TOWARD A SOUTH AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN INTEGRATED OCEANS GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK

South Africa’s Leadership Dilemmas in Promoting a Global South Dialogue on Governance in the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans

Proceedings Report

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

- **AIMS** African Union Integrated Maritime Strategy
- **ASEAN** Association of Southeast Asian Nations
- **AU** African Union
- **ATLASUR** A joint naval exercise that involves South Africa, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.
- **BASIC** Brazil, South Africa, India, China
- **BRICS** Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
- **CCAMLR** Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
- **CCAS** Convention for Conservation of Antarctic Seals
- **CLCS** Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
- **CGRAMRA** Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Marine Resource Activities
- **CSCAP** Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
- **DIRCO** Department of International Relations and Cooperation
- **DoD** Department of Defence
- **DTI** Department of Trade and Industry
- **ECCAS** Economic Community of Central African States
- **ECOWAS** Economic Community of West African State
- **EEZ** Exclusive Economic Zones
- **EU** European Union
- **FES** Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
- **G77 + China** Group of Seventy Seven and China
- **GDP** Gross Domestic Product
- **GGC** Gulf of Guinea Commission
- **IBSA** India, Brazil, South Africa
- **IBSAMAR** India, Brazil, South Africa Maritime
- **IGD** Institute for Global Dialogue
- **IORA** Indian Ocean Rim Association
- **IONS** Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
- **IOMSR** Indian Ocean Maritime Security Regime
- **IPAP** Industrial Policy Action Plan
- **NAM** Non-Aligned Movement
- **NDP** National Development Programme
- **NIPF** National Industrial Policy Framework
- **OSF** Open Society Foundation
- **PEP** Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection
- **RSA** The Republic of South Africa
- **SADC** Southern African Development Community
- **SAPI** South African Foreign Policy Initiative
- **SANDF** South African National Defence Force
- **SIDS** Small Islands Developing States
- **UN** United Nations
- **UNCLOS** The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
- **UNISA** University of South Africa
- **US** United States of America
- **ZPCSZA** Zone of Peace and Cooperation for the South Atlantic
I. INTRODUCTION

Maritime security and oceans governance are rapidly becoming important international challenges. The importance and relative urgency to address these challenges gave reason for this symposium to be held, which was co-hosted by the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), funded by the Open Society Foundation (OSF) of South Africa initiated under its former South African Foreign Policy Initiative (SAFPI), and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) South Africa Office. The symposium was held in Pretoria, between the 18th and 19th November, 2014.

According to the concept note drafted for the symposium, “within the context of conceptualizing a South African global South geo-strategy,” the symposium aimed “to build on discourses regarding South Africa’s evolving approach to national security and development focusing on the strategic significance of its maritime domain and that of the African continent.” Furthermore, utilizing South Africa’s positioning as a “geographically pivotal state” placed it as an important contributor to global oceans’ governance, “maritime security and functional cooperation along with the promise of a ‘blue economy’.”

Therefore, the points of reference for the symposium were as follows;

- Understanding the strategic dimensions pertaining to comparative South African, Indian, Brazilian and Australian perspectives on the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic
- Analysing naval and maritime security perspectives on challenges in securing the African sphere of the global oceans commons
- Analysing comparative African regional perspectives on these challenges
- Understanding the oceans’ economy as it pertains to South and Southern Africa in terms of maritime domain issues, sustainable development and trade and investment
- Outlining future prospects for Global South cooperation, by elaborating on a framework for a sustained oceans and maritime security dialogue with the India-Brazil-South Africa trilateral linkage as a possible point of departure for arriving at such a cooperation framework.

From these points of reference, the symposium ultimately sought to produce policy recommendations. These proposed recommendations sought to “promote partnerships in trade, investment and multi-sectoral capacity-building in naval and maritime security sectors, including commercial shipping which would be informed by environmental imperatives for sustaining healthy oceans.” The outcome of this process would be the formulation of a ‘framework for multi-dimensional dialogue and cooperation’ that

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would outline the future use of the southern oceans, as well as understanding how “securing these commons would further the development of South and Southern Africa and the continent as a whole.”

Context

To put this dialogue into perspective and within a South African context, Ambassador Anil Sooklal from DIRCO provided the welcoming address and expounded on the following points;

- From analysing and adopting aspects of the Malaysian maritime development model, Operation Phakisa was conceptualized.
- There are 250000 jobs directly linked to various maritime regimes locally, but with Operation Phakisa, this number could be up-scaled to a million jobs.
- An integrated approach on how to deal with the ocean is vital. Academic sector, business sector, and civil service must coordinate.
- 2015 plans for a conference to bring together these three entities to focus on the ocean economy.

Elaborating on these points, Robert Higgs, the South African navy’s Rear Admiral and Chief of Staff (speaking on behalf of Vice Admiral {Ret} J. Mudimu), emphasized that in the age of globalization, key-changes in the routes of trade placed specific responsibilities on coastal cities, and reinforced expectations of coastal states to provide safe passage for commercial goods. For example, the Benguela arrangement between South Africa, Namibia and Angola amounted to mutually beneficial trade and commercial cooperation in the Southern African maritime environment. Thus the sea was, in essence, a ‘highway’ that had to be managed through effective partnerships with stakeholders.

Rear Admiral Higgs went on to accuse African governments of ‘sea blindness’, in the sense that not enough effort had been made to utilise maritime regimes efficiently. Thus the Navy had an important function to fulfil in this sense. The growing urgency to address maritime security served as a principal motivation. He reminded the audience that on the 15th of October 2014, Jacob Zuma announced the intended outputs from Operation Phakisa, which sought to build South Africa’s Marine transportation capacity, advance its off-shore oil and gas exploration, promote aqua-agriculture, and expand South Africa’s marine protection and ocean governance capacity. These plans served to protect the maritime environment, facilitate coastal community development, and develop plans for an Oceans Bill. Literary platforms such as the Defence Review also outlined / reiterated responsibilities for the SANDF e.g. the protection of the South African maritime environment, and its function as a key component of the national environment. Furthermore, it linked the protection of trade routes to the promotion of the South African economy.

Therefore the thrust of both Ambassador Sooklal’s and Vice Admiral Higgs’ presentations was that the increasing pressure to sustain and invigorate the Southern and South African economy compelled the government to proactively engage oceans’ governance, marine security regimes, and trade over the oceans.
II. THE GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN THE INDIAN AND SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEANS FROM SOUTH AFRICAN, INDIAN, BRAZILIAN AND AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVES

Objectives

- Place oceans governance within maritime security
- Analyse and setup a geo-strategic environment
- Creating frameworks and institutions to exploit the blue economy (blue ‘green’ economy) within international and global economic and political dimensions
- Considering a uniquely SA perspective on the Southern Oceans in the context of a ‘Gondwanan geo-strategic identity’
- Points of focus regarding maritime security, trade and development, global south collaboration can hinge upon IBSA, as a possible point of departure for a cooperation framework

Analysis: One

With these contextual markers in place, Mr Francis Kornegay, senior research fellow at the Institute for Global dialogue (IGD), the University of South Africa (UNISA), and Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Centre then elaborated on the current and future function of South Africa’s ‘Gondwanan’ Maritime Domain; with a focus on the Indian, South Atlantic oceans and Antarctica. He explained that Africa figures prominently as the world’s central peninsular continent in what is an essentially global South-rimland configuration. In fact, South Africa’s maritime, strategic influence benefits from two important shipping lanes within its territorial control. Thus there was indeed a geo-strategic ‘big-picture’, from the vantage point of South Africa and Southern Africa in general.

However, very little was done to weigh these benefits, and its implications for the marine economy in the southern oceans region (including the Antarctic). A multi-dimensional approach to dialogue is therefore important, in so far as it would unlock the potential for an IBSA-based outreach strategy by South Africa, India and Brazil, which could jointly involve elaborating an architecture of ‘Dialogue Partners’ bringing together Australia, Indonesia, Mauritius and East African Community states with the South Atlantic ATLASUR countries of Argentina and Uruguay, as well as South Africa and Brazil extending to Chile, Angola and Namibia (with the possibility of establishing linkages with ECOWAS and ECCAS).

Furthermore, the need to understand strategic dimensions pertaining to South Africa, Brazil, Indian perspectives (for example, “more complementarity between IBSA and BRICS as opposed to a duplicative conflict of interest favouring BRICS over IBSA – especially when it comes to considering the geostrategic oceans-maritime landscape”) was also important. Thus, his recommendations were as follows;

1. The development of an Integrated National Security and Development Strategy which would articulate a consciously considered national strategy for South and Southern Africa in crafting an Integrated Southern Oceans Governance and Maritime Strategy; one that should dovetail into comprehensive synergy the work of the Departments of Environmental Affairs and of Transportation. But this would require a tripartite lead role for DIRCO, the Department of Defence (DoD) and Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in providing the umbrella framework for inter-departmental
and inter-agency coordination in implementing a Blue Economy agenda that has to emphasize the
health of the oceans as a paramount national, regional and global South security interest.

2. Such an integrated strategic approach to statecraft would require establishment of a National Security
and Development Management System which conceivably could emerge out of the current portfolio
of the Ministry in The Presidency responsible for implementing the National Development Plan,
Monitoring and Evaluation.

3. Irrespective of the future of IBSA, South Africa, in conjunction with India and Brazil, should jointly
convene a Special Summit on Oceans Governance and Maritime Security in the Southern Oceans
which might include the following countries: Australia, Indonesia, Mauritius, Argentina, Chile,
Paraguay, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Namibia and Angola. The purpose of such a special summit
would be to begin a consultative process toward an eventual Indian Ocean-South Atlantic ocean
governance and security architecture of cooperation – call it the elaborating of the rim-land
Gondwanan Community in the metaphorical reuniting of the southern supercontinent as a
complementary balance to the North Atlantic Community. This architecture should, among other
things, reinforce the AU’s Integrated Maritime Strategy complemented by those of the Regional
Economic Communities such as ECOWAS & SADC.

4. Last but not least, the development financing of a sustainable Blue Economy for South and Southern
Africa and Africa as a whole as well as other rim-land states in the global South would seem to have
to be central to advancing such an agenda. Therefore, serious thought and planning should be given
to conceptualizing an African based and led Maritime Sustainable Development Financing Vehicle,
including investigation into the feasibility of establishing such an instrument and its terms of
reference. Here, the African Regional Centre of the BRICS New Development Bank may be relevant.
Otherwise, these options should be considered in terms of private equity investment as well as inter-
governmental and/or public-private partnership possibilities. The convergence of rising global
demand for infrastructure development financing dovetailing with increasing interest in developing
and securing a sustainable oceans economy would seem to point toward the need for such a specialist
financing mechanism inclusive of project preparation capacity for ensure the environmental
sustainability of maritime initiatives. The sustainable development and maintenance of major in-land
waterways, river basins and ecosystems along with supporting the environmental security and
biodiversity integrity of Indian Ocean Island States might also be served by such a facility.

Analysis: Two

With these insights in mind, Prof Dennis Rumley, Distinguished Research Fellow at Curtin University in
Western Australia, shifted the dialogue’s perspective, and focused his analysis on the Emerging Indian
Ocean landscape: security challenges and evolving architecture of cooperation – IORA, IONS, amongst
other groupings. He broke down his analysis into 4 components.

First, he outlined Australia’s identity dilemmas and its contested regionalisms i.e Australia’s changing geo-
political characterizations, Australia’s changing continental geopolitical identity, Australia’s geo-political
role, the maritime orientation of Australia. He then expounded on the notion of securing the Indian Ocean
region by analysing regional security concerns, IOR security arrangements, IOR regional maritime security
initiatives, the role of IONS and IORA, and Australia’s maritime orientation and tradition. He argued that
the primary focus of Australia’s maritime strategy had been about securing maritime economies that
reflect the interests of the peoples inhabiting areas in and around the southern oceans. His third point of focus was about working towards an Indian Ocean Maritime security Regime (IOMSR). The table below is illustrative of Australia’s input and its relationship with the geo-political landscape.

Elaborating on these points, Prof Rumley argued that despite the many efforts the Australian government made to bolster its presence within IOMSR, it faced the following challenges; the growing need for the conceptualisation of maritime security, strategic objectives not spelt out, insufficient stakeholder inclusivity, a ‘constabulary’ approach to piracy focus, the expansion of the piracy range, addressing the causes of maritime insecurity, state deference to the UN, state sovereignty concerns, political tension amongst regional states, lack of effective coordination, weak legal base, effective enforcement mechanisms needed, and insufficient resources and expertise.

Therefore in summary, Prof Rumley’s perspectives on Australia’s foreign policy regarding maritime security regimes and interests were concluded with the following options / recommendations;

- **Option 1** – Reject the current maritime Status quo
- **Option 2** – Strengthen Australia’s sub-regional approach
- **Option 3** – Have a more independent Australian perspective
- **Option 4** – Divided Indian ocean regime
  - ASEAN and US-Asia command
  - USA Indian ocean approach may be fragmented however it aids financial capacity
  - Region can be sub-divided into 5 regional groupings with India assuming the lead.
  - Indonesia and Australia in dialogue. West Indian ocean dialogue has been offered
- **Option 5** – IO Maritime Energy Security Stakeholders
  - 26 states have collective interest in Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Forum
- **Option 6** – Multilayered approach put forward in Nairobi 2014
  - Australia may benefit from interaction as an intermediary middle power
  - Australia maritime interests are to be closely linked with US maritime strategies

Lastly but importantly, Prof Rumley pointed out that the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific provides opportunities for engagement, policy recommendations and a viable platform for dialogue.

**Analysis: Three**

Adding to the previous analyses and arguments, Dr P. K. Ghosh, Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation based in New Delhi, presented his paper titled; “An Indian Perspective on an Evolving Indian
Ocean Governance Architecture.” Dr Ghosh began his analysis by stating that the Indian Ocean is an “active ocean” perceived by many as the current centre of the strategic world. Highlighting what he termed a ‘Geo-political’ scenario, he outlined how the IOR was in the throes of a power transition in which the current strategic apprehension is similar to when Great Britain announced its withdrawal from the East of Suez.

This struggle has intensified as a consequence of the ‘imperial overstretch’ of US forces, and a commonly perceived erosion of US influence in the region. India has thus emerged as a somewhat reluctant primary player in the evolving construction of the IOR, followed by an emerging China, South Africa, Australia, and Indonesia. Nevertheless, the broadening of the concept security incorporates non-military aspects such as socio-economic development, environment and politics. Security has become more comprehensive in its ambit with regards to the IOR. Complementary to this, the notion of cooperative security approaches, based largely on regional systems, emphasize the significance of cooperation rather than competition. Dr Ghosh thus emphasized that conflicting interests do not necessitate conflict amongst states.

Furthermore, the IOR has not been able to exist without a maritime regime structure. It is also a concern that IORA has not produced what it was supposed to produce, and the lack of emphasis on security in the agenda or the charter of the IORA, made it essentially an economic organisation. Thus geo-political formations such as ASEAN had resolved to have a focused security agenda recently. Dr Ghosh also highlighted how hope still existed in IONS and its ability to facilitate a better IOR. India has thus been cooperating with China, Japan and South Korea on a number of naval security objectives. To date, the level of naval exercises were shallow, but with the hope that they would be a lot more comprehensive.

Dr Ghosh thus recommended that;

- There needed to be a serious focus on a regional method for multilateralism which incorporated the belief that regional interactions amongst ASEAN members, and with outside countries should be informal, non-legalistic, consensus-based and inclusive.
- In order for India to be viable and relevant to the entire region, it needed to have an inclusive agenda.
- India needed to “Carry along” other regional littorals with limited maritime capacity.
- India needed an “outreach strategy” for having associate members and dialogue partners.
- India needed to have more frequent exercises and / or posting a dedicated liaison officer in operational headquarters and cross training of each other’s naval personnel.

Analysis: Four

Rounding off this part of the dialogue, Érico Duarte, who is Assistant Professor at Strategic and International Studies, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, spoke on “The Emerging South Atlantic landscape: security challenges & evolving architecture of cooperation – ZPSCA, Gulf of Guinea Commission,” amongst other groupings.

Prof Duarte presented his perspectives within four contextual themes. Firstly, he located his analyses of the South Atlantic security regime within the reality of US military hegemony in the region, and how this was a central issue for Brazil’s emerging maritime policy. Secondly, he analyzed how American

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Dr Ghosh was also the former Co-Chair and India Representative for the CSCAP International Study Group on Maritime Security.
Conditionalities of power influenced Brazilian foreign and defense policies during 20th century, consequently marking the events that drove changes in Brazil’s relationship with the US, as well as its pursuit for a new and autonomous development track in 21st century. Thirdly, his paper addressed the emergence of the South Atlantic ‘Blue economy’ as the cornerstone of a new orientation and, for the first time, synergetic, foreign and defense policies between Brazilian ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. As result, Brazil elaborated a new agenda and hierarchy of priorities for a new security policy, in which the South Atlantic served as a primary point of departure and boundary for an autonomous South American region and sanctuary for Brazilian development. The final part of his paper examined what constituted ‘a Brazilian perspective’ on naval power, and how this related to Brazil’s development plans within the South Atlantic.

In summary, Prof Duarte argued that Brazil did not believe the exploitation of the South Atlantic would force it into a Golden Age. Rather, Brazil focused its attention on the fact that it faced the danger of limited energy resources and the consequences of this with respect to its development. Therefore its academic institutions had been very responsive to the growing importance of the ‘blue economy’. Furthermore, Brazil had managed to consolidate its economic autonomy due to it possessing the largest population, territory and assets with regards to natural resources. Since 1970, it had promoted the most successful process of industrialization in the region.

Prof Duarte therefore emphasized that Brazil had greater potential to convert its social resources in terms of military capacity than all its neighbouring states. The South Atlantic served as the next priority area in which Brazil envisioned a free, maritime regime and area that embraced the Caribbean and West Africa of coast.

In light of these factors, Prof Duarte highlighted the following events, and put forward the following recommendations;

- Since 2012, Brazil reinforced its position as a provider of naval consultancy, training and exercises for West African countries. That was possible by the acquisition of three Amazon-class ocean-patrol vessels.

- The Zone of Peace and Cooperation for South Atlantic (ZPCSA) was re-launched in 2013 by the Montevideo Declaration and is the main Brazilian diplomatic initiative for South Atlantic.

- However, Brazil saw South Africa as the more skeptical and resilient ZPCSA member, though it recognized the legitimacy of South Africa’s concern with the gulfs of Mozambique and Somalia, and South Africa’s absence from the Gulf of Guinea Commission as the main reason for that.

- Brazil compelled itself to be an active player in the Gulf of Guinea. It took part in the Cooperation of Yaoundé meeting in June of 2013. Brazil was invited as an observer but had an important role regarding the design and planning of the executive branch, and the center for inter-regional operations. Additionally, Brazil presents itself as a provider of naval expertise. Therefore on one hand, it intends to expand joint training and exercises in engagement and anti-piracy operations, but also in criminal and penal maritime issues. On another hand, Brazil intends to support a South Atlantic system of maritime traffic by expanding its own data platforms (Sistema de Informações Sobre o Tráfego Marítimo- SISTRAM), which is already integrated with Uruguay and Argentina.
through the Regional Center for Maritime Traffic in the South Atlantic Area (Centro Regional de Tráfego Marítimo da Área Marítima do Atlântico Sul - CRT-AMAS).

- For those reasons, the joint exercise operations, such as ATLASUR, IBSMAR and Atlantic Tides (with United States), are important indicators of Brazil’s maritime security objectives.

- Brazil does not regard, and probably does not want to give BRICS a greater role in South Atlantic. On one hand, it considers that India, China and Russia have deeper concerns with Somalia Channel and Eastern Africa. On another hand, the case of greater role in South Atlantic would prove a threat to Brazil’s security policy.

II. SOUTHERN AFRICAN MARITIME SECURITY REGIMES, NAVAL CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY CHALLENGES, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE AFRICAN UNION INTEGRATED MARITIME STRATEGY (AIMS)

Objectives

- Analysing the implications of the Defence Review findings for South Africa’s capacity or limitations in projecting its influence in the maritime realm of security challenges
- Analysing the prospects for South Africa to influence regional and continental maritime security and naval cooperation and capacity-building
- Analysing how the subsequent considerations relate to the larger challenge of implementing AIMS

Analysis: One

To kick-start this part of the dialogue, Nick Sendall, who is a member of the Defence Secretariat within the South African Department of Defence, presented a paper titled the “Geostrategic and Foreign Policy Implications of the Defence Review: Maritime security and naval challenges.”

In summary, he explained how South Africa viewed itself as a sovereign and peaceful country with no aggressive intentions towards any other State. It sought to live in peace with its neighbours and actively pursue principles of non-intervention in the affairs of other nation-states. It sought to promote peace and security, prevent and deter conflict, pursue the peaceful resolution of conflict and deepen systems of democracy and global governance. He emphasized that South Africa further recognized the interdependence of States and will seek to promote cooperation over competition and collaboration over confrontation. In light of this, Multilateralism, bilateral collaboration, diplomacy and political effort are considered the first line of South Africa’s defense, it being critical for South Africa to enhance its defense relations with key partners on the continent, as well as with both the established developed partners and the emergent partners of the developing world. This indicated an increased requirement for military support for diplomatic efforts to resolve both intra and inter-state conflict on the continent.

However, Mr Sendall explained that the Defence Review of 1998 had a fixation with landward aspects of security. Thus a maritime strategy in the new Defence Review was an important focus now. This strategy would be implemented through an enhanced maritime domain awareness (MDA) program. This program outlined requirements to enhance Maritime Intelligence, Maritime Task Force(s), Rules of Engagement,

In totality, according to Mr. Sendall, these action plans sought to fulfil the focus of the SANDF’s core objectives areas, which were to;

- Defend and protect sovereignty and territory
- Ensure security of strategic resources
- Ensure SA’s freedom to trade
- Achieve peace and security and stability within the region
- Intra-African trade very important to SA

Added to this, they would fulfil the SANDF’s joint defence requirements by;

- An increased reliance on special forces
- Versatile maritime force
- Forward basing regarding force projection for protracted periods.
- Interoperability was required for various units e.g. combat support

The Defence Review 2014 thus defined the policy and strategy principles that would steer the Defence Force through the next twenty to thirty years (four-MTSF periods) across five planning milestones in the following manner;

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**Planning Milestone 4**  
Enhance the Defence Force’s capacity to respond to emerging threats (end-state of the Defence Review).

**Planning Milestone 5**  
Defend the Republic against an imminent or dire threat (illustrative in nature; outside the scope of the Defence Review).

In conclusion, Mr Sendall stated that it was “clear that the world in which South Africa exists is becoming increasingly volatile and unstable and solutions to insecurity are vested in a combination of:

- Strategic partnerships that promote peace and stability.
- Rooting democracy under-pinned by strong ethical governance.
- Economic advancement for African prosperity.
- Strengthening multi-lateral mechanisms. (AU, SADC and UN)

Furthermore, the role of Defense has changed from being that of a protector towards a wider application of being a strategic enabler and a catalyst for change wherever it is applied.” Furthermore, the adoption of an appropriate funding mechanism was urgently required to stabilise, restore and ensure the defense capability of South Africa.

**Analysis: Two**

Next in the program was Charl Maritz, Commander of the SAS Mendi in the South African Navy, and his presentation was titled “African Naval & Coastal Patrolling Issues: Cooperation, Capacity-Building, Dialogue (i.e. Sea Power Africa).”

He presented an operational perspective on the South African navy’s activities, and began by insisting that one could not control that which they do not control. Therefore in the maritime regime of southern Africa, regional stability had to be maintained. This was done by understanding the maritime landscape, which included assessing the degrees of maritime criminality, and what it was driven by e.g. economic, social and religious factors.

Commander Maritz also emphasized that maritime transportation had seen the establishment of economic and coastal centres worldwide. However, covering and searching the geography of the sea took time. Therefore it was important that there was a visible policing of the oceans to curb criminality. He also reminded the audience that the vessels available determined the approach the navy adopted when it encountered troubles. Commander Maritz was also concerned about the fact that although the South African navy’s aircraft surveillance capability was approximately one hundred nautical miles, there was a non-availability of persistent surveillance data.

He detailed the procedures undertaken by Special Forces units, amongst which the most important activity was the Visit Board Search Siege (VBSS). He also addressed what happened after the boarding of ships had occurred. In summary, these activities required capacity that was limited, and his only recommendation was that more emphasis had to be placed on developing their operational capacity.
because one ship and supporting elements were not enough to address South Africa’s maritime security challenges.

Commander Maritz concluded by highlighting and recommending that;

- South African navy’s Operation COPPER effort was not enough
- The cost of maritime security insurance and assurance was high and needed to be funded
- The operational level need/s required a;
  - Comprehensive maritime crimes act for South Africa
  - Seamless JIIM interaction
  - Intelligence driven & persistent MDA
  - Capable, supported enforcement mechanisms
- It was important that South Africa had the will, the law and the enforcers necessary to curb and combat maritime criminality in any / all its sea zones of influence

Analysis: Three

Building on this analysis, Charles Ukeje, Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria, delivered a paper titled “The Abuja Declaration and the Challenge of Maritime Security Strategy in the South Atlantic.” He saw a lot of commonalities regarding the challenges faced by maritime regimes in the South Atlantic (the most common challenge being piracy), and he drew parallels with the address made by Charl Maritz, and how the challenges highlighted in Commander Maritz’s presentation could be applied to Central African and West African concerns.

In presenting his analysis, Prof Ukeje chose to employ a bottom up and top down approach. For example, although piracy was the most popular form of maritime insecurity in public consciousness, he stated that it was neither the only one nor the most vicious or devastating in terms of fiscal, human and environmental costs. Other maritime security challenges with equally profound and perhaps more far-reaching implications, especially for human (and state) security included drug, arms and human trafficking; the massive importation of fake pharmaceutics and psychotropic drugs; the stealing of crude oil otherwise known as illegal oil bunkering; illegal, unauthorized and unregulated fishing and marine pollution to name a few. This was why the International Crisis Group described the Gulf of Guinea which spans the entire length of West and Central Africa, and as far as Angola, as “the new danger zone” because maritime insecurity had become a major regional problem that was “compromising the development of this strategic economic area and threatening maritime trade in the short-term and the stability of coastal states in the long-term.”

Prof Ukeje also noted that the Colonial history of African states in West Africa bound them together, whilst also differentiating their interests. Different bodies of water incur different challenges, while the seaborne trends reflect a commonality or commons. Interest was not about the exploitation of resources but how the states were threatened by such issues. Thus the Abuja Declaration gave concrete expression to the growing quest for a new agenda around which a distinctive African-centred discourse on and solution to maritime security can be discussed and realised.
He also explained how the Abuja Declaration was, to a large extent, recommendatory. He noted that it began by recognizing that the Gulf of Guinea countries, through their various cooperative mechanisms (ECOWAS, ECCAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission, GGC), had made ‘significant progress towards a Comprehensive Maritime Security Regime for the Gulf of Guinea [aimed] at fostering a sustainable and inclusive character of that regime.’ Furthermore, there were key four parts to the Declaration, namely recommendations to: i) nation-states; ii) regional organisations; iii) the international community; and iv) local communities and stakeholders from civil society.

In summary, he recommended that:

- The Abuja Declaration should represent an attempt at lending a voice to the issues that may go missing
- The navy must not be the only form of deterrence
- Policy should make sure that developmental aspects are addressed, particularly regarding local communities
- Legal vigilance on the role of multinationals in the region
- Weaknesses of the state must be addressed, especially when the state is perhaps the only way to address maritime governance and security
- Keen to propose how a new regional arrangement may evolve
- Impossible for ECOWAS to stay focused solely on economic issues
- Regional focus needs social, developmental aspects incorporated in a maritime governance strategy.
- Operation prosperity (Nigeria and Benin) cooperation
- The role of the international community should be more complementary.

Most importantly, he emphasized that local communities were the main reason the Abuja Declaration was produced. It demonstrated how maritime security affected local communities and how they were more or less the missing link in the search for lasting solutions to efficient maritime regimes in the region.

According to Prof Ukeje, the Declaration specifically prescribed that local communities and civil society, including the research community, should play a more prominent role in the design and implementation of a bottom-up approach to maritime security. It further insisted on the mainstreaming of previously excluded but critical social categories, especially gender and youth, in mobilizing broader consensus around key cross-cutting issues such as livelihoods, vulnerability, resilience, food security, sound management of the coastal ecosystem and poverty; not the least because these concerns were currently missing in the debate on how to promote sustainable maritime security strategy in West and Central Africa. The Declaration also recommended that civil society and community-based organisations must be encouraged to play more visible and proactive roles in tackling maritime security by identifying and strengthening capacities to monitor the implementation of the Yaoundé process and similar initiatives as well as by creating awareness among the citizenry.
The emphasis on local communities and stakeholders in the civil society is, in itself, an acknowledgement that a 'bottom-up' approach to maritime security and ocean governance is long overdue. Such a bottom-up approach would put the well-being, security and safety of peoples first; re-align with the core raison d’être of the state to protect citizens and territorial integrity of the country. The point of emphasis in this regard is the emphasis on the deployment of ‘soft’ power, especially the design and putting in place of an inclusive governance and development agenda.

IV. THE REALM OF THE OCEANS ECONOMY AND SOUTH AFRICA’S POTENTIAL IN THE USE OF ITS OFFSHORE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE, AND BUILDING INTER-REGIONAL TRADE MOMENTUM

This part of the dialogue, which took place on the second day of the symposium, was opened by a keynote address delivered by Renfrew Christie, Senior Professor and Dean of Research, University of the Western Cape (Ret.).

Prof Christie first pointed out that the population of Africa was to double by 2030 according to UN Population statistics. The global human population was roughly 6.9 billion in 2010, and would rise to roughly 9.6 billion by 2050. Therefore utilizing the oceans was an important solution to addressing energy and food security. Planning the political economy of Africa in relation to its oceans was important, and need to be treated with great care.

He then argued that approximately 2.4 billion Africans would need industries and transport that was linked to maritime organisations and institutions. Therefore society at large had to start with the necessary investment initiatives and development soon. According Prof Christie’s research, Africa was found to be the least explored region for hydrocarbons, and it was also the least electrified. This was coupled with the fact that oil had the potential to cause wars, as well as a fast-growing population. Therefore an African maritime strategy would help deal with population growth, and the stigma of war related to the extraction and exploitation of crude oil.

He also argued that ships and ports were vital to the future of Africa, and the blue economy had to be used to extract opportunities for the development of Africa for Africans. Maritime trade had proven to be a better way of transporting goods, and needed to be encouraged. Furthermore, much of Africa’s oil resources lay off the coast of most African countries. Therefore eliminating piracy required good strategies on land and strong navies. Sustained long term naval air surveillance was also crucial to maritime security. In conclusion, Prof Christie stated that without strong maritime and naval forces, Africa will not be able to benefit from its blue economy.

Objectives

- Analysing the implications of South Africa’s territorial waters claims for its relations with Mozambique and Namibia
- Analysing how the ‘blue economy’ focus could generate trade and investment momentum, especially with the context of the Indian Ocean Rim
• Analysing whether there are lessons that could be learned from the international engagement in the Arctic (in relation to Antarctica)?

Analysis: One

Kick starting the analysis for this session, Prof Jo-Ansie van Wyk from the Department of Political Science at UNISA, Pretoria, presented a paper titled “Defining the Blue Economy as a South African Strategic Priority: Toward a sustainable 10th province?”

According to Dr van Wyk, there was a genuine possibility of adding an 11th province to South Africa’s territorial domain (this being the oceans). Furthermore, there was a global consensus regarding the economic value of the ocean, in that it created over 350 million jobs worldwide. She also highlighted the fact that the oceans’ economy contributed 54 billion Rand to South Africa’s GDP in 2012. It also had the potential to contribute a 177 billion Rand to SA’s GDP. This was possible because roughly 11 000 vessels entered South Africa’s ports, which suggested that South Africa had better port management and performances structures than most African countries. Nevertheless, South Africa took longer to unload containers than e.g. Nairobi or Luanda.

She went on to argue that the term Blue economy was interchangeable with Ocean or Maritime economy. In this regard, a large number of developing states had increasingly recognised the importance of their blue economies. For example, 75 individual or joint claims were submitted to the CLCS in October 2014. These claims were centred on geo-political & ideological issues, Economic issues, Security issues, Technology and Finance. These claims were all lodged within the legal boundaries of UNCLOS, which limited the state’s national jurisdiction over ocean space, access to seas, navigation, protection and preservation of the marine environment, exploitation of living and non-living resources, scientific research, seabed mining and the settlement of maritime disputes.

She emphasized that there was a difference between the legal and geological definition of continental shelves. Hydro-graphic surveys and technology were not common amongst developing states. Therefore the scramble for continental shelves was a current concern. Claiming continental shelves meant states would have to increase their national jurisdiction. In this regard, SIDS would significantly benefit from continental shelf claims. South Africa protected its maritime interests and responsibilities in this regard through the Maritime Act. She also noted that ECOWAS was a shining example of cooperation in the mediation of claims to continental shelves. In southern Africa, claims brought forward by Mozambique did not stir up controversy tense in comparison to Namibia, perhaps due to the FDI of RSA in Mozambique.

Nevertheless, Dr van Wyk recommended that South Africa needed to;

• Communicate the content and status of the country’s continental shelf claims
• Improve governance in all sectors inland and off-shore
• Cooperate with Namibia & Mozambique to resolve competing claims
• Promote and establish a Southern African Continental Shelf Agency and Strategy including these three states
• Commit to and realise regional building in respect of maritime issues similar to what is achieved by rising powers such as Brazil and India in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans
• Contribute to the realisation of the SADC Maritime Security Strategy. This should precede a stronger focus on SADC as a regional institution
• Promote 2050 AIM Strategy
• Invest in scientific cooperation on maritime matters
• All South Africa’s key partners in IBSA and BRICS are regional maritime powers with vast maritime interests and capabilities in sea trade, commerce and naval influence. Therefore, the country should enhance the maritime economy focus of these groupings through dialogue on oceans governance and maritime security cooperation.

Analysis: Two

Furthering this discussion, Dr. Brendan Vickers, Head of Research at the International Trade & Economic Development Division, DTI, delivered his paper titled “Geo-economic Patterns in the Southern Oceans: Trade & investment prospects in a blue economy.”

Dr Vickers began by highlighting the fact that South Africa was a maritime nation with one of the largest exclusive economic zones in the world. It therefore had significant potential for unlocking further economic development opportunities for GDP and job creation. The South African government was therefore finalising an Oceans Strategy focused on:

• Marine transport and manufacturing activities
• Offshore oil and gas exploration
• Aquaculture
• Marine protection services and governance

Central to achieving this was ‘Operation Phakisa’. According to Dr Vickers, the NIPF and IPAP were central components of the NDP. Thus attention needed to be focused on reviving the manufacturing sector, given its growth-pulling capacity, and multiplier effects with respect to economic growth. The strategic implications of these actions were:

• Linking IPAP and TP through tariffs and local content
• Promoting value-added exports to shift trade structures
• Industrial financing, incentives and skills development
• More attention paid to services and regional value-chains

In summary, Dr Vickers noted that South Africa had key trading partners in the South Atlantic and IOR, and that it should focus less on trade liberalisation, and more on trade facilitation. The strategic implications of this would be that these actions would;

• Expedite trade agreements
• Developmental integration
• Transport connectivity (e.g. national shipping lines)
• Promote customs and ports cooperation
• Export and FDI promotion and facilitation

Analysis: Three

The dialogue then shifted to an emphasis on “Antarctica and a Blue Economy in the Southern Hemisphere: Arctic lessons learned,” a paper which was delivered by Tom Wheeler, an Independent Commentator and former diplomat.
Mr Wheeler pointed out that in May 1958, US President Dwight D Eisenhower invited South Africa, along with eleven other countries then actively involved in Antarctica, to participate in the negotiations in Washington DC that led to the adoption of the Antarctic Treaty a year later.

American motivation for initiating the negotiations had two related reasons.

- The Cold War competition between the US and Soviet Russia was at its height, and with the Cold War tensions came fears of military conflict and nuclear weapons testing in the South Polar region.
- In addition, no international arrangement or treaty regulated Antarctica, leading to countries scrambling to claim sections of the Antarctic as national territory, some of them overlapping. This had the potential for conflict, especially between Argentina and Chile or Argentina and the United Kingdom, as was demonstrated by the Falklands War of 1982. The Falklands fall outside the Treaty area, but are claimed by both Argentina and the United Kingdom, an issue that continues to this day. South Africa signed the treaty in 1959 and it came into force in 1961 after all signatory countries, including South Africa, had ratified it.

Membership has reached 50 countries, of which 29, including South Africa, are Consultative Parties with voting status. Consultative Parties include China (1983), India (1983), the Russian Federation (1961), Ukraine (2004), the United Kingdom (1961) and the United States (1961).

To be recognised as Consultative Parties, countries have to demonstrate their interest in Antarctica by carrying out substantial scientific activity there. Consultative Parties participate in decision-making at the annual Consultative Meetings (ATCMs). Other parties may attend the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) but only as observers. The 37th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting took place in Brasilia between 28 April and 7 May 2014.

Mr Wheeler noted that the Treaty applied to the area south of 60 degrees south and describes the area as”... a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.”

According to Mr Wheeler, the Treaty in its fourteen articles;

- stipulates that Antarctica should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Military activities, such as the establishment of military bases or weapons testing, are specifically prohibited;
- guarantees continued freedom to conduct scientific research, as enjoyed during the International Geophysical Year 1958/59;
- promotes international scientific cooperation including the exchange of research plans and personnel, and requires that results of research be made freely available;
- sets aside the potential for sovereignty disputes between Treaty parties by providing that no activities will enhance or diminish previously asserted positions with respect to territorial claims;
- provides that no new or enlarged claims can be made, and makes rules relating to jurisdiction;
- prohibits nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste;
- provides for inspection by observers, designated by any party, of ships, stations and equipment in Antarctica to ensure the observance of, and compliance with, the Treaty;
• requires parties to give advance notice of their expeditions;

• provides for the parties to meet periodically to discuss measures to further the objectives of the Treaty; and

• puts in place a dispute settlement procedure and a mechanism by which the Treaty can be modified.

The Treaty has been amplified by three additional agreements, namely:

• Convention for Conservation of Antarctic Seals, CCAS, (1972)


• Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, also referred to as the Madrid Protocol or PEP, (1991; came into force through sufficient ratifications in 1998).

Although a Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, CRAMRA, was negotiated in the late 1980s and opened for ratification in 1988, it never entered into force, as Australia and France declined to ratify it on the grounds that it did not explicitly exclude the exploitation of mineral resources.

It was later superseded by the Madrid Protocol which explicitly precluded the exploitation of mineral resources for fifty years from the date of entry into force of the Protocol. Minerals exploitation is therefore prohibited until 2048. In terms of article 25 the protocol may be reviewed after 50 years’ of coming into force if a contracting party so requests. This means that the ban on mineral exploitation is guaranteed until 14 January 2048 and beyond.

All the Consultative Parties referred to above were also parties to the Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection (PEP).

As part of an initiative by the member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 in the UN, led by Malaysia, there were calls for the international regime of Antarctica to be reappraised. The final document of the NAM meeting in September 1983 called for a more just and equitable framework for the exploitation and management of the resources of Antarctica. Nothing came of this move, given that exploitation of mineral resources is prohibited by the Madrid protocol to which several NAM members are party.

Mr Wheeler eventually concluded that it would seem that as incomplete and as conflicting as the provisions of the various international agreements affecting Antarctica may be, there was reason for optimism that the spirit of the Antarctic Treaty and its declaration of the Southern Continent as a “zone of peace and co-operation” were secure for the foreseeable future and even beyond.

Nevertheless, he recommended that:

• To sustain its desired reputation as a major global player from the South, South Africa must continue to play an active role not only in scientific research in the Southern Continent, but as Antarctic Consultative Party also in its political and legal administration through its attendance and creative participation in the annual meetings of Consultative Parties and the meetings of parties to Antarctic agreements such as the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Living
Resources (CCAMLR). In seeking to do this there will nevertheless be competition for attention from subjects of greater importance, such as the African Agenda, South Africa’s peacekeeping role and various other multilateral issues.

- While Antarctica is not a foreign policy priority for South Africa and other countries of the South, South Africa should whenever possible in multilateral fora and in bilateral commission meetings seek to influence fellow Southern states to abide by the provisions of the Treaty and its additional conventions to achieve the objective of Antarctica being “... a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.”

V. POSSIBLE FRAMEWORKS FOR GLOBAL SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION IN OCEANS GOVERNANCE AND MARITIME SECURITY

Analysis: One

Dr Abhijit Singh, a Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies & Analysis, India, then lead the dialogue with his discussion on “IBSA Trilateralism and Prospects for Southern Oceans Cooperation: Indian perspective.” Dr Singh first insisted that BRICS can best be conceived of as friends with benefits club – a club who’s aim was to strike deals. On the other hand, IBSA had political symbolism – in that IBSA was a good model with which to address maritime security. However, the idealism that characterised IBSA needed to be tempered.

According to Dr Singh, Indian interests / stakes lay in the indo-pacific region – and India had to play a part in securing the Southern Africa and Gulf slots. Therefore India adopted a two pronged approach in the Indian Ocean, which was to:

- Secure trade routes in Western Indian Ocean
- Ensure influence among island states

Furthermore, India’s growing relationship with West Africa bore significance for Indian involvement in the South Atlantic. For example, India received 10% of energy imports from South America. Nevertheless, the South Atlantic is not a strong factor in India’s geopolitical strategy. India’s three geopolitical realities were that it needed to extend it external influence, reduced defence budget, and heed to the littoral states that were voicing stronger opinions. In essence, they could not afford to be seen as a reluctant leader.

Dr Singh also emphasized that India’s maritime engagement with Southern Africa was based on South-South Cooperation. India used IBSAMAR to sometimes clarify its foreign policy stance. To a degree, IBSAMAR was an area of comfort for Indian interaction within the Southern Oceans. It also outlined a framework for Oceans governance. He also noted that the IORA reinvented itself – and this was a good case for IBSA to learn from. Furthermore, the 3rd IONS conference was significant due to the presence of African states. However, according to Dr Singh, there were conceptual and functional constraints in the form of a lack of centralising mobilising agendas, an increased emphasis on militaristic measures, and sustained Indian involvement in the Southern Oceans.
In summary, Dr Singh was optimistic in the sense that ECOWAS, GGC, SADC, AIMS all attempted to address the basics of ocean governance and maritime security. He therefore recommended that;

- IBSA needs a comprehensive dialogue process. A ‘blue economy’ approach is apt, but the broad vision should be harmonised.
- The suggestion to convene a special IBSA summit for the development of a sustainable governance, security and cooperation framework and the promotion of a ‘Blue Economy’ in the southern oceans is particularly apt.
- Africa’s maritime realm is central to a Southern Ocean’s governance construct. IBSA must revive the African maritime sector by allocating resources, providing expertise and a helping draw up a coherent maritime strategy.
- In the creation of an African maritime economy, the emphasis must be on law-enforcement, training, capacity building and infrastructure creation. IBSA could consider mobilizing assistance from international players so as to assist in the implementation of African maritime initiatives toward good governance.
- An IBSA outreach program inviting ‘dialogue partners’ to contribute towards promoting an Indian Ocean-South Atlantic oceans governance and maritime security framework is a useful suggestion.
- South Africa has an important role in establishing an IBSAMAR-ALTASUR link, and must bring about greater interaction between Indian Ocean and Atlantic powers.
- It is unlikely that there will be much support in New Delhi for a bi-annual IBSAMAR, even though a track 1.5 naval and security dialogue patterned after the Shangri-La dialogue is a useful suggestion.
- The venue for the IBSAMAR exercises must continue to be the South African coast – at least in the near future. It is unlikely that India will find it worthwhile dispatching a contingent to the Brazilian coast for an operational exchange.
- The proposal to develop synergy with the IORA through an Indian Ocean Dialogue initiative is worth exploring.
- The IBSA-IORA blue economy summit must follow the first phase of capacity creation in Southern and Western African states.
- The IBSAMAR exercises must continue to be held off the South African coast. It is unlikely that India will find it worthwhile dispatching a contingent to the Brazilian coast for an operational exchange.
- IORA’s model of Indian Ocean governance must be used as an instructive example. An IBSA academic council on the lines of the IOR academic group must take forward cooperation in non-security maritime issues such as science & technology, disaster management, fisheries, etc.

Analysis: Two

The next presentation came from Alcides Costa Vaz, Vice Director from the Institute of International Studies, University of Brasilia, and his paper was titled “IBSA Trilateralism and Prospects for Southern Oceans Cooperation: A Brazilian perspective.”

According to Dr Costa Vaz, maritime strategies had been a relatively new addition in Brazilian policy. This strategy had been described as one that dealt with energy, defence and naval industries. Also, from Brazil’s diplomatic perspective, the South Atlantic had to be preserved as a peaceful area that encouraged
cooperation. Therefore limiting the influence of great powers and the growing militarisation was a concern for Brazil regarding the South Atlantic.

Dr Costa Vaz acknowledged that IBSA served as the only window through which Brazil could get in touch with the Southern Oceans. He also argued that global ocean governance should be an increasing focus of the IBSA strategy because IBSAMAR had benefited because the South African Seawaters served as a meeting point for India, Brazil and South Africa. However, IBSAMAR faces huge budgetary constraints and this limits the capacity of IBSA (IBSAMAR) to act.

In conclusion, Dr Costa Vaz was of the opinion that Brazil did favour the notion of South Atlantic Governance, and that IBSAMAR could play a limited but functional role within a global oceans governance framework.

Analysis: Three

Taking the discussion further, with a paper titled “IBSA Tri-lateralism and Prospects for Southern Oceans Cooperation: South African perspective,” Sanusha Naidu, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Global Dialogue-UNISA and Independent Consultant, began by asking the question, ‘When would IBSA hold its summit? – this was supposed to have happened but had not – and this was crucial for a governance framework formation, particularly in terms of IBSA states.

She noted that the Blue economy’s security had a very important human security dimension to it, and not just the traditional security dimension. Furthermore, IBSAMAR had been talked about a lot, but not the IBSA development fund. The need for emphasis on the issue of an IBSA development fund was significant because it extended the dialogue from primarily a maritime security regime to human / social contexts and challenges.

Ms. Naidoo then posed a few questions, and made a few concluding remarks;

- How does a maritime regime link up with SA’s broader multilateral Governance framework?
- Where would such a strategy (maritime / IBSA / governance) fit?
- South Africa’s ideal governance framework was grounded in the context of global governance reform
- Therefore IBSA had to be analysed in terms of BASIC’s convergence of issues
- South Africa also faced tensions between BASIC states in terms of projection of power
- It is important to note that China wants to open a naval base in Walvis Bay, which has geo-strategic implications
- Where would the convergence and strategies emerge regarding oceans governance? – It was expected that these governance issues would be formulated around the resources found on the seabed.
Analysis: Four

Mokhele Tsietsi, Commander, CEO of South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA), then spoke on “Africa’s Continental Challenge in Governing the Maritime Commons: The AU Integrated Maritime Security Strategy.”

He noted that the AU Maritime Security Strategy (AIMS) 2050 oceans already connected 70 % of Africa’s countries, thus illustrating that oceans had a big role to play regarding the integration of trade between African states. Therefore an integrated maritime development framework was necessary to enhance; i.) Public Interest perspectives, ii.) Industrial perspectives, iii.) Transportation perspective, iv.) Commercial services, v.) Resources perspective, vi.) tourism and leisure perspective.

In this regard, Commander Tsietsi reiterated that the key challenge facing Africa other than the Liberian Register, was near-absence of indigenous blue-sea merchant tonnage, to keep the continent’s sea lines of communication open. This situation, according to Commander Tsietsi was not sustainable, undermining Africa’s ability to develop its maritime economic regimes. Therefore, he recommended that South Africa needed to:

- Promote African naval support for off shore operations i.e enforcement of navigational freedoms for African states and citizens
- Carry influence in world trade and shipping affairs
- Secure and diversify opportunities for African investors
- Sustain numbers of African who could find jobs at sea if they had berths for training

Furthermore, it needed to promote the maritime industrialisation programme by:

- providing adequate ship repair infrastructure facilities on the continent
- establish regional maritime industrial hubs for ship building, boat building and component manufacturing

South Africa also needed to provide world class ‘soft infrastructure’ development programmes by;

- introducing maritime awareness and education to its populace
- Providing high tech training and research centers
- Improving participation of females in maritime initiatives

Analysis: Five

Rounding of the analytical aspect of the dialogue, Captain Ralph Costa from the Brazilian Navy spoke about the Blue Amazon – an idea that stemmed from the utilisation of the Amazon and its green economy. He also emphasized how important the Southern Atlantic was to the citizens of Brazil, and how it was crucial for the Brazilian Developmental state. The utilization of the South Atlantic, and interaction with other States was not without its difficulties;

- Language differences e.g. Portuguese and English and colonial differences
- The use of ships were the only means of transportation to join distant countries (colonial/ pre-flight era)
The use of equipment, planning, naval exercises, and provision of supporting elements were all affected by understanding of languages, and differences of systems and the uses thereof.

Nevertheless, Captain Costa concluded that military force was crucial to the safety and security of IBSA states’ beneficitation of the Ocean. Furthermore IBSA states were ready to operate together at sea and Brazil hoped that the world would heed to the interests of these states. This partnership may extend to other fields of the IBSA Military regime.

VI. CONCLUDING ROUNDTABLE AND DISCUSSION

Moderating discussions and reflections on the way forward with regard to the Strategic Dimensions of the blue economy, Fadel Nacerodien, Chief Director for Policy Research and Analysis Unit within DIRCO stated that

- South Africa was looking for a way forward, in terms of mapping processes, and including all the necessary developmental elements
- He reiterated that South Africa had to revamp institutions as well as establishing new ones
- Integrated approach as we look at the integration of all sectors involved and affected by policy surrounding the ocean economy.

Questions and comments from floor

- Dennis – IORA reform is necessary – looking at the dialogue, 5 states dominated aid allocation to Africa – Recommendation 1) Germany is the only state in that group that is not a partner of IORA. – Recommendation 2) Indian research organisation located in Mauritius attached to IORA. In total, this may provide policy paths for IORA
- Ndora – How do we convince the citizens to foot the tax bill for the maritime and how do we sell this idea of the need for maritime security and blue economy to the people?
- Leon – Looking inward to our blue economy, and the launch of Operation Phakisa as part of the NDP, it is clear that you need maritime domain awareness to monitor the activities within our EEZ;
  o Operation Phakisa provides an opportunity for the cooperation (inter-operability) of departments
  o Maritime Awareness needs to be more efficient
- Colin – This conference was an attempt to win over the hearts and minds of opinion makers – How many levels exist? How far is civil society from government as well as states with regards to cohesion? We need a youth based approach – therefore how do we entice entrepreneurial attitudes into local communities?
• Abhijit – The attraction of partners in the marine economy will tend to be security/extractive related? Is there a case for us to build a more flexible community in order to communicate issues more freely?

Responses

• Mr Kornegay – The critical idea was to begin developing a contextual awareness of the various marine dimensions – The bigger geo-strategic and economic picture was looked at as a beginning of a multifaceted and multi-dimensional communication. The event is not intended as once of but rather a long dialogue to be broken into further compartments. Various organisations and government department have worked together;
  o Wanted a policy dialogue within South Africa and between South Africa and other countries to be established
  o Rumley’s ideas of an Indian Ocean organisation is the kind of things we want to move forward on
  o Recommendations from the symposium will be provided
• Mr Nacerodien – Discussions usually took place on an organization to organization basis, or dialogue between departments and organizations. But the discussion for this symposium were on the whole more inclusive and also consultative;
  o We did not intentionally exclude the northern states (Europe) – they were invited
  o Interest generated has been large and demonstrated the work that is still left to be done
  o Two conferences in 2015 (Provisional 17-20 march 2015) will take place – International Seabed authority and the international continental shelf
  o Security and Socio-economic issues also need to be discussed e.g. food security and sustainable development
• Rear Admiral Higgs – Smart ways to approach state security were discussed, and the intention was to avoid the Academic Ivory Tower, which was achieved particularly through participation and articulated opinions;
  o Planned Strategies requires institutionalisation
  o The cooperation with our security partners need to strengthened
  o More visibility on maritime strategies as there needs to be a civil society understanding
• Dr Zondi
  o A lot of issues were covered and a lot of question were raised on the conceptualisation of strategies to approach the domain of maritime security and blue economy
  o The oceans need to be secured as it has the potential to contribute to the development sought after
  o Who are the key actors in the ocean/ – that has to be discussed as we may be too state-focused or regional focused
  o Most importantly, what are the interests of external partners in the Southern Ocean?
  o What economic and social opportunities are emerging and therefore what do we need to secure from who, and how?
  o The Fragility of the SIDS and Madagascar need to be examined in the context of the Indian ocean
  o Denuclearisation behind the ZOPACAS, however the remilitarisation of the South Atlantic is very evident
- Looking at the various institutions that exist currently, what are their roles within the realm of the Southern Oceans and Maritime security and governance?
- Research, Diplomacy and dialogue need to be further pursued, particularly with regard to facilitating policy formulation.