South Africa in the World 2020
Re-shifting trajectories 2.0

Closed Workshop report 28 July 2020

This event was hosted by the Institute for Global Dialogue and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, South Africa
The IGD is an independent foreign policy think tank dedicated to the analysis of and dialogue on the evolving international political and economic environment, and the role of Africa and South Africa. It advances a balanced, relevant and policy-oriented analysis, debate and documentation of South Africa’s role in international relations and diplomacy.

The IGD strives for a prosperous and peaceful Africa in a progressive global order through cutting-edge policy research and analysis, and catalytic dialogue and stakeholder interface on global dynamics that have an impact on South Africa and Africa.

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### Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AfCFTA</td>
<td>African Continental Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>MERS</td>
<td>Middle East Respiratory Syndrome</td>
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<td>Nedlac</td>
<td>National Economic Development and Labour Council</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>PPE</td>
<td>Personal Protective Equipment</td>
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<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
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<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<td>SARS</td>
<td>Severe acute respiratory syndrome</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>VUCA</td>
<td>Volatile, Unpredictable, Complexity, Ambiguous</td>
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Introducing the Institute for Global Dialogue’s podcast for the scholar, practitioner and everyday African with a view to ‘bring foreign policy to the people’, featuring a series of strategic dialogues with a broad range of expert guests and discussants.

Available on all major podcast platforms.
Executive summary
This report is a summary of a closed policy workshop held by the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) in partnership with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) South Africa. The proceedings contribute to the IGD’s flagship project on exploring South Africa’s position in the world. This is a horizon scanning exercise, taking stock of the diplomatic agenda in the context of what is happening in the world and how it affects South Africa.

South Africa has the required policies on integrated governance and departmental clusters, which are key to sharing resources and expertise in managing the environment. The workshop discussion reflected the need to engage in strategic approaches to managing these types of mechanism and consultation to attain effective implementation.

South Africa faces the following challenges and risks:
- Tensions between pragmatism and ideology are evident in the party–state environment.
- There is a perception that political appointees may not be able to pursue pragmatic foreign policy goals effectively.
- There is a risk of losing skilled and interested people because there is insufficient recognition, or channels of engagement are not properly defined.
- While South Africa is concerned with party–state dynamics, the rest of the continent will move in a direction where South Africa cannot be part of a proactive conversation.

There are opportunities for addressing these challenges by
- continuously and consistently training and upskilling foreign service staff
- including a comprehensive oversight role for parliament and civil society
- creating more open and transparent engagements through the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
- looking to agendas (like health and city diplomacy) that are not traditionally part of the foreign policy discussion, but which do form part of the content
- optimising pragmatism through established channels that promote private sector and business engagement, and
- driving a proactive discussion on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).
Introduction and objectives

Although South Africa is hastening to pursue an ambitious foreign policy agenda, the focus on South Africa’s engagement in Africa is based on the assumption that the coronavirus pandemic has shifted all short- to medium-term contexts away from business-as-usual global engagements and zoned in on a more focused regional or continental emphasis. South Africa’s foreign policy is fraught with contradictions between the different spaces, and at this juncture, getting foreign policy “right” is crucial. The purpose of this exercise is to clarify what strategic choices and policy review would mean for South African foreign policy in regional and global contexts, taking into account current domestic constraints and potential trajectories.

The IGD’s flagship project on exploring South Africa’s position in the world is a horizon scanning exercise, taking stock of the diplomatic agenda in the context of what is happening in the world and how it affects South Africa. This discussion forms part of a discussion surrounding foreign policy machinery engagement in strategic foresight.

The workshop was split into three panels:

2. Institutional governance of foreign policy: What is the status and effectiveness?
3. Going forward and promoting a culture of preparedness

Various scenario planners discussed a number of possibilities within the range of high, medium and low road scenarios; in this context it is necessary to build resilience when faced with additional pressures. The question is, how will this affect South Africa’s ability to ensure it reaches its objectives through foreign policy? The IGD has done a mini literature review of the high, medium and low road scenario options that face South Africa and panellists were asked to pivot the discussion within these potential contexts. The discussion showed that even in the case of the most optimistic scenarios a number of fundamental changes need to take place.

However, this kind of thinking also needs to be assessed against the advent of other black swan events, as seen with other global health crises throughout time; the SARS and MERS outbreaks have been litmus tests for what to expect on a smaller scale. These were exacerbated by some of the imagined tensions in the global system, especially those that emerged following the global financial crisis between the United States of America (USA) and China. Relations between China and the USA began to decline after during Obama's time, and when Trump came in, a surge of nationalism occurred and these tensions became a lot sharper, with implications for the way global governance institutions function, as well as how the African countries will navigate them.

1 In looking at a potential snapshot of South African high, medium and low road scenario trajectories, a number of organisations and authors engage substantially in this study: Frans Cronje, CEO of the South African Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR); Jakkie Cilliers, founder and former Executive Director of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS); Indlulamithi South African scenarios, Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA).
Workshop summary

Panel 1 – South African foreign policy in a VUCA world: re-imagining foreign policy in the post-pandemic ‘new normal’

Observers of South African foreign policy note more reactive decision-making in comparison to reflective, pragmatic thinking. In both looking back and looking forward at South Africa’s foreign policy priorities and objectives, the country’s promotion of multilateralism and embracing of soft power has positioned it as a middle power. In evaluating the coherence and strategic calculus of foreign policy, a pertinent question arises as to whether the future will look towards a South Africa first approach and pursue its yet-to-be defined national interests, or towards a retention of the status quo. South Africa’s engagement with Africa has been based on peace, stability and development as a driver of its relationship with the region. While the rationale for most foreign policy decisions has coalesced around, inter alia, the African agenda and the bridge-builder role, a number of inconsistencies and contradictions press for a deeper analysis of what a pragmatic, strategy-oriented and introspective foreign policy would look like and how this can be effected.

Panel 2 – Institutional governance of foreign policy: What is the status and effectiveness?

The newly passed Foreign Policy Act (2019) coupled with the National Development Plan (NDP) (2011) should provide more precise guidance from government on creating more effective linkages in foreign policy governance across an inter-departmental landscape. This is further linked to how South Africa engages its bureaucratic machinery (inter-departmental and parliamentary relations) and its second-generation APRM review, as well as looks forward to the role of cities as implementors of foreign policy through city diplomacy and the anticipated AfCFTA.

Panel 3 – Going forward and promoting a culture of preparedness

In going beyond a business-as-usual approach, the politics of sustainability, shared prosperity and building resilience are crucial to South Africa’s diplomatic practice. This is, however, a tricky balancing act where the trilemma of neoliberalism, capitalism and nationalism exists in an interconnected risk environment. Will the South African economic policy reset towards the convergence of an uneasy compromise of financial socialism, state capitalism and venture communism? In terms of the key drivers highlighted in panels 1 and 2, what would pragmatism look like in terms of preparedness and mainstreaming strategic foresight? Where does the Foreign Service Act fit in and how can it be effectively operationalised? Going forward, in inculcating a culture of preparedness, to what extent can this be done, but also how should this be navigated and strategic foresight and planning promoted in order to avoid knee-jerk reactions and getting stuck in a sort of ideological logjam with regard to South African policy. Hence, it is perhaps necessary to address the forward-looking dimensions of the strategic foresight angle and the idea of preparedness.

Discussion highlights

The interplay between competing factors

The domestic institutional setting is an important basis for articulating foreign policy and complementing economic strategies (in the context of South Africa’s economic diplomacy strategy). In view of government’s weaknesses related to gridlock in policy decision-making, or in decision-making
around key policy areas, especially economic policy, it is important to get institutional coordination right. Expectations are that the Foreign Service Act (2019) will solve a number of interdepartmental challenges and will get actors to talk in one language, starting from the messages being transmitted from a number of sources. These interact with one important feature, the installation of the state bureaucratic machinery in terms of party political or sectoral interests. In terms of the response to the pandemic, Ramaphosa initially had widespread public support for the measures being implemented; however, as the economy shut down and the socioeconomic impact on the majority of the public placed immense pressure on the welfare systems in place, and with the surfacing of corruption allegations in the procurement of personal protective equipment (PPE), public support waned.

South Africa is in a process of transition, from a political and social order that was to a large extent influenced by the Zuma regime and an economic system which was also affected by global economic developments, to that of the Ramaphosa regime that is in urgent search of an economic solution that works but is vested in an environmentally conscious decision that incorporates social justice and securitisises health. There has been more reception for decarbonising the economy. This is indicative of the increasing awareness that in order to emerge from this crisis, we will have to tackle the big challenges, the systemic challenges, that have arisen.

How is Africa going to deal with competing interests versus its need to achieve AfCFTA? Intra African trade stands at 16% importance for building value chains; structural transformation; training on economic diplomacy in a Covid world where geopolitical and geo-economic tensions between China, the USA, and Europe impact the rest of the world. In optimising the AfCFTA, it is important for diplomats to understand the dynamics of South African businesses and how their respective interests can be linked directly to national interests over and above those of economic diplomacy. In understanding particular critiques linked to South Africa’s hegemonic position. This is not a discussion of South African exceptionalism but rather how it rationalises geo-economic pragmatism in relation to the AfCFTA, as well as how economic diplomacy training can be maximised by showing the complex policy matrix that needs to be navigated in terms of creating and interlinking value chains in trade, manufacturing and innovation, such as connecting trade with industrial production and building the capacity of countries in the productive sector. Companies in South Africa are building and strengthening their regional economic strategy as a way of increasing their own sustainability, which is reflected in building a regional strategy. South Africa and other bigger countries must take a leadership role in ensuring that the impact of this agreement will be beneficial to all the countries on the continent and not just big countries like South Africa. This means, first, that South Africa will need to ensure that if the agreement itself is asymmetrical, it is tilted in favour of the smaller countries. Second, that South Africa needs to address issues of industrialisation and will help to build capacity in other countries. It is not just about exporting South African goods, but building local industrial capacity. Third, it is important to build cross-border infrastructure, because that is essential for production to take place in other countries. And fourth, support should be given to the building of better governance in other countries, because without that, this trade agreement will not succeed.

What is the interplay between the behaviour and influence of the different actors and types of sources of foreign policy on South Africa’s strategic orientation, vision and engagement in global affairs? What are the highs and lows?
The evolution of South African diplomatic practice

The discussion highlighted a number of points on the role of personnel and the rapid change in diplomacy not only as a result of Covid-19 but also as a result of overall trends in digital diplomacy and the need to adapt to growing technical demands.

As an allegorical comparison to the health crisis, South Africa’s foreign service bureaucratic environment needs to pay considerable attention to its health and shed weight:

First, move away from ideology in favour of pragmatic strategies for South African diplomacy. The first honeymoon years of South African diplomacy created various expectations that were further postured through ideological goals of solidarity informed by the ANC’s liberation agenda during the apartheid years. This is tricky terrain to navigate in the emergence of new actors in Africa, especially when appears that there is a delinking of South African national interests and the pursuit of an ideological foreign policy. Second, dedicated infrastructure and resources should be used more wisely and not expanded further to develop areas of specialisation or a niche diplomacy. A major critique is that South African diplomacy is overstretched and ill focused. It is important to reduce embassies to more strategic points, and rationalise the use of the 45 embassies in Africa, as the continent is the most pivotal point for South Africa’s agenda. By comparison, other middle powers are able to use their foreign service resources with more expediency. For example, the newly promulgated Foreign Service Act (2019) could also make use of complementary actors like the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). This also links to coordinating the training potential of all involved in the foreign service in a more dynamic environment.

And third, provide a healing environment for foreign service personnel. Foreign service personnel need training that bolsters the emotional quotient of civil servants, addresses the basics of diplomacy and builds resilience through technical training by shadowing multinational companies that represent South Africa all over Africa, to understand what the issues are that those companies are dealing with and what diplomats can do to make it easier for South African business to thrive.

Opportunities through a multilateral dimension

Multilateralism will be redefined by the Covid-19 pandemic. Greater care has been taken in how relations are observed internationally, and this period has defined how South Africa’s multilateral engagement may evolve when faced with geo-political, geo-economic and geo-technological shifts (foreseen and unforeseen). South Africa has gained momentum in the multilateral track and has remained true to its foreign policy priorities.

South Africa is adapting to the additional bureaucratic pressures placed on the foreign service by the Covid-19 pandemic; however, it is clear that it will continue to have an impact on the world for another two to three years, and possibly for much longer. As seen globally, the pandemic is feeding any underlying institutional crisis which impacts on the domestic foundations of foreign policy. Another contributing factor relates to the necessary coherence between different aspects of policy in order to have success in multilateral engagements. The crisis has highlighted that the South African government operates in silos which makes for poor governance. Although the last 10 to 15 years have had their fair share of battles, South Africa is positioned optimally to pursue a successful multilateral policy, especially when using resources in a strategic manner. For example, over the last three non-permanent United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) terms (2007–2008, 2011–2012, 2019–2020) it is possible to track how the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) has absorbed inputs and critiques from the first two non-permanent terms and applied them to the third term. In the course of the last term, South Africa has also cooperated with Indonesia, in Kuwait and around Israel–Palestine issues; Germany on women, peace and security; and Russia and China around issues related to Syria and Yemen. South Africa has managed to keep a neutral stance in its engagements in terms of its role as a bridge builder, showing how it can craft its niche role. In addition, the current crisis has shown the need for agility complemented by policy coherence amongst all departments: Health, Home Affairs, International Relations and Cooperation, Trade, Industry and Competition, to name a few. The crisis has forced much policy response to look inward or continent wide, which also has a multilateral dimension. As South Africa assumed leadership of the African Union (AU) in January 2020, under normal circumstances, Ramaphosa would have had to balance his domestic responsibilities with those expected of the head of state. This would have garnered much domestic criticism, similar to what Mbeki experienced. However, due to the health crisis, he has been able to manage his responsibilities to the AU chair remotely and draw more widely from continental expertise.

Barsriers to achieving a participatory foreign policy
Prior to the advent of the pandemic, the world was becoming markedly less open. This was seen in tensions arising between China and the USA, Brexit, and the rise in nationalist discourse across Europe. Globally, Freedom House indicators are showing that democracy is under strain in terms of transparency and access; in this context, the world and multilateralism are facing additional challenges because the world is less open and less free. South Africa has managed to maintain consistency in foreign policy in multilateralism. Foreign policy is driven by vibrant agenda issues and a lively discussion is encouraged by parties that lobby for different perspectives and issues. And while discussions are driven to downsize diplomatic representation abroad, another solution may be to fully engage official and unofficial actors in more dynamic dialogues that encompass oversight but contribute to robustness.

The official stream includes government departments (driven by DIRCO), parliament, and the National Executive authority that monitors and evaluates foreign policy from various source documents and engagements. The unofficial stream is that of academia, civil society and business, which form part of direct and indirect oversight and engage with topics that may be overlooked by official sources. In the current pandemic context, communication and the ability to engage in discussion are not limited by lockdown measures and it is possible to provide alternative solutions. However, there is a disparity in which voices are able to reach the conversation in general, thus impacting on this notion of a participatory foreign policy and implementing a streamlined or consistent mode of engagement. There is a perception is that foreign policy is still an elite issue; however, this has been debunked, especially noting responses to Covid-19. The domestic constituency for global health has a stake in foreign policy, with many constituencies driving initiatives from the ground up and even contributing to an overall regional response in navigating the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic by negotiating PPP and medicine in various cases.

From evaluations of actors, there is scope for a more effective use of parliament. The role for Members of Parliament could be developed into further common parliamentary forums: the Pan-African Parliament in support of the AfCFTA, and the
international and inter-parliamentary union. Parliamentary outreach to civil society has the scope to take place more often in order to gather information more frequently. In considering the presence of civil society, it is important to build in various mechanisms that pre-empt the participation needs of different civil society groups, which are not homogenous. It is important for DIRCO to move away from being perceived as a gatekeeper of foreign policy rather than as a conduit. But again, it is unclear to what extent this is bureaucratised or politicised from the outside looking in. As South Africa grasps multilateralism internationally, it is important to apply multilateralism domestically and engage in a participatory foreign policy domestically, which may offer stronger domestic support.

The role of the second generation APRM review
The APRM serves as a litmus test for South Africa’s anticipated performance and projection of domestic scenarios. When the report was released in 2007, the ills or “old friends” from 10 to 15 years ago (employment capacity constraints and poor service delivery, poverty, inequality, land reform, violence against women, violence against children, the HIV and AIDS pandemic, corruption, crime, racism and xenophobia, and managing diversity) are still evident challenges in the present day. The second generation review can learn a number of lessons from South Africa’s first review and the subsequent reviews other African countries have undertaken; it is important to take a bottom-up approach in the process. Other African countries have had a non-governmental entity chairing the APRM National Governing Council process, whereas South Africa’s review has been administered by the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), with the minister as the focal point, a political appointee of the ANC, as well as the head of the National Secretariat. These three roles have been separated in most other countries.

Another challenge to the second generation review is the advent of the Covid-19 pandemic, which seems to have derailed the process. Optimally, the review should take in a candid and transparent open process driven from the bottom up, and is an honest evaluation of our real governance challenges and our achievements. However, due to the digital divide, it would be increasingly difficult to make this process more inclusive. Another risk is that the process will be highly controlled, closed, government-driven and top heavy, which does not reflect what the process is in its entirety. However, it is more likely that South Africa may muddle through the middle, and that the process will be somewhat open, although there may be strong government pressure not to present a wholly unflattering picture.

Opportunities lost in navigating continental spaces
Africa is a fundamental pivot point for South Africa’s foreign policy agenda, in that the interpretation of physical spaces and South Africa’s implementation of the AfCFTA are crucial. Ideologically, the ANC is still deeply wedded to the idea of rural development as the critical priority facing the country, which is a similar ideological frame that the rest of Africa is approached. However, the urban development agenda is linked to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the United Nations (UN) Habitat Agenda and the New Urban Agenda, which was formulated by local government representatives. In 2017, South Africa took over the presidency of the United Cities and Local Government Organization, which was a unique opportunity to link the AfCFTA practically to coordinate investment in the areas of energy, sanitation and transport, as cities are directly tied to generators of global growth. There is an opportunity to craft a results-driven pan-
African strategy that is embedded in Agenda 2063.

The youthful demographic profile and energy of the continent needs to be harnessed; at present a high number of youth are born in urban spaces but cannot access the formal economy for opportunities. The lever for effective incorporation of the youth is thus linked to how physical spaces are understood through infrastructure that is low carbon and labour intensive.

South Africa’s value chains in infrastructure construction and management could thus address four key priorities: securing meaningful employment, the climate change emergency, dealing with inequality, and cracking the cultural crisis of meaning; as well as the overall drive for city diplomacy among African cities. Local and provincial governments need to use their roles more effectively in driving cooperation; however, 1) local and provincial governments do not have direct access to these international organisations, and 2) the most significant barrier is that the domestic political environment takes precedence. While this role is a less prestigious than other positions South Africa has held, its potential to drive solutions from the ground up has not been linked or harnessed.

It is anticipated that South Africa will continue to muddle through and make decisions on an ad hoc basis and in a reactive manner, which will mean that South Africa will be outflanked by other governments that are a lot more strategic in terms of understanding the diplomatic potential of the Urban Agenda.

However, as a realistic solution to furthering a pragmatic agenda that addresses problems such as Covid-19 that are already chartered has not changed the fundamentals. As to the role of business, there needs to be greater alignment and the integration of the private sector in the economic agenda. While that is something that has not been particularly successful in the past, it is important to focus on the positive signs of mobilisation during a crisis. It is important to mentor strategic networks that are inclusive and interrelated with civil society and business, and are equipped to participate in foreign policy.

The predominant challenge has been how do you involve the business community or the private sector in some of these discussions in a cohesive and consistent manner? Regardless, the best solution thus far has been through organised structures, which need to continue in order to be grown and developed. Although South Africa’s private sector is fairly divided, there is a possibility of rallying organisations in response to the pandemic; specific reference is drawn to health and economic issues. During this time, there has been an effort to mitigate the unintended consequences of Covid-19. In general, the business community needs to have a stronger partnership with complementing government departments. The realities are that the private sector is preoccupied with survival, and this is a vital space for government to intervene with support mechanisms or policy adjustments. In this context, there is potential for InvestSA, the National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac) and Brand South Africa to work within the multitrack diplomacy system, complementing the business track as consultative bodies. These institutions serve to achieve particular objectives; however, these bodies are not used to their full potential and these institutions need

Optimising pragmatism through the private sector and business
The link between pragmatism and economic diplomacy has been drawn frequently.

2 Brand South Africa is set up to develop and implement a proactive marketing and communication strategy for South Africa, and to promote South Africa. Nedlac is constituted to
rthinking in order to rationalise the utility and effective linking to provincial and municipal levels. There has been a marked improvement in online communication as a result of the pandemic, because resources are not diverted to transporting people for physical meetings. However, other gaps remain, such as how do institutions engage and complement each other, and how do they link to government departments in order to cooperate and further engage diplomats in implementing foreign policy?

**Improving the party–state environment**

When South Africa democratised in 1994, there was euphoria around South Africa’s role in the world which was based on the role and global footprint of the African National Congress (ANC) as a liberation movement during the struggle against apartheid. The ANC had a relatively strong international relations infrastructure through the various offices set up around the world, which operated as an effective and autonomous department of international relations for a potential government in waiting, even outnumbering the diplomatic presence of the apartheid government. After 1960, the objectives of the ANC as directed by OR Tambo was to set up the ANC in exile and form solidarity partnerships around the world. When looking back at the ANC’s international relations in history there are various lessons for the ANC and the government of today: The representatives placed abroad received diplomatic training in both socialist and non-socialist countries; chief representatives went through a thorough, systematic deployment process; and in countries where the ANC was not able to gain support from the governments of those countries, there was a relatively sophisticated strategy for engaging directly through a multitrack diplomacy approach with the citizens, businesses, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in those countries. However, in the last 25 to 26 years, the capacity to implement strategic thinking has not featured strongly, which has contributed to demoralisation in the civil service overall. And much feedback from the ANC indicates a desire to see a return to a golden period in South African foreign policy in terms of South Africa exerting influence abroad, as well as creating an effective synergy with the state and the parliamentary committee on international relations. In the early years after democratisation, the majority of ANC cadres left Shell House to staff government and parliamentary functions, the unintended consequence of which was that the ANC was weakened as an organisation because trained members could not focus on the work of the party and policy.

One of the recommendations has been to link South Africa’s foreign policy to a galvanising concept, similar to that of the African Renaissance, that shapes how government departments engage with each other. It is important to move away with siloed work cultures where departments at the three levels are not talking between levels and other departments. What can drive a more collaborative government is a strong sense of mission, and direction on where we are or what we are trying to achieve with our foreign policy. If the domestic side is weak, it is very difficult for ambassadors to actually put South Africa on the map. Solidarity and ideology have a role but it is vital to combine solidarity with strategic action in order to be an influential actor and certain policies should be adopted both at a state and a non-state level.

operate under its own Act (1994), and further set up to promote economic goals through an inclusive participatory environment, consensus building and encourage coordination in policy. Invest SA aims to facilitate the increase in the quality and quantity of foreign and domestic direct investment by providing an investment recruitment, problem-solving and information service to retain and expand investment in South Africa and into Africa.
A point of emphasis should be the right skills and purposeful strategy of deployment. While the issue of political appointments and vetting will have a demoralising impact on career diplomats, it is important to factor in countries that expect a political appointment because of close party-to-party ties between the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP).

In an environment where resources are diminishing, and the number of missions are increasingly being criticised, it is vital to understand what South Africa wants to achieve in its international relations and how best to align the respective resources with the strategic objectives of the country. This includes the way in which key roadmaps, organisations and funds are managed like the Industrial Development Corporation, the African Renaissance Fund and the choice of projects on the continent. Some representatives on the continent have voiced some level of disappointment around the types of expectations that were created in terms of South Africa's role within the continent. And there is a gap between those expectations and what has been achieved.

Covid-19 provides an opportunity to rethink how foreign policy has been exercised over the last 25 years. South Africa has expanded its diplomatic footprint much faster than anticipated; now it is important to think strategically about the type of presence.

**Key takeaways and ways forward**

Domestic scenarios in foreign policy activities play a role in shaping discussions on resilience building. At this point in time, pessimistic outlooks dominate discussions of South Africa's general health and future; and while a combination of scenario outcomes seem to crop up at different times, it is increasingly important to take as much advantage of the high road or “good times” outcomes and build resilience to low road outcomes.

Ideology versus pragmatism is the predominant challenge facing South African foreign policy; moving forward, it is important to define national interests in official terms in order to address an overall crisis in implementation.
Appendix 1 – Draft programme

Date: 28 July 2020
Time: 8:45–12:45
Platform: TBC

8:45–9:00  virtual check-in
9:00–9:15  Welcome
9:15–9:30  Zoonotica: brief overview by Francis Kornegay
9:30–10:30 Panel 1 – South Africa foreign policy in a VUCA world: re-imagining foreign policy in the post-pandemic ‘new normal’

Speakers:
Yolanda Spies
Sithembile Mbete
Mzukisi Qobo

10:30–11:30 Panel 2 – Institutional governance of foreign policy? What is the status and effectiveness?

Speakers:
Steven Gruzd
Faizel Ismail
Lesley Masters
Edgar Pieterse

11:30–12:30 Panel 3 - Going forward and encouraging a culture of preparedness

Speakers:
Catherine Grant
Philani Mthembu

12:30–12:45 Key takeaways, ways forward and close