brought on as a result of changes in the balance of power globally from which comes a greater role and responsibility for the world order being taken by major developing countries, manifesting itself in their growing role as emerging donors.

While the analysis on trilateral cooperation, largely dominated by knowledge institutions of the global north like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), is expanding, not enough attention is being paid to the experiences and perspectives of the ultimate beneficiary of the assistance. This policy brief outlines key dynamics that shape trilateral cooperation drawing on data from research fieldwork in Lesotho and Malawi as well as discussions with various actors. At the back of my mind is the question: what is distinct about trilateral cooperation from the vantage point of a beneficiary country?

What is Wrong with ‘Old’ Bilateral Aid?

Trilateral or triangular development cooperation is largely about the structure of relations and number of actors involved in a development assistance initiative. It is the fact that there is a donor country working in partnership with an emerging actor in development assistance directed at a third country in need on the basis of agreements between the three. The location of the emerging actor at the centre of the partnership means that a country closer to beneficiaries in geographical distance and in terms of shared historical experience is directly involved in shaping development projects being undertaken. The hope is to overcome the paternalistic nature of traditional aid delivery as an act of kindness from former colonial powers to former colonies. The age-old paternalistic donor-beneficiary relationship remains entrenched though despite general acceptance of its failures and harm.

Traditional aid is blamed for perpetuating poverty and underdevelopment in the developing world. It is argued that it is a fundamentally flawed idea based on the logic of the colonial era’s civilising mission premised on assumptions about the European man as a saviour of others. In this sense, the donor is not only the source of finances, but also of civilisational ideas and policy choices that must be made because they are ‘international best practice’, when in fact they are just Western practices. The logic of aid as a ‘White Man’s Burden’, to borrow from William Easterly, is tied to the heritage of the European Enlightenment period where the European man came to regard himself as superior to others, a harbinger of civilisation that he assumed others did not have, science and innovation others did not have, democracy and development that others did not have. Aid has been a civilising mission used to extend the European civilisation in the form of its Euro-Christian norms and values, liberal democracy, liberal conception of human rights, particular kinds of education and health care, and liberal/neo-liberal economics. Therefore, like the civilising mission, aid is the enticing, attractive and salvationist language of colonialism and
its successor, neocolonialism. No wonder, after independence aid has played a crucial role in keeping former colonies on the periphery of a Westernised world. It is one of the ghosts of the empire that Kwasi Kwarteng only touches on in passing in his book entitled *The Ghosts of Empire*. It remains trapped in the coloniality of power, being and knowledge, i.e. the multiple hierarchies constructed to entrench the European at the apex the human ladder.

Development aid is a misnomer that conceals the anti-development logic underpinning it. It is aid without a genuine response to underdevelopment, which cannot be undone without sacrificing the power and privileges of developed countries. Its name has changed many times as criticism has increased, from civilising mission to development aid to development assistance, development cooperation to partnerships, without changing its underlying logic. It is premised on theories of change that privilege the experiences, dreams and visions of the North. It is still pretty much about the objectives of the North a lot more than the key imperatives of beneficiary countries. While the language and discourse have changed quite a lot as a result of international commitments including the Paris Declaration, the essence of the aid relations is still experienced by developing countries as a paternalistic relationship still laden with conditionalities to do with Northern norms. Worse, as the works of Dambisa Moyo, William Easterly and others show, aid has in fact been exactly what has undermined Africa’s economic development. Billions in aid flows have been found to be anti-growth and anti-development. One of the latest developments in the aid industry is the emergence of major developing countries as providers promising to do things differently. Aising from this, Northern donors have also innovated, seeking donor partnerships with these countries in the hope that this would improve the political legitimacy of aid and reduce the paternalism trap.

**Is Trilateral Development Cooperation a North–South Partnership?**

The structure and content of trilateral development cooperation cannot be adequately understood from the perspective of dominant actors to the exclusion of the views of beneficiary countries, the weakest of the three parties. This is because there are major differences between conditions seen from the vantage point of providers of assistance and the experience at the point of encounter or the view of beneficiary countries. From the point of view of the former, assistance is all glossy because the glossy objectives of the providers are assumed to be the reality. But beneficiaries experience more than just what is stated in vision statements and objectives of programmes, which includes the possibility of experiencing the direct opposite of the grandiose aims. Providers have a positive feeling about their intentions, but their positive intentions do not automatically translate into reality on the ground. There are many reasons for this.

Often it is trilateral cooperation when a Northern party provides significant funding while the emerging donor from the South provides project management and technical expertise while it also makes an investment in the initiative. Often, the funding still comes with conditionalities like democracy, good governance and human rights, thus ensuring that the fundamental problem of political conditionalities is still tied to it.

A quick review of the experiences of Lesotho and Malawi with specific trilateral development cooperation initiatives tying in South Africa with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Ireland (IrishAid) to support food security through the development of drought-resistant and pestilence-resistant potato cultures is revealing. Both Malawi and Lesotho had identified support for potato production (with in-built components of technology and skills transfer) as their great need. Both countries had bilateral agreements with both South Africa and the two Northern donors on food security and agriculture that provided the framework for convergence of interests between the three actors in each case.

Malawi and Lesotho are not mere beneficiaries, but contribute financial, technical and human resources to the project. They actually are fully responsible for implementation and were obliged to appoint project leaders to take full responsibility for everything but funding flows. USAID and IrishAid keep a healthy distance from project implementation. Ultimately, South Africa takes their place and carries their burden in the eyes of beneficiary countries. The management of the project is in the hands of South African officials liaising with a project manager on the ground in Malawi or Lesotho. In each of these cases, South Africa keeps control of funding and accounting for the projects, making spending on the projects subject to approvals in Pretoria sometimes to the detriment of elements of the project on fragile potato cultures. For instance, when project workers discover one morning that rats have created a hole to enter the greenhouse, this must be fixed within hours. However, this can take weeks of procurement processes being done in Pretoria.

Therefore, the emerging development actor in the triangle has the burden to exercise direct oversight over and continuous support to the project, while also managing its relationship with the northern co-funder of the project. This places a huge
responsibility on the South African government department responsible for project management, in this case the Department of Science and Technology. This works where capacity exists, but leads to resentment where it is overstretched. Emerging actors can take their goodwill and legitimacy for granted without due regard to the possibility that longstanding donor cultures can creep in aid-like relationships.

Trilateral cooperation does inherit the sins of development assistance, especially paternalism arising from the use of private sector companies to whom elements of project work is outsourced. The problem of South African companies and their attitude in the rest of Africa, including the two countries involved, is widespread and can play itself out in the trilateral development arrangements, as we found in this case. There was an element of the experience of beneficiaries in both cases that was no different from normal paternalistic development assistance. In this sense, perceptions of South Africa as a ‘Big Brother’, a self-interested regional hegemon or even a sub-imperial power doing the bidding for former colonial powers resurface due to practical experiences of the power of Pretoria in the relationships. Equipment for the project is sourced from white South African companies and in some cases one of the companies used displayed a condescending attitude, thus influencing the vantage point of project participants on the ground.

There are also huge problems relating to poor national ownership and coordination in beneficiary countries, matters common in paternalistic development assistance. In the case of Lesotho, there was evidence of weak project management and ownership among domestic actors – the government department concerned, University of Lesotho and farmers. A long history of aid, we know already, has built a culture of dependency and weak national ownership. It will take ages to undo this. African recipients of aid have learnt over time to give up on their potential to take control of their destiny. There is also reluctance to integrate the project into national policies and programmes.

Conclusion

Triangular partnerships are an important new trend in development assistance, but what is really new in this case is the intention on the part of the Northern donors to share with major developing countries the burden to respond to needs and the responsibility for aid as an age-old tradition steeped in coloniality of power. What is also new is the willingness of major developing countries to leverage their geo-political proximity to poor countries in need to influence how assistance is provided. But as far as the poor countries targeted in this are concerned, the underlying logic of development assistance as a paternalistic encounter is yet to change and therefore major developing countries take the risk of being seen as conniving to perpetuate historical aid patterns. This implies that in spite of evidence of greater country ownership of interventions on the part of poor countries targeted, major developing countries are quickly inheriting the negative consequences of development assistance, quickly becoming ‘Big Brothers’ looking down on their smaller neighbours.

Recommendations

○ Emerging actors like South Africa must think deeply about what is different in their involvement in development assistance beyond just coining terms like development partnership in place of development assistance, development partner instead of donor. This should entail greater reflection on post-development paradigms they espouse, notions of power they seek to promote and logics of culture that underpins their activities so as not to perpetuate the ghosts of empire.

○ They have to invest a lot more in project management systems so that there is sufficient expertise for ensuring continuous and intensive project oversight and support. South Africa has to create project units dedicated to this specialised skill without becoming a replica of a donor because it cannot undertake this responsibility without systems to carry this out excellently.

○ Much more time, resources and expertise must be invested in project management support to beneficiary countries, so that South Africa does not have to be the project accountant on behalf of donors, generating a lot of ill-feelings from project leaders on the ground.
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Introduction

Ms Buenaventura began this session by looking at the rise of Southern groupings in the 21st century, with new global institutions which promote the Global South position, like the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and the Network of Southern Think Tanks (NeST). NeST is a platform led and driven by Southern researchers to share and generate knowledge on South–South cooperation and international development. It consists of research institutes, universities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private sector and government agencies. NeST South Africa has been active in discussing and unpacking South Africa’s specific development cooperation paradigm.

The year 2015 marked a watershed year for development cooperation with the Finance for Developing Conference and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. This was the first time that the Financing for Development Conference was held on African soil. A hot topic of discussion centred on the need to upgrade the Committee of Experts in International Cooperation in Tax Matters as an intergovernmental entity which is critical to curb International Financial Institutions (IFIs) out of developing countries. This reflected on the ‘power of the South’, as never before have the G77 rallied together on an issue which allowed developing countries to have an equal say in how global tax rules are designed. The launch of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) addressed the unfinished business of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with the overarching theme of eradicating poverty. The negotiation process was an opportunity for the G77 to participate in the global development process focusing on the importance of inclusive economic growth, protection of the environment and social inclusion in a balanced manner. The role of the G77 is gaining more traction in the global conversation on development and in September 2015, the United Nations (UN) acknowledged the important role of the G77 in shaping global social and economic development in order to narrow the gap between developing and developed countries.

The Role of the South in Development Cooperation

South–South cooperation has been in existence for the past 60 years and many Southern countries have emerged as important actors in the global economy. South–South cooperation is based on the central idea of solidarity and engaging in a mutually beneficial relationship which promotes self-reliance in a demand driven development process. Their exact contribution is hard to quantify but important contributions have been made through financial assistance, capacity building, skills exchange and technology transfer.

There have been a number of conferences which promote South–South cooperation; an important conference has been the Delhi Conference of Southern Providers (2013). This conference discussed the weaknesses which affect South–South cooperation such as poor data and information management, weak monitoring and evaluation across all Southern agencies and a need for a platform for knowledge exchange, peer learning and support of the South–South cooperation narrative. Importantly, the need for a common position among Southern partners when engaging in global policy fora was emphasised in an effort to counter balance the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development–Development Assistance Committee (OECD–DAC) narrative. Importantly, the Delhi conference highlighted the fundamental differences between North–South cooperation and South–South cooperation. In order to create more synergy between the two models, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation was created.
The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation

This presented a new multistakeholder partnership which included civil society organisations, donors, recipients, business and parliament and was purposed as a new global and national monitoring and accountability forum to promote effective development cooperation. The language of ‘aid’ also changed to ‘development effectiveness’. The first high level meeting was held in Mexico in 2014 and the attendance varied. India and China were not present while Brazil expressed its disapproval. South Africa on the other hand, called for a focus on the needs of the poorest and focused mainly on Africa. Kenya is set to host the second high level meeting in Nairobi in late 2016. The position of the ‘South’ at the second high level meeting is not clear.

To conclude, the rise of the South, especially emerging economies are challenging the Bretton Woods institutions. However, these emerging economies exist in a hostile economic environment. Time will tell how emerging economies can narrow the gap between developed and developing countries. Going forward, more attention needs to be given to how the principles of South–South cooperation translate to ordinary citizens, the poor and marginalised.
When conducting the study, Mr Chiwandamira communicated with 96 members of government departments, 33 staff members of South Africa’s development partners, and 4 others representing non-governmental institutions. Three countries were chosen as case studies for international benchmarking, namely: Brazil, Mexico and India. The reason for their selection is that all three countries are middle income countries that play pivotal roles in trilateral cooperation. Mr Chiwandamira explained that Brazil was chosen due to its extensive engagement with Africa and participation with India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA). Mexico was chosen due to its strong institutional character of trilateral activities, grounded in legislative framework, and also its unique position in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (including observer status on the DAC committee) and G20, while India was chosen as an Asian example of trilateral activities, and its participation in IBSA, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), and engagement with Africa.

According to Mr Chiwandamira, studies suggest that South Africa is providing more than R2 billion. This includes the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF) and other funding provided by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO); transfers to multilaterals (including AU, NEPAD, SADC, UN and GEF); loans via the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), BRICS Bank, African Development Bank, World Bank, and Southern African Customs Union. Mapping out South Africa’s trilateral projects with the support of development partners, Mr Chiwandamira stated that a total of 72 projects were undertaken in the period from 2004–2014, with 53 projects completed, 12 to be completed in 2015, 1 in approval process, 1 on going with no completion date, and 5 to be completed between 2016 and 2018. Most of South Africa’s trilateral activities focus more on Africa, with the Democratic Republic of Congo ranking high with 9 projects, followed by Burundi with 6 projects and South Sudan with 5 projects. The majority of the projects are in the conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security sector. Over time focus has shifted from war torn fragile states to include other countries and other sectors such as Science and Technology, Environment and Public Management.

In measuring the contribution to South Africa’s trilateral activities by the development partners, Mr Chiwandamira argued out of 16 development partners, Canada is the largest contributor, followed by the United Kingdom (UK), Belgium, while the smallest contributor is Switzerland. The highest sectors whereon which investments from these development partners focus are social infrastructure and services; followed by conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security; economic infrastructure and services; multisection/cross cutting; and production sectors. When it comes to South African government departments participating in trilateral cooperation activities, the top three departments are the: Department of Science and Technology with 13 projects, South African Police Service with 7 projects, and Defence with 6 projects.

Explaining the finding of the study, Mr Chiwandamira spoke about the management processes of South Africa’s trilateral projects where he outlined three types of management modality. These are joint/steering committees, SA/recipient country management initiative, and multiple/plural management structures. However, he argued that there are no uniform management structures, and this poses a major weakness when it comes to monitoring and evaluation. There are different management approaches by South African government departments, with DIRCO and Treasury having limited involvement. As a result there are no guidelines for management trilateral activities. At the same time this management modality together with the selection of country of focus and sector are influenced by the development partner.

Mr Chiwandamira also spoke about the management of the funds where he mentioned that funding modality is dependent on the development partner’s preference. Development partners such as Australia (AusAID), Canada (CIDA), Norway, Sweden and the US (USAID) channel funding through the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) account.
However, this has in some cases caused project delays due to late disbursements of funds. Other development partners such as the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) manage the funds directly, and there are only a few cases where funds are managed by an implementing agent. No funds have so far been transferred to the beneficiary country.

Discussing some of the management challenges, Mr Chiwandamira cited coordination and steering as the greatest challenge due to the complexity of the management structures. He argued that success was noted where the management structure is simplified and inclusive of all three partners. Logistical challenges were mainly recorded in the peace and security projects. Other challenges referred to were the usage of Government of South Africa’s financial and procurement procedures which slowed implementation process, also over ambitious designs of projects with very little monitoring and evaluation and reporting.

On the way forward, Mr Chiwandamira concluded by arguing that there are a number of important steps necessary to ensure greater effectiveness of trilateral activities in South Africa. What is needed is a mapping exercise and review of international good practice in coordination trilateral projects. He linked the success of trilateral cooperation in the future to the evolution of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). Cabinet has already agreed that there will be a division of powers with regards to development cooperation; National Treasury will retain its oversight over ‘incoming’ official development assistance (ODA), whereas SADPA will take responsibility for ‘outgoing’ ODA. While SADPA is not a suitable agency to house trilateral activities at present, a long-term view is more encouraging and in line with best practice. This, according to Mr Chiwandamira, is because once SADPA is fully operational, it will have a dedicated trilateral programme. Secondly, SADPA is best placed to ensure that South Africa’s commitment to South–South Cooperation (SSC) would underpin trilateral development cooperation activities, as it is ideally located to ensure greater alignment between trilateral cooperation and the foreign policy intent of South Africa.
Introduction

In his assessment of Brazil’s International Development Cooperation as a foreign policy tool, Prof. Milani focused on the importance of both domestic and international politics in light of Brazil foreign policy and the changing political economy. Brazil transfers very little money through development cooperation and places more emphasis on knowledge transfer and technology transfer. Private sector plays an important role here and this speaks to the political economy created around development cooperation and how economic interests are maintained. Brazil is not a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and therefore has developed its own norms around development cooperation which are different from those of the OECD–DAC model.

Brazilian norms: Differences from the OECD–DAC

The Brazil Cooperation Agency (ABC) is affiliated with the Ministry of External Affairs and is well managed by career diplomats in a traditional bureaucratic setting. This kind of environment makes it difficult for the Brazilian parliament to participate in foreign and public policy in the way that the South African parliament does. As a result a committee on foreign policy has been formed which looks at how to reform this system based on a set of domestic variables which include: the social demand for democratic participation, institutional building, funding and a stable budget. A legislative framework is also needed for the development cooperative activities.

The ABC channels funds mainly into Latin America and Portuguese-speaking parts of Africa. Brazil provides technical cooperation in Africa mainly in the agricultural sector and also transfers public policy knowledge. Contributions are quantified by working time of the civil servants too; however, civil society is not engaged in the implementation of projects. The biggest project has been in Haiti in the area of public health where four hospitals were built. Prof. Milani argued that this project was related to the security interests and foreign policy of Brazil.
Introduction

Mr Sharma began his presentation by explaining that India has followed the principles of South–South Cooperation since its independence in 1947. There has now been a renewed world interest in India’s development cooperation especially after the global economic downturn. India’s development cooperation is premised on ‘Partner and Partnership’ and not ‘Leader and Leadership’. India’s contribution is both through providing financial assistance and access to its markets and duty free tariff preferences to least developed countries (LDCs).

Genesis and Evolution of India’s Development Cooperation

Indian foreign policy was inspired by Gandhi’s philosophy of ‘Growth for All’ and ‘One World’. The skills gap in newly independent countries in Africa and Latin America was the impetus behind India’s development cooperation initiatives. India accumulated experience in skills development through the Colombo Plan, Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme (SCAAP), and Third Country Training Programme (TCTP) and eventually led to the establishment of the Economic and Coordination Division in 1961 and then the India Technical and Cooperation Programme (ITEC) in 1964.

India’s Development Cooperation Policy underwent a major change in the early 2000s. A minimum ceiling of USD25 million was set for incoming foreign aid to India and only G7 countries were left to provide aid; however, in 2016, India declined aid from the United Kingdom (UK). A reason for this was that the foreign exchange reserve rose from USD5.88 billion in 1991 to USD350 billion in 2009–2010.

The recent institutional changes in India’s development cooperation initiatives are not completely unprecedented and what emerged was the lack of consistency in these efforts. In Nepal, India established the Indian Aid Mission (IAM) in 1954 which was renamed as the Indian Cooperation Mission (ICM) in 1966 and eventually replaced by the Economic Cooperation Wing (ECW) in 1980. The importance of evaluation and impact was first realised when the project undertaken in Nepal in 1964 under the ICM was reviewed. Review projects were then carried out in Afghanistan, Iran, Sri Lanka and Czechoslovakia.

A special division called the Economic Coordination Division (ECD) was eventually set up and was mandated to take care of aid and trade relations with Nepal apart from monitoring projects. The ECD linked foreign policy to India’s economic growth for the first time. A new orientation in Indian development cooperation led to three major activities: technical assistance, promotion of economic collaboration and an analytical and advisory function. In 2003, there was a paradigm shift in India’s development cooperation and the India Development Initiative (IDI) was established and was later renamed as the India International Development Cooperation Agency (IIDCA). The guiding principle of this new agency was that India’s assistance would be specifically directed at developing countries that were in greater need of external aid than India. The IIDCA was meant to act as a coordinating mechanism for all the different line ministries. The board of the IIDCA was made up of the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Finance and Commerce and Industry.

Maturing of India’s Development Cooperation

The nature of India’s development assistance has diversified and now includes new areas like frontier technologies. Effective partnerships were also created through the market access to exports from LDCs. Three key instruments of India’s development cooperation are grant-based assistance and skills transfer through ITEC. Lines of credit are administered by the Indian Development and Economic Assistance Scheme (IDEAS) through EXIM Bank. Grant specific interventions have been seen in Nepal and Butan since the 1950s. Capacity building is situated within the ITEC programmes where 54 institutions in India provide over 200 training programmes.
Mr Angelino began his presentation by highlighting the potential of Mexico and South Africa as development cooperation actors as both recipients and donors. Mexico has established itself as a strong development cooperation partner in its region and the agenda includes the perspective of all stakeholders.

In 2007, the national law for development cooperation was put forward and would act as the normative body to give support to the development cooperation agenda. This included four years of dialogues and participatory processes which included both non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and academics. The Mexican model of development cooperation is therefore based on five pillars, namely: normative aspects, judicial provision, administrative coordination, financial administration and information (monitoring and evaluation). The financial pillar has proved problematic since funding for development cooperation is a challenge. The monitoring and evaluation pillar also called for a more complex analysis of the projects. In 2011, the law was promulgated and recognised the actors in development cooperation.

Mexico and Germany have partnered to strengthen the Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID). It is co-hosted by AMEXCID and was initiated by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). A distinctive feature is that AMEXCID develops its own processes and methodologies guided by national and international experts and practices. The project focuses on tools and capacity development, strengthening the Mexican cooperation policy and intra- and inter-institutional coordination. The current challenges faced by AMEXCID are related to strategic planning which includes an alignment to national policies and international development cooperation law. Methodological improvement is also needed and this relates to tools and methodologies that are results based and allow development cooperation flows to be quantified. A third challenge is process streamlining and consolidating data management processes. There is also a need to institutionalize a capacity development programme for AMEXCID staff and members of the Mexican cooperation system. Lastly, the role of Mexico as a relevant actor in the agenda setting processes needs to be confirmed.
Ms Mabera’s presentation focused on South Africa’s emerging profile as a development partner and its repertoire as a peace actor. Peace and stability, on the one hand and development on the other, are mutually impacting concepts. Hence, establishing a nexus between sustainable development and peace and security has far-reaching policy implications for South Africa given its positioning as a key developmental partner in Africa (and the Global South) with a particular focus on mediation, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD). Informed by its own history and foreign policy leitmotifs, most of South Africa’s development interventions have generally fallen under the category of peace diplomacy (including continental involvement in peacemaking, mediation processes, UN-sanctioned peacekeeping and peacebuilding in accordance with the AU PCRD framework).

Furthermore, the overlaps between South Africa’s foreign policy priorities and the peacebuilding agenda, especially its focus on human security, suggest that it could be a significant driving force in taking the post-2015 development agenda forward. This presented an interesting area of analysis on the uptake of triangular development cooperation (TDC) in the African peace and security landscape. Given the contestation around definitions of TDC, one such arrangement gaining traction in peace and security is trilateral cooperation among three multilateral institutions in peace operations in a beneficiary country. This is seen with the African Union–United Nations–European Union (AU–UN–EU) arrangement.

The AU, UN and EU partnerships in peace operations in Africa include transitions from one mission to another, hybrid missions, support missions and co-deployment. The basis of these partnerships is supposedly founded on complementarity, shared values and legitimacy, and comparative advantage. In this context, the assumption is that the AU and regional organisations’ comparative advantage is based on similar experiences to the beneficiary country. Somalia, Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali serve as germane examples of beneficiary countries. The Secretary General of the UN has also appealed for greater political coherence, harmonisation of strategy and for mandates to be developed together in consultation through a coordinated response and vision. The central theme of coordination running through the recommendations is, however, hindered by the interest driven nature of development cooperation. Recommendations made in a report on AU–UN Hybrid Missions by addressing the shortfalls of the TDC model called for a common strategy and a clear division of responsibilities. However, this does not address the inherent problems with TDC which perpetuate specific power dynamics. In fact, it has been argued that TDC still represents the ‘age old paternalistic donor-beneficiary relationship’ and the only new element is that the burden is now shared with an emerging power.

In terms of South Africa’s contribution as an emerging power, the transformative potential of mediation holds great promise for South Africa’s long-term stabilization agenda. South Africa is in the process of establishing a specialised mediation unit within Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) which will complement the mediation support units of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), AU and UN. Bearing in mind that the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) is also a work in progress, it is imperative for government officials to acknowledge the prospects for a symbiotic relationship between the two entities. Mediators lay the foundation for the peace process, ensuring that strategic issues and actors are included in the process and that key issues are prioritised in the negotiations and post-negotiations phases. During the implementation of development assistance, mediators can also facilitate dialogue across the range of actors involved in development initiatives. On their part, development agencies can facilitate communication between the parties involved in mediation by utilising their local channels. Development actors can also reinforce implementation of peace agreements by offering flexible aid instruments that are tailored to the specific post-conflict needs of the society emerging from conflict.
In conclusion, Ms Mabera noted that a more flexible TDC model is needed in peace and security operations in order to work with other actors outside of a formalised arrangement. To surmount problems of coordination given the range of interests, there should be more focus on alignment with the beneficiary country’s needs. The financing of integrated peacebuilding and development programming is open to a plethora of actors and partnerships, but only if there is harmonisation and coordination from the operational and strategic level. In this regard, it is incumbent upon South Africa to formalise a coherent and well-informed peacebuilding and stabilisation strategy with clear guidelines and terms of engagement with potential partners. Fine-tuning of an in-house mediation capacity holds conflict transformation potential ultimately linked to universal goals of peacebuilding and sustainable peace.
The India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Development Fund (hereafter the Fund) was established in 2003 and is symbolic of South–South cooperation on trilateral development. Initiated in 2004, the Fund became operational in 2006. It was specifically designed as a poverty and hunger alleviation facility. Each member state contributes USD1 million annually and the Fund is administered by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Office on South–South Cooperation in New York as part of the partnership with the UN. The Permanent Representatives to the UN in New York from the IBSA countries serve as the Board of Directors of the Fund and the UNDP serves as fund manager and the Secretariat to the Board of Directors.

Source: UNDP: IBSA Development Fund: 2015 Overview of Projects Portfolio
Projects under the Fund are directed to least developed countries (LDCs) and post-conflict reconstruction. The Fund supports projects on a demand driven basis through partnerships with local government, national institutions and implementing partners. Projects include capacity building among project beneficiaries, built-in project sustainability and knowledge sharing among Southern experts and institutions. Initiatives are concrete expressions of solidarity and objectives range from promoting food security, to addressing HIV/AIDS, to extending access to safe drinking water – all with the aim of contributing to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Fund is interpreted as a way to challenge the dominance of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) model of development and promotes a model of trilateral government to government collaboration and partnership, setting the agenda and enhancing development cooperation ownership. It is seen in the context of offering an alternative development that captures the model of South–South cooperation and development diplomacy. By locating it within the UN system, it exemplifies the role that the UN can play in triangular development cooperation (TDC) in terms of work around the world. It facilitates the transfer of proven Southern development solutions through knowledge peer learning.

In terms of South Africa’s management of the Fund, due to restructuring of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), the Fund shifted from Global Governance (previously Multilateral) to the Asia Desk (IBSA unit). The Fund as part of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) would oversee it as part of proposed trilateral development cooperation; however, until such time as SADPA is formalised, the Fund will be managed through the Asia desk. Operational issues are still being settled because the Asia desk only focused on the political dimension of IBSA.

When discussing the future of the Fund, Ms Naidu brought up several issues regarding the future status of the IBSA trilateral arrangement. For example, questions around whether Brazil will sign the IBSA Trust Agreement came up as well as whether the Indian proposal to increase contributions to USD2 million will be accepted considering the value of contributions to the BRICS Development Bank. The delay in hosting the tenth summit also poses a challenge. There are also issues around the role of the UNDP and whether it will continue to administer the Fund amid tension within the UN system regarding the size of the Fund in relation to the larger administrative costs. The size of the Fund has also led to it being considered as bridging finance for larger projects to be rehatted under the UNDP at a later stage.

Going forward, the role of the UNDP as the Fund manager needs to be reconsidered and more attention paid to the proposal by India that the Fund should be managed by the three countries respectively through their development agencies. However, the role of managing the Fund through the Finance Ministry also needs to be considered. Accountability and monitoring of impact, project sustainability and governance all have to be considered. Questions of service providers and return on investment for the member countries also need to be discussed transparently. Importantly, the impact on domestic resources needs to be considered in the context of public diplomacy.

The Fund is a real expression of South–South TDC and approaches to development diplomacy and the global development agenda. It is important as an alternative development model with no conditionalities attached and reflects the linkages between diplomacy and development. There is political will; however, there is waning interest within the working groups which therefore calls for a possible streamlining of the working groups to specific focus areas.
The Role of the Private Sector in Financing for Development for the Post-2015 Development Agenda in the Context of Triangular Development Cooperation in Southern Africa: Transport Corridor Case Studies

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Introduction

At the Financing for Development Conference held in Addis Ababa in 2015, a resolution was made to involve more partners in socio-political and economic transformation. While multi-stakeholder financing arrangements can be more complex, they offer significant potential in times of constrained resources from traditional sources of development financing and can result in more sustainable, inclusive outcomes in the long term. This kind of financing is especially needed for the development of sustainable, resilient and quality infrastructure which is a shortfall in developing countries. There is thus an acknowledged role for new infrastructure facilities such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Global Infrastructure Hub, BRICS New Development Bank, Asia Pacific Project Preparation Facility, Africa50 Infrastructure Fund and Inter American Investment Corporation.

Private Sector Involvement

The private sector has an important role to play in infrastructure and can break down the challenges of access to financing and provide innovative models of financing with different modalities. For example, urban developments with relatively high user tariffs can be attractive in the longer term; however, rural pro poor developments and challenging sectors where upfront costs are prohibitive need more careful intervention and focused policy instruments. The role of the private sector in sustainable development is mainly as a source of financing but it can also be involved in the core operations and act as a driver of sustainable economic growth and develop opportunities in value creation.

In order to attract private sector involvement in infrastructure and include these organisations as credible development partners, incentives must exist to develop these projects and must be available on an equitable and transparent basis. Transparency and a level playing field will also enhance competition. New forms of partnerships include government, civil society, development finance institutions, academia, donors and independent research organisations.

South Africa as an Infrastructure Partner

South Africa has been a major player in socio-economic development in Africa’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development Programme (NEPAD) for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA). The objective of PIDA is to implement the African Union’s (AU) Abuja Treaty and the creation of the continental African Economic Community. South Africa has aligned the National Infrastructure Plan to the development of the regional infrastructure and the strategy here is to target fast-growing African countries and partner with them on regional projects across the transport, water and energy sub-sectors. Furthermore, the Tripartite Free Trade Area means addressing the transport fragmentation in Africa and since a revised concept of corridors has emerged linking its regional integration infrastructure development and cooperation development objectives, it therefore makes sense to consider an approach supporting development.

A case study such as the Maputo Corridor is an example of such regional infrastructure development through the Private Participation in Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) which is purposed to improve performance of cross border transport in South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique. This project has improved infrastructure for ICT, industrial development and intermodal facilities. Challenges remain and are often more visible as this is a mature, established corridor and there are also frustrations at political logjams and logistical difficulties which are compounded due to the volume of traffic on this corridor.
Future engagements with the private sector on the development of transport corridors and other infrastructure initiatives in the region could be done under the guidance of SADPA once it is established and could also involve other partners, such as development finance institutions, multilateral development banks and aid agencies of third countries. There is limited public funding for infrastructure and government needs to learn how to capture capital that developers invest in road infrastructure. Economic centres can be developed as markets along a corridor with little financial investment required from the community. A holistic concentration on corridors will allow for all assets to be involved: port, road, rail and border posts. The lack of attention to rail development in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region has contributed significantly to trucking delays at border posts, high maintenance costs and requirements for roads and high accident statistics on these roads due, in part, to truckers rushing to meet local demands.

In terms of the role of private companies, their corporate social responsibility programmes are important, but government and civil society are also important actors in this planning. Corporate social responsibility programmes should therefore not be seen as isolated interventions but should be sustainably built in.

For regional corridors, an independent secretariat with research capacity is critical. This is better structured as a private-public partnership with additional stakeholders from civil society and experts from relevant sectors. An independent oversight body (regulator) to control and standardise the terms of partnerships and enforce the obligations of each party is important. Concession agreements should also be thought of as a longer term undertaking to keep user tariffs and fees down. Project champions and leaders should constantly and consistently articulate a clear vision with clearly stated goals, objectives and time lines for corridor development phases. This will benefit and educate external project stakeholders and users, as well as internal management and staff.
Dr Nganje’s presentation provided an overview of local government contribution to South Africa’s development cooperation in Africa and proceeded to make a case for incorporating decentralised cooperation into the design of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA).

Decentralised cooperation has evolved from sister-city relationships and neoliberal ideas of small central government to decentralised cooperation as an aid delivery vehicle in the context of North–South cooperation with a focus on finance and technical assistance from the North to the South (to a limited extent). It then became a collaborative partnership for sharing knowledge, experiences, best practices and human institutional capacity building thereby adapting to a new discourse on development cooperation. This led to decentralised South–South cooperation, trilateral cooperation and multilevel cooperation.

There are different examples of South Africa’s local government and decentralised cooperation in Africa, such as eThekwini’s partnership and mentorship of Maputo (Mozambique) on managing informal markets, Johannesburg’s partnership with Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) on a range of issues – HIV/AIDS, city planning – and Johannesburg’s mentorship of Lilongwe (Malawi) on developing a city development strategy. In terms of trilateral cooperation, there is one such project involving eThekwini (SA), Greenwich (UK) and Tema (Ghana) on using sports for economic development. There has also been another project involving the Bojanala District municipality (SA), Lahiti (Finland) and Ho municipality (Ghana) on environmental and waste management. Lastly, there is an arrangement involving the South African Local Government Association (SALGA), and local government associations from Sweden, Namibia and Botswana on transparent local governance and economic development.

South Africa’s local governments receive more development assistance than they contribute. Inadequate financial resources, disparities in levels of development, lack of capacity to design and manage technical exchanges and hostile diplomatic relations have been major constraints on South Africa’s local government decentralised cooperation in Africa. Financial and technical support for decentralised cooperation has often come from Western donors, multilateral development agencies and local government networks. Trilateral initiatives have generally been spearheaded by the local governments in the North with the support of their national governments and in line with the latter’s foreign policy objectives. Pretoria has played a minimal role in the decentralised cooperation of local governments.

Furthermore, there has generally been little synergy between South Africa’s development cooperation in Africa and the decentralised cooperation of local governments. Both local and national governments stand to benefit from greater synergy between South Africa’s development cooperation and decentralised cooperation. Local governments would benefit from the financial resources, institutional support and diplomatic networks of the national government. Greater synergy between the two would contribute to extending the reach of and deepening South Africa’s development cooperation on the continent while also aligning development cooperation with the priorities of South Africa’s foreign policy. Decentralised cooperation contributes to improved local government performance through the process of self-reflection.

There are different examples of how decentralised development cooperation can be incorporated in the SADPA model. This is seen with the Finnish North–South Local Government Cooperation Programme. The Finnish foreign ministry provides the funding and policy framework and the programme is administered by the Finnish local government association. Finnish local governments identify foreign partners (often their twinning partners) and submit the project proposal. The United Kingdom (UK) model – Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF) – is funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) and is administered by the CLGF, which also identifies areas of priorities and invites proposals from local governments in Commonwealth countries needing technical assistance. The CLGF then matches the requests with the appropriate UK local government. The
Brazilian model – Program for Decentralized South–South Technical Cooperation – is funded and administered jointly by the presidency (Office for Federative Affairs) and Brazil Cooperation Agency (ABC). There is an open competitive call for applications to which local governments in Brazil respond with project proposals mostly based on existing partnerships. The France–Brazil Decentralized Trilateral Cooperation Programme for Haiti and Africa is another example and is funded and administered jointly by the ABC and the French Development Agency (AFD) through a process of open calls for applications. Local governments in Brazil and France then respond with project proposals mostly based on existing partnerships. The last example is that of the Chinese model where provincial and local governments serve as executing agents of Chinese aid projects. They are tied to individual Chinese cooperation partnerships with African countries. Beijing defines aid policy and provides funding, while provinces and municipalities provide technical capacity to implement the projects.
About the Institute for Global Dialogue

The Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) is an independent South African-based foreign policy think tank dedicated to the analysis of, and dialogue on the evolving international political and economic environment and the role of Africa and South Africa. It advances a balanced, relevant and policy-oriented analysis, debate and documentation of South Africa’s role in international relations and diplomacy.

Origins and background

The Foundation for Global Dialogue was established in 1995 as a culmination of several years of efforts led by the former South African president, Nelson Mandela, in his capacity as the principal of the African National Congress. He and his team of leaders saw a need for a research organisation that would facilitate the new South Africa’s engagement with the changing global order after 1994. This was a period in which three vectors of change coincided: the tectonic shifts in global power politics following the collapse of the Soviet Union; the wave of democratization that hit Africa and south America; and the near-miraculous transition from apartheid to democracy in South Africa. The initial funding came from the German government and went towards establishing the Foundation’s competitive edge, a combination of policy-oriented research, catalytic dialogue, tailor-made publications and grant-making for NGOs interested in international relations.

After a strategic review in the late 1990s, the Foundation became an Institute, thus shedding the grant-making responsibility in order to strengthen its analytical and dialogue focus. The research agenda crystallised around three broad programmatic focuses:
- South Africa’s foreign policy analysis: This spans the making and management of foreign policy, multi-stakeholder interface, public diplomacy, development diplomacy (development cooperation, economic and commercial diplomacy and paradiplomacy);
- African Studies: Regional and continental integration, peace diplomacy, inter- and intra-African trade, and Africa’s external relations; and
- Multilateral Governance Analysis: Various international developments that relate to changes in multilateralism with the growing influence of non-state actors. This includes multilateral trade, international finance diplomacy, conflict in the Middle East and global governance.

Vision

We work towards a prosperous and peaceful Africa in a progressive global order.

Motto

Towards a better Africa. Towards a better world.

Mission

Our mission is to become a foreign policy think tank of choice through cutting edge policy research and analysis, catalytic dialogue and stakeholder interface on global dynamics that have impact on South Africa and Africa.

Values

We commit to work in a manner that promotes:
- Integrity
- Credibility
- Value addition
- Team work
- Excellence
- Creativity
- Impact

Strategic objectives

In the long-term, the work of the IGD will be guided by the following objectives:
- To strengthen the IGD’s institutional positioning as a sought-after broker between the world of knowledge and the world of policy;
- To promote a broader understanding of the role of foreign policy and diplomacy in the pursuit of national and international developmental goals;
- To ensure that our analysis and dialogue have discernable policy outcomes and impact;
- To establish and strengthen mutually-beneficial strategic partnerships (with individuals and institutions) nationally, in the African region and globally;
- To enhance the standard of our service to clients and consumers of our work in order to ensure their satisfaction.

Association with UNISA

As part of its continuous repositioning as a world-class facilitator of ideas-making on foreign policy and international diplomacy, the IGD entered into an agreement with the University of South Africa in 2010. On this basis, the IGD has strategic partnership with UNISA to pursue joint research, dialogue and publications as well as giving the IGD access to some facilities and services.