Contents

List of acronyms and abbreviations ........................................................................................................3
Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................4
Welcome and opening remarks .............................................................................................................4
Panel 1: foreign policy and geopolitical landscape .............................................................................8
Question and answer session one .........................................................................................................13
Panel 2: Global engagement and South-South Cooperation .................................................................15
Question and answer session two .......................................................................................................21
Vote of thanks and closing remarks ....................................................................................................22
Appendices: Programme ......................................................................................................................23
About the Institute for Global Dialogue associated with UNISA .........................................................25
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAPA</td>
<td>Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CwA</td>
<td>Compact with Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DST</td>
<td>Department of Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-20</td>
<td>Group of 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSRC</td>
<td>Human Science Research Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBSA</td>
<td>India Brazil South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGD</td>
<td>Institute for Global Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IONS</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Naval Symposium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IORA</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Rim Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHI</td>
<td>National Health Insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORASECOM</td>
<td>The Lesotho Water Transfer Scheme under the Orange-Senqu River Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCRD</td>
<td>Post Conflict Reconstruction Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Preferential Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDF</td>
<td>Regional Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIDMP</td>
<td>Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISDP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISR</td>
<td>Regional Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACOIR</td>
<td>South African Council on International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADPA</td>
<td>South African Development Partnership Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPO</td>
<td>Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFAA</td>
<td>Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

The round table, which focused on South Africa’s 2018 foreign policy agenda during the course of the year, also looked towards possible projections for 2019, and took place on the 22 February 2018 in Pretoria at the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC).

South Africa’s 2018 foreign policy agenda is possibly its busiest since 1994. The country finds itself chairing the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) partnership and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), while it is also involved in the G20 summit. It also co-chairs the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), as well as chairing the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This provides an opportunity for the country to continue its pursuit of a developmental African and global South agenda.

These leadership commitments and challenges emerge and conclude against the backdrop of an unsettled geopolitical terrain, interacting with an equally uncertain domestic political landscape as prelude to next year’s national elections, which are likely to be the most fiercely contested since democratisation in the country. This public dialogue thus explored what lies ahead for South Africa in 2018 and how Tshwane will navigate one of its busiest agendas of international engagements while interrogating how domestic political dynamics may affect South Africa’s foreign policy.

Welcome and Opening Remarks

Dr. Philani Mthembu: Executive Director, IGD associated with UNISA

South Africa has taken up numerous leadership roles in various international and regional groupings in 2018. The SADC chairship, which South Africa took in August 2017, the FOCAC co-chairship, the 2018 BRICS presidency as well as the IORA presidency while also preparing for the G20 meeting in Argentina, as the only African country. South Africa has also submitted a bid to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for a non-permanent seat for the 2019 cycle. Should this be a success, South Africa could serve in this position for a third time. These commitments and challenges come at a time when the country is experiencing some domestic challenges. The governing party and the country have a new president; and the finance minister has recently announced the first VAT increase in democratic South Africa. With national and provincial elections set to take place in 2019, all major political parties are gearing up for what will be the most contested elections in the democratic era.

The busy 2018 political agenda will test the strategic thinking and execution of the state as well as its ability to coordinate with multiple stakeholders at the national and subnational levels. Although the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) plays the central role in coordination, other actors also coordinate their activities and roles within this sphere. Indeed recent years have seen a growth in the institutionalisation of the multiple layers of diplomacy. Global politics is not only limited to state-to-state relations, but also increasingly involve think tanks, the business community, and civil society.
These actors must thus also come up with strategies of engaging their counterparts instead of constantly reacting to events as they arise. Therefore, this dialogue seeks not to be reactive but to be forward thinking, anticipating events before they arise. This is also the work of think tanks, which must ensure that while their work has an academic value, it also has value for policy makers and practitioners.

Mr. Aziz Pahad: Council Member, South African Council of International Relations

The South African Council on International Relations (SACOIR), which was established by former DIRCO minister, Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, in 2015, endeavours to provide a consultative forum for the regular review of South Africa’s foreign policy and more importantly, the government’s capabilities to implement policies as well as to make recommendations to the minister of DIRCO. SACOIR’s mandate is to provide a public platform for the debate of South Africa’s foreign policy and the conduct of international relations, bringing the voices of civil society to the foreign policy process and reflecting the importance of non-state actors in the influence of foreign policy.

Over the last two and a half years, SACOIR has had various priorities, including global and economic trends and their impact on South Africa, the African Agenda, emerging powers, South-South Cooperation and relations with the global North. The transformation of global governance, including the fundamental reform of the UNSC, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), as well as the Bretton Woods institutions also remained a key priority. Plans relating to international peace and security and economic diplomacy have also been part of its priorities.

Many of SACOIR’s priority areas will be discussed today and this discussion will include the various key positions that South Africa will undertake in 2018, which include SADC, FOCAC, G20, BRICS, IORA and even South Africa’s intentions of a third UNSC tenure.

These themes fall within the scope of the roundtable titled South Africa and the world in 2018. The two panels explore issues on South Africa’s foreign policy post-1994, geopolitical landscapes, global engagement, and South-South cooperation. It is important to understand whether South Africa has the capacity, both in financial and human resource terms, to successfully carry out the ambitious 2018 political mandate that we have put out for ourselves. The foreign policy discussions of the Mandela administration and the Mbeki administration and the subsequent discussions of the current day need to critically address the achievements of these previous administrations and highlight their challenges so that it is possible to learn from them going forward. There seems to be a tendency in South Africa and other parts of the continent of producing new partnerships, new thinking and new policies without assessing where we come from and the lessons learned.

Mr. Pahad explained that it is important to raise the issue of how the developing world is still a victim of what is happening in the world. However, it is important to question whether Africa and the global South will remain victim to global trends or how it is possible to make an impact. There are a few of the global trends that cannot be ignored. Firstly, how foreign policies of all governments in the world have had to come to grips with the policies of US exceptionalism and what President Donald Trump refers to as America First. This policy can be characterised by the increasing influence of the military industrial complex, massive increases in defence spending, disregard of international law, increasing regime change, and the weakening of the UNSC.

Secondly, the unprecedented pace of globalisation and the governance of a neoliberal system, which has resulted in growing inequalities within and between countries, to which South Africa is no exception. Thirdly, the recent World Bank conclusion that neoliberal policies have been oversold and have failed to which the Secretary General, Ángel Gurría, of the OECD commented, “We have reached a tipping point.” Mr. Pahad continued to explain that Brexit, the Trump administration’s America first policy and many recent elections in Africa, Europe, Asia and Latin America are good examples of a global leadership deficit.
Fourthly, the threats to international peace and security including in the Middle East and the North African region where the policies of some countries are based on a concept that is termed constructive chaos to achieve a new middle east. The emergence of a new phenomenon called the Sunni coalition, which sees Iran as an existential threat and the tensions between Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and the Sunni coalition create a dangerous situation in the region.

Mr. Pahad expressed that the developments in the Middle East and North African region are underestimated and that there is a possibility of war erupting, involving major powers with weapons of mass destruction. It may be difficult to fully understand the implications of the dynamics in the Middle East because alliances are constantly changing, allies today are enemies tomorrow. Hence this discussion and future discussions should not see things as black and white because many grey areas and those that can contribute to peace and stability easily become implementers of policies of chaos. The unprecedented immigration and migration into Europe and the US, which has heightened religious fundamentalism, Islamophobia, racism, right wing new fascist organisation, xenophobia (we just have to look at recent elections in Europe to confirm that view), cannot be ignored. In addition, there are new role players with the rise of emerging economies, particularly China. The recent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report of the Asian pivot states that China is not only an economic threat but also a military one, which is not to be ignored. Added to this is the growing threat of nuclear proliferation in North Korea and the growing tensions between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Russia.

The rise of terrorism, extremism and the reality that the Sub-Saharan region is seeing unprecedented increases in the number of foreign troops and bases is another factor to consider when discussing our relations with the South. Given all factors that have been mentioned, we cannot but conclude that the global world order is at a tipping point as we seek to explain the realities of South Africa and the world in 2018. Perception management in the era of ‘fake news’ and what President Trump referred to as alternative facts, will also remain important. Many governments’ documents conclude that the control and manipulation of information as a form of soft power is indeed a reality. This demands a critical assessment of information we receive and to seek alternative perspectives, it demands that think tanks and civil society contribute to the management and use of knowledge to impact on the better understanding of foreign policy and its implementation.

In conclusion, we have reached a very difficult period in the global world order and therefore our discussions cannot be business as usual, they must contribute to the debate on what are or will be the political, economic and security impacts of global trends on Africa and what must be Africa’s response. What knowledge do South African policy makers need in order to make informed policy decisions and what options are possible for government to deal with unforeseen circumstances, predict, and analyse potential new developments. This roundtable is the beginning of the process that we can utilise to bridge the gap between government at every level especially between the international relations ministry, think tanks, and civil society in order for us to be able to discuss and define what the new global order is and what its impact will be on all of us.
Panel 1: Foreign Policy and Geopolitical Landscapes

Ms Sanusha Naidu: Senior Research Fellow, IGD associated with UNISA

Ms. Naidu stated that we are experiencing a landscape that is not static but rather a moving target, which is constantly evolving. Although the spread of globalisation has generally been good, the world is also de-globalising at the same time in numerous ways evident in events such as Brexit, the migration policies, elections that seem to move away from the ideological spectrum even amongst emerging powers. This was the starting point of the presentation and aimed at asking where South Africa fits in this evolving landscape and how South Africa’s foreign policy needs to be repurposed.

Mr. Aziz Pahad’s challenge was to critically assess the foreign policy of the previous two administrations and in this regard, the Jacob Zuma administration plays an important role because it provides a starting point of what is needed in South Africa’s foreign policy. The Zuma administration also speaks to whether South Africa has the capacity to become the BRICS chair or the FOCAC co-chair, and what its legacy will be in terms of the Africa Outreach Partnership that was started by South Africa and has now become an important partnership for the other BRICS members. What is also important is South Africa’s UNSC bid since it is applying for a third term as a non-permanent member.

The starting point is what President Cyril Ramaphosa raised in his first state of the nation address, which was how his administration considers its diplomacy in the year ahead. One of the starting points of this diplomacy is the notion that there is a need to consolidate economic diplomacy. His address was a clear indication that strengthening the economic engagements around the world would be the focus of his administration, which was highlighted by the two main reference points in the speech, the Continental Free Trade Agreement and the enhancement of intra-BRICS trade. Assuming that this is the starting point leads us to the point that repurposing was the key message coming from Davos and that the Ramaphosa administration’s view is to consolidate around the market. South Africa is politically stable, and has policy certainty and a recently announced budget that was relatively well received by international markets. This is the point where analysts should begin to think about what South Africa’s 2018 strategic vision will be, as well as the plan going into the 2019 national elections.

The third point to be made in this context is the message coming from Davos, which somewhat highlighted the message and vision that South Africa’s foreign policy is going to become a foreign economic policy, with strong linkages back to the domestic. A critical point in this regard is whether South Africa has the capacity and bureaucracy required if it is to deliver on the envisioned foreign policy. This will be monitored and analysed critically over the next few months, particularly looking at South Africa’s BRICS presidency, South Africa’s role in SADC, South Africa’s engagements in different regional blocs both within the continent and outside the continent, re-establishing trade partnerships with traditional economic actors. This then leads to the question of how to reconcile all the above into a package that delivers on domestic priorities, with the country’s embassies having to play a central role in this regard.
There have been many different anecdotal stories about South African missions abroad, hence the need to think about a foreign service that is both better professionalised and capable compared to what is currently being observed. This then brings our attention to the Foreign Service bill that is currently before parliament and more importantly what will happen to the South African Development Partnership Agency bill (SADPA) that South Africa wants to create. Ms. Naidu further asked if South Africa has both the financial and human resources needed to cover these activities in the foreign policy.

In conclusion, what appears to be more important is the idea that South Africa has to look to the domestic to see how its foreign policy will be repurposed, this should be the point of departure. There is much happening in the country and that is going to send out the message, which will be a difficult task because it is about economic transformation that has to also satisfy the international community around policy certainty ensuring that the country does not receive another credit downgrading. Therefore the new South Africa is going to be one that concentrates on how the domestic is aided by the international.

**Dr. Garth le Pere: Extraordinary Professor, University of Pretoria**

A conceptual and analytical register called the VUCA effect can be used to make sense of the dialectic between global order and disorder: it is Volatile; it is Uncertain; it is Complex; and it is Ambiguous. The VUCA effect then suggests that the evolving global order is highly fragmented, and this fragmentation is compounded by an eco-system of serious challenges. Here it is possible to include poverty and unemployment, cybercrime and cyber security, demographic change, slow global growth, financial market turbulence, right wing populism, climate change, refugee crises, geo-political instability, terrorism, the Trump effect, the BREXIT conundrum, and then there is a weak multilateral architecture that is incapable of addressing most of these global and systemic concerns.

Dr. le Pere further highlighted several key points of consideration as South Africa hopefully re-designs and rethinks its foreign policy after the desultory and lamentable lost years of Jacob Zuma. Firstly, a rather agnostic and sceptical view, which is that the halcyon and euphoric days of BRICS are over and the world is entering a distinct post-BRICS era of emerging markets. Generally, growth in emerging markets has tended to be volatile, swinging between expansion and crisis. From 2000-2007, average growth of 7% was largely due to high commodity prices, growing global trade, and cheap financing. However, since 2008/2009 more than three-quarters of emerging markets have experienced declining growth due to weaker external demand, which is seen in China’s recalibrating of its economy, and inadequate domestic policy responses to a volatile global economic environment. In short, BRICS are no longer the drivers of the global economy due to structural and cyclical growth constraints.

Secondly, and closely allied to the above point, is a new and ongoing cycle of resource slumps. In the early 2000s, a ‘super cycle’ of global prices for energy and minerals was at a 50-year high and agriculture prices were at a 30-year record. Starting in 2014, there has been a ‘slump cycle’ with a dramatic drop in oil prices of more than 50% to $50 a barrel. Energy prices fell 27%, while metals and food fell 10%. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, the global resource slump will continue until 2020 and oil will only rise to $60 per barrel by 2020.

Secondly, and closely allied to the above point, is a new and ongoing cycle of resource slumps. In the early 2000s, a ‘super cycle’ of global prices for energy and minerals was at a 50-year high and agriculture prices were at a 30-year record. Starting in 2014, there has been a ‘slump cycle’ with a dramatic drop in oil prices of more than 50% to $50 a barrel. Energy prices fell 27%, while metals and food fell 10%. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, the global resource slump will continue until 2020 and oil will only rise to $60 per barrel by 2020.
Thirdly, BRICS countries have to contend with geo-political realignments and changing power dynamics, particularly in the protectionist and populist era of Trump, which has diminished the effectiveness of global institutions and the multilateral system. Dr. le Pere further reiterated the point that has previously been made that since the end of World War II, there has been little transformation if reform of the UNSC is anything to go by. In the IMF, the US controls 16.7% of voting rights compared to China’s 3.8% while Russia’s quota of 2.5% is equal to all of Africa’s 54 countries combined.

The fourth consideration is the expansion of the geography of violent Islamist extremism, with active fronts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Somalia, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. We have also seen rising radicalisation and attacks across Western Europe and increasingly the United States. There has been a six-fold increase in the number of global terror attacks from 2,750 in 2006 to 16,800 in 2014. Globalisation magnifies the threat: extremist networks use modern Information Technologies (IT) and social media to advertise, recruit and raise money. ISIS supporters reputedly have 46,000 Twitter accounts, and make use of open air travel and shipping amenities, visa free travel areas, and global money transfers and financial networks.

The fifth relates to current trends in IT, these disrupt regulation in various sectors and challenge traditional business models. Tech companies such as Google, Yahoo, Facebook and Twitter have higher valuations than ordinary firms based on higher price-to-revenue ratios. Therefore, in future, IT firms will dominate top global companies and advances in data generation, storage, and analysis will allow almost everything to be personalised from media, advertising to medicine. These shifts in IT usability, mobility, and sociability will affect how consumers interact with one another and the growing business and private sector in South Africa, as in other emerging markets, has to be alive to this reality. The final consideration is evolving artificial intelligence, which is a major feature of the fourth industrial revolution mentioned by President Ramaphosa in his address. Artificial intelligence is increasingly used in fields as diverse as finance, journalism, medicine, retail, and engineering as well as for making lethal battlefield decisions through its integration into advanced weapons systems.

There are three types of Artificial Intelligence: Artificial Narrow Intelligence which only specialises in one area and cannot perform any other task (playing chess would be an example). Second, is Artificial General Intelligence, which can perform any task that a human can, and includes complex reasoning, thinking abstractly and learning from experience (for example managing the supply chain of a supermarket). The third is Artificial Super Intelligence, which is more intelligent than humans in many areas and is a major focus of concern. Artificial Super Intelligence is estimated to take off around 2075, about 30 years after Artificial General Intelligence has been achieved. However and in general, Artificial Intelligence raises first order ethical and philosophical concerns as well as great uncertainties about the future of work and labour markets, management, and the organisation of production systems.

In conclusion, against this selective background and in the context of the VUCA effect, Dr. le Pere explained that the revival of South African foreign policy will require sorely lacking competences in four key areas. These key areas are; adaptive and visionary leadership that is normatively grounded; strategic and analytical foresight; tactical policy literacy and intelligence; and high levels of managerial ability and agility.
In reflecting on former President Jacob Zuma’s interactions with Africa within the context of South Africa’s diplomatic momentum, Prof. Khadiagala explained that this momentum had declined under the Zuma administration. Central to this debate, it is possible to pose a question that has three larger perspectives; firstly, foreign policy is about seizing opportunity where those opportunities exist. The key element here being that those opportunities exist to begin with as it would not make sense to have a foreign policy where those opportunities do not exist. This forms the very basic theory of leadership, which states that there are very few opportune moments that can be seized for foreign policy, especially regarding South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa. The Zuma administration had very few opportunities to make a big difference in Africa, comparing it to the Mbeki administration would be very unrealistic and it would conceal very significant continuities between the Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma administrations.

Secondly, it is my opinion that the cheapest foreign policy for South Africa in Africa is for South Africa to succeed at home; this is what Prof. Khadiagala further referred to as the theory of raw modelling, a theory of foreign policy as emulation. The biggest contributor to the damage to South Africa’s image on the continent was when it appeared as if South Africa was going to fail as a state, this is a very important concept for foreign policy by emulation, or by example. When analysts began to see the collapse or damage of South Africa’s institutions, this had a negative effect on foreign policy in Africa and this needs to be revisited to see how the current Ramaphosa administration begins to rebuild institutions as a way of strengthening its image in Africa.

And thirdly, collective leadership in African issues has been a key element of South Africa’s presence in Africa. It is important that South Africa returns to managing African issues through African partnerships. This then leads us to the very important question of how would South Africa create new partnerships around key issues and how alliances would be created, whether it be the tripartite agreement or the African Union (AU). Collective leadership is the only game in town, and South Africa is not going to win if it is not working with its colleagues.

Having given the above three main points, how should Zuma’s administration of foreign policy in Africa be evaluated, its strengths and weaknesses? One approach would be the issue around collective leadership and building alliances. There was temptation around unilateralism which hurt South Africa’s engagements with Africa. Another would be the many inconsistencies around African issues and there are many examples to this regard, such as South Africa’s handling of the Libya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) situations. The third aspect is that South Africa assumed leadership roles in the wrong issues, such as the issue of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and taking on crusades that were not very helpful. South Africa needs to take a step back and evaluate where it can lead better. There is a need for strong leadership in SADC such as on issues like the (DRC), we know what is broken in the DRC, and this matter becomes a habitual
problem for South Africa since President Kabila is in SADC. The situation in the DRC requires strong leadership from South Africa rather than cushioning President Kabila.

There are areas where South Africa would have to exercise leadership in the long run, however, these areas are quite problematic; Ethiopia is collapsing, which is concerning because of the AU’s location and Ethiopia’s regional importance. The Horn of Africa is another area that requires attention, so is Kenya, which is also in the region. The DRC requires more energy, which should not be a problem since institutions such as SADC are already in place.

In conclusion, there is a need for more intellectual leadership that will be translated into very clear policy documents; serious ANC documents on foreign policy are needed. There is also a need for a foreign policy establishment shake-up, not that foreign policy should be in the hands of the same people for up to nine years but rather that there is a clear vision and direction of where foreign policy should go and what it should achieve. African policy has suffered as a result of continuity in leadership rather than continuity in the bigger picture. The significance of normative leadership should not be underestimated and it has been lacking. If South Africa were to return to this style of leadership, whether at the AU level or even at the domestic level, it would be a significant achievement.

Dr. Mabutho Shangase: Senior Research Fellow, IGD associated with UNISA

South Africa assumed the chairship of SADC six months ago and much has happened in that time: There has been a change in South Africa’s governing party as well as a new national president; and Zimbabwe, neighbour and fellow SADC member, also has a new president.

This presentation focused on three areas; the progress report on South Africa’s chairship, the alignment and areas of congruence with other regional blocs such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC) and lastly, the contingencies into the future since President Ramaphosa has just recently took over office. South Africa assumed chairship of SADC from Swaziland in August 2017, under the theme “Partnering with the Private Sector in Developing Industry and Regional Value Chains”. The SADC objectives are informed by the SADC Common Agenda and are comprised of four blueprints: The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) (2015-2020), which forms the third of the five year plans with the first being in 2001; the Regional Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap (RISR), the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO), and the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan (RIDMP).

South Africa has two main objectives for its SADC chairship, institutionalisation of the relationship between governments and the regional private sector, and operationalisation of the SADC adopted industrialisation policy and its costed action plan. The symbiotic relationship between industrialisation and infrastructure development cannot be overstated as former President Jacob Zuma indicated, in one of the sessions, SADC cannot realise industrialisation if it does not bolster our capacity for infrastructure development. The master plan identified three areas; agro processing, mineral beneficiation and manufacturing.
The Lesotho Water Transfer Scheme under the Orange-Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM), ratified by Lesotho, Botswana, South Africa and Namibia, the agreement for which funding was approved by the African Development Bank (AFDB).

The second objective of South Africa’s SADC chairship is the involvement of the private sector. In this regard, mining giant De Beers, in Botswana, has been heavily involved in the water transfer scheme and even facilitating one of the first meetings to this effect. The second project is the Inter-state Natural Gas Committee which was created in order to marshal ideas for the facilitation of a gas exploitation regime that will contribute towards the regional energy mix. The ministers of finance from the SADC region have recently concluded the institutional underpinnings towards the realisation of this project with technical assistance coming from the AFDB. The last ideal that is targeted by this project is the establishment of a Regional Development Fund (RDF). The idea of the RDF is to move away from borrowing from traditional institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, it is the promotion of turning to regional institutions rather than international institutions for loans which is similar to what is envisioned through the BRICS Development Bank.

Looking at achievements made outside the infrastructure projects, there is progress which has been obtained under South Africa’s chairship. South Africa has been able to facilitate the acceleration of democracy through on-going talks with the government of the DRC regarding fast tracking the next national elections in the DRC, one contentious issue has been about setting up timelines and specific dates for these elections to which SADC suggest setting up an office in Kinshasa in order to monitor the process. The implementations of the SADC recommendations in Lesotho which were looking at the reform of the constitution, reform of the security sector, ending political instability. The strengthening of strategic partnerships with the private sector in developing industry and regional value chains and the continued processing of the Burundi SADC membership application are also progress areas under South Africa’s SADC chairship.

Lastly, regarding areas of congruence and alignment with other regional blocs, there has been overlap with previous speakers. The achievement of a Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement (TFFA) that has been ratified by 26 countries with a collective population of 625 million people and an estimated US $1 trillion GDP has been the greatest achievement of South Africa’s chairship. However, there have been a number of delays in reaching these targets dating back to 2010 and 2015 when looking at the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and East African Community (EAC). The other delay is regarding the adoption of a single currency as well as the economic union which will not meet its 2018 target date. The achievement of a TFFA will hopefully lead to a continental free trade area as well as the realisation of an African Economic Community (AEC) (as envisioned in the Lagos Act of 1980 and the Abuja Treaty of 1991).

In conclusion, it is not foreseeable that the Ramaphosa administration will continue implementing the above objectives. President Ramaphosa has previously played an instrumental role in the resolving of the political crisis in Lesotho while he was still deputy president, so this should signal continuation in areas such as industrialisation and regional value chains. South Africa is half way into its tenure as SADC chair and will be handing over to Namibia in August 2018.

Question and answer session

In the question and answer segment of the panel, the audience raised a number of distinct areas of discussion; Firstly, an audience member remarked that there is a clear indication that economic diplomacy is the focus of South Africa’s foreign policy. There were questions whether this would mean a reduction in South Africa’s peacekeeping and mediation efforts. The panel reflected and explained that the challenge remains in balancing domestic considerations and resources that you need to invest domestically with your obligations and what you would like to achieve externally. The result is then that you choose where to get involved and where to turn a blind eye, a decision that goes beyond just peacekeeping but involves choosing to act in your best interests.

Another perspective is that there has not necessarily been a decrease in South Africa’s peacekeeping and mediation efforts but rather that it goes back to participating in priority areas and not over extending resources but choosing where it is important to be visible, and visibility is a problem of choice. Presence in Africa remains strategic, and it is important to choose your partners and create a few alliances to work with. South Africa will now have to pick new partners to work with, like Rwanda or Nigeria.
Next, South Africa’s position in Africa was discussed; the audience wanted to know if South Africa still saw itself as a gateway and a representative of the continent in the global economic environment. The panel explained that this is an overplayed argument; strategically it does not make sense for business people to use South Africa as a way to get into Africa, as there are many gateways in Africa. All roads are currently leading to East Africa with the Silk Road initiative, although the instability in Kenya and Ethiopia is putting the potential benefits at risk and South Africa needs to be careful of playing into a narrative that might negatively affect the strategic role and vision that it wants to achieve.
In exploring the BRICS membership, the audience expounded on Professor le Pere’s statement whereby the euphoric days of BRICS were over; whether this meant that the hopes that came with the establishment of this grouping are dwindling and what the implications for the recently developed NDB were?

It was further discussed that because BRICS is not normatively grounded; it is made up of five very different members, and the membership cannot go beyond the geopolitical landscape. While the term BRICS came about from the idea of an investment banker, Jim O’ Neil, it then gathered a life of its own to become a geopolitical construct that got people excited. It is also important to recognise that the BRICS countries started cooperating long before Jim O’ Neil coined the actual term. Dr. le Pere explained that BRICS does not have an internal coherent normative, it is very transactional and is about what we can get from the global system. It is thus note necessarily pushing a transformative agenda that locates BRICS within the Global South and the new global agenda. The challenge for South Africa is whether we can create a normative centre of gravity and develop some kind of internal chemistry and a common vision of what it is we want to do, away from the current transactional logic. He then asked if South Africa can create a normative ideology. Dr le Pere went on to say that, an organisation that had a normative agenda that was grounded in a strong normative agenda of the global South was the India Brazil South Africa (IBSA) group. However, this group has lost momentum in recent years.

The next question asked where the de-colonialism debate can be located in South Africa’s foreign policy analysis. It was then expressed by the panel that South Africa is still in the colonial debate and it is still wrestling with issues of how its image and perception is received in the rest of the world. The debate around the financing of African institutions is very much a de-colonial debate, and it is important to step back and see that if these institutions are important, we need to pay for them. This also brings us back to the issue of whether Africa wants to be a self-sufficient continent and what does self-confidence mean, it means self-funding African institutions.

The session closed with a discussion of the possible impact of the repurposing of South Africa’s foreign policy in the ASEAN region; and South Africa’s position as chair of IORA, and how that could impact cooperation in SADC. It was determined that there are many overlaps in this regard as well as areas of alignment and congruence hence the focus remains the same.

Panel 2: Global Engagement and South-South Cooperation

Ms. Faith Mabera: Senior Researcher, IGD associated with UNISA

After President Cyril Ramaphosa’s state of the nation address, one commentator called foreign policy the governmental stepchild, referring to its scant coverage of foreign policy engagements. Save for the mention of South Africa’s plan to accede to the TFTAA and the Continental Free Trade Area and the utility of the BRICS group in the promotion of value-added trade and intrastate investment, domestic issues and economic diplomacy constituted the bulk of the president’s speech. Yet this year will be a hive of activity for South Africa’s foreign policy enterprise. Apart from chairing SADC, BRICS and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and wrapping up its co-chairing of the Forum for China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC), SA will be the sole African member of the Group of 20 (G-20). Looking ahead to 2019, it seems to be all systems go for South Africa’s third tenure (2019-2020) as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.
Closer to home, as the Ramaphosa administration finds its feet on the diplomatic front, South Africa will have to take stock of its positioning in the African context and whether its moral and political capital will demand a repurposing, not only in diplomatic momentum but also of priorities and strategies. For instance, will observers see an African agenda 2.0, distinct from the Nelson Mandela era (focused on South Africa’s credentials of good international citizenship), Thabo Mbeki’s overdrive into institutionalising and fine-tuning South Africa’s foreign policy, or Jacob Zuma’s thrust in economic diplomacy, albeit of the “Look East” variety? While the state of the nation address resonated deeply with economic development and foreign economic strategy, Ramaphosa’s exposition pointed to the oft-overlooked dynamics underpinning the entanglement of domestic politics and international relations.

There is a bold recognition of the delicate balancing act between national interests and international engagements, and the centrality of structural factors that underpin sound policy decisions, such as a strong, capable state and an efficient bureaucracy, including a professional diplomatic service. In the context of foreign policy analysis, the interaction between the domestic sphere and the global arena has been depicted as a two-level game in which leaders seek to achieve negotiated outcomes at the international level that gain domestic approval. As such, these outcomes or win-sets at international level are shaped by preferences and coalitions, inputs by domestic political institutions and actors seeking to influence outcomes, and bargaining strategies employed by the foreign policy elite at the international level.

In pursuit of basic foreign policy goals — security, autonomy, wealth and a reorganisation of global power — it is imperative that South Africa goes back to the drawing board, garnering lessons from past triumphs and blunders and injecting strategic direction to foreign policy. The profiling of South Africa as a pluralist middle power and the prioritisation of multilateralism as a key pillar of its foreign policy demands solid normative consistency between South Africa’s domestic political framework and its objectives in the global arena.

An examination of the core business of the multilateral forums South Africa is participating in 2018 reveals consistency with domestic priorities: The IORA 2018 theme is “Uniting the Peoples of Africa, Asia, Australasia and the Middle East through Enhanced Co-operation for Peace, Stability and Sustainable Development”. As chair, South Africa will seek to align the activities of the association with the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy in maritime security, capacity building, skills development and technology transfer in the ocean economy. The SADC 2018 theme is “Partnering with the Private Sector in Developing Industry and Regional Value Chains”, in line with the SADC Common Agenda and regional plans. The BRICS 2018 theme is “Inclusive Development Through a Socially Responsive Economy”, prioritising economic prosperity and inclusive growth; science and technology; conflict resolution, peace and social justice; and revisiting the global commons by strengthening responsible forms of strategic co-operation and sustainable development.

In FOCAC, South Africa is overseeing the implementation of the Johannesburg Plan of Action (2016-18). South Africa is co-chair of the G-20’s development working group as well as the Africa advisory group on the G-20 Compact with Africa. These priorities reveal an overlap in thematic and strategic focus that dovetails the priorities set out in the National Development Plan (NDP) as well as Africa’s Agenda 2063. It remains to be seen whether South Africa will be able to connect the dots on the foreign policy agenda while proving adept at playing the two-level game in diplomacy and domestic politics.

Professor Narnia Bohler-Muller: Executive Director, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery Programme, HSRC

South Africa began chairing the IORA forum in October 2017 and will remain chair for the next two years. In my opinion, this particular multilateral regional forum is relatively comfortable in a normative sense, which is very unusual as it consists of 21 members around the Indian Ocean Rim and with six dialogue partners including Germany, recently joining. There is a secretariat in Mauritius, it holds everything together, and it is very committed, which is what makes the academic group different from BRICS. There is central coordination around the work done and this has proven very invaluable. There is coordination between IORA’s chair, the Department of Science and Technology (DST), as well as the DIRCO. This multilateral forum is a comfortable place to be because there is one thing that this region has in kind and is important to them and that is the Indian Ocean as well as the resources that are found in the water and surrounding areas. The Indian Ocean is geo-strategically important and simultaneously it is valuable due to the resources from the ocean as well as the trade that takes place in the waters.
Indonesia performed well in 2017 and hosted the first leadership summit of the IORA. Whereas previous years have only had a ministerial summit, the Jakarta Concord was adopted at this summit, and it clearly states what IORA priorities are in the action plan. The association has a set of priorities and South Africa also has a subset of priorities on the side that set out to honour national interests as well. The two new cross cutting areas in IORA are the Blue Economy and Women Empowerment. Australia pushed for the gender agenda, particularly women’s economic empowerment, although this took a number of years to materialise; an agenda declaration that recognises gender equality within the context of human rights has now been incorporated. IORA members were able to work together to eventually agree on this kind of agenda, even countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran. There is a lot of sincerity in the way this association operates and this is something many multilateral associations can learn.

South Africa has identified a number of priority areas for its tenure as IORA chair and Africa is at the top of those priorities. South Africa intends to lobby African countries within IORA to work together, particularly East African countries and Small Island Development countries. Issues relating to the environment and climate change are predominantly important to these countries.

The Blue Economy was originally linked to the work done around the ocean’s economy by Operation Phakisa, the term Blue Economy is preferred by IORA as it focusses on sustainability. This will be South Africa’s second priority area and this has been something that South Africa has been pushing for over the last three years, so we are very happy that the Blue Economy core group has achieved a permanent role and is now the Blue Economy working group within the region and this is going to be very important. Although the issue of water is included in the Blue Economy, it is somehow falling in importance on the agenda. South Africa has been pushing the water agenda within IORA and a water core group has been created, which was initiated by South Africa’s Water Research Commission. Countries now have an interesting set of recommendations around what can be done in terms of cooperation with Cape Town being at the forefront in this regard. The key area of these guidelines is the issue of innovation and why it seems to be lacking. Countries such as Yemen and the UAE are very keen to contribute towards up-scaling and training around issues of water and innovative ways of water conservation.

The third priority for South Africa’s tenure as IORA chair is women empowerment, an agenda that is included in all forums, however, this is a challenge because the representatives are often predominantly male. In situations, there may be only one woman for every ten men in a forum, so South Africa needs to have some form of a quota in this regard.

The final priority area is safety and security. IORA is not a defence organisation so we have the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Unfortunately, IONS and IORA have not gelled because IORA is steering clear of the military matters relating to foreign policy. Although there have been agreements on coast guards working together, naval military cooperation or exercises were opposed by the more powerful countries in IORA. The issues of safety and security are based on early warning systems, disaster management, illegal fishing, as well as softer security issues such as food security. Food security
is an issue because while there is shortage of food inland, there is a problem of over utilised resources in water. These issues are discussed within IORA with aims of finding solutions.

South Africa has taken over the chairship of IORA in a strong position, as previously India had put in a lot of effort into the forum, followed by Australia, then Indonesia and now South Africa. The new Secretary General is Ambassador Dr. Nomvuyo Nokwe, who was appointed at the beginning of 2018. South Africa is in a good position to influence the IORA agenda within the region while simultaneously taking into account the consensus that already exists within the region, so there are no efforts from South Africa to try to turn anything around but to rather strengthen areas that need strengthening. There is also talk of implementing a UN Resolution from 1971, which has never been implemented and thus makes the peace and security agenda more challenging. South Africa is also bringing this matter to the table and it remains to be seen what developments will follow. There are a number of issues that stick out; IONS, the zone of peace, the issue of France and the Commons, as well as Pakistan because India will leave the association if Pakistan becomes a member.

There are geopolitical tensions within the region but because the focus has been more along the lines of cooperating, up-scaling training and information sharing, it has been a very successful association for the past few years. The South African national academic group dealing with IORA priority areas is chaired by DIRCO, HSRC, DST, the Department of Higher Education and Training as well as the Water Research Commission meaning that researchers and academics within the country are working on various issues that translate into the agenda. The other IORA countries are also trying to come up with similar groups since this is proving to be working very well for South Africa. South Africa has strong academic networks that are working on areas that are of importance to the region and their focus is one that will ideally feed into national policy as well as trade and industry within the region. Although trade is not really the focus of IORA, it has increased significantly.

Dr. Neissan Besharati: Senior Research Fellow, IGD associated with UNISA

Drawing from academia and first-hand experience, Dr. Besharati started by explaining international development cooperation and South-South cooperation as important areas for South Africa’s foreign policy. South Africa’s engagement in Africa is not a choice; it is determined by domestic issues, which are extremely tied to Africa as a whole. A crisis in Africa is a crisis in South Africa, development in Africa is development in South Africa. A war in Congo or Somalia will lead to more people seeking refuge in South Africa as will a food or economic crisis in Zimbabwe or Malawi. This then has a negative impact on national services, creates more dissatisfaction domestically due to more people competing for the already scarce jobs and resources leading to instances of xenophobic violence as well as tribal conflict as has already been observed in South Africa and other countries. This proves that South Africa cannot choose not to get involved in Africa; it has to step in to ensure that the rest of Africa is in a healthy shape.
South Africa is the most developed economy in Africa but has a relatively small market with less than 60 million people, eventually the corporate companies will want to expand their markets to the other 1 billion people in the rest of the continent, hence the growth of the South African business sectors continue to grow across Africa. Dr. Besharati highlighted the South African Development Cooperation model, which is not aid or charity nor is it what is traditionally thought of when modern institutions offer aid to developing worlds, but rather enlightened self-interest. Although it does have an element of Ubuntu, helping fellow African brothers and sisters particularly those who helped South Africa during the fight against apartheid it is a much more mutual benefit and horizontal relationship. Hence, South Africa feels that it is part of the South-South cooperation model and paradigm, which is quite different from the North-South side cooperation model of development in its procedures, values and norms.

South-South cooperation includes what is traditionally considered as aid and technical cooperation. What is unique is the emphasis on trade, investment, financing for infrastructure, and these are very particular traits of South-South cooperation. This is also the case in South Africa where there is also an economic relationship aside from the aid aspect. Sharing a common history, territory, land and culture also allows South Africa’s support to be tailored and adaptable to the conditions of other African countries. There are two very distinct and unique features of South Africa’s development cooperation model that make it stand out in the global landscape. Firstly, South Africa prides itself on its democracy and institutions. Although observers may find problems with these institutions, they remain among the most functioning institutions in Africa. South Africa has been involved in many technical and capacity building projects with other Africa peers in key institutions on topics such as public financial management. Secondly, the peace building and the Post Conflict Reconstruction Development (PCRD) approach has remained a priority.

Peace and security are instrumental in Africa, and the AU has said that there is no development without peace, making peace and security central to the African agenda. South Africa has one of the biggest armies in Africa in this context, both in terms of personnel and equipment and because South Africa is not engaged in war with another country, this budget has been directed to supporting peace and stability on the continent. This is often displayed through helping to organise ballots, sending ballots to remote areas, providing human logistical support in droughts, or training or mediation that South African leaders have been involved in. A large part of South Africa’s contribution to Africa has been in the peace building dimension.

The question is how this has developed over the years? Although the main features have remained the same, the emphasis has slightly changed depending on the leadership that we have. Nelson Mandela was an international figure hence his emphasis was on the international, however, it is possible to argue that the peak of South Africa’s development cooperation was during the Mbeki administration. During this time, the focus was on Africa, either through the establishment of NEPAD, African Renaissance, and APRM as well as on solving the DRC crisis, which was funded using tax payers’ money and other resources. This focus on Africa was a key feature of the Mbeki administration. However, there was a counter movement in South Africa and within the ANC with people questioning why money and resources were being spent resolving outside issues while South African citizens were experiencing issues of unemployment, poverty and poor service delivery. This can be attributed to the decline in foreign policy traction of the Zuma administration as well as a decline in South Africa’s engagement on the continent.

One of South Africa’s biggest accomplishments in foreign policy under the Zuma administration has been its BRICS membership. In terms of the current Ramaphosa administration, it is still very early to say in which direction we will go. Although it is possible that the Ramaphosa administration will continue to focus on domestic issues, which may overshadow the foreign policy issues. The SONA and the budget speech have emphasised that the budget is going to go towards social grants, the National Health Insurance (NHI), and free education, all while there is a budget deficit and an economy that is not growing hence the lack of appetite to spend money outside the country. Nonetheless, this is based on observing President Ramaphosa, his background, and his interest in supporting South African foreign investment, big businesses, as well as his interests in the regional trade agreements. Ministers Naledi Pandor and Lindiwe Zulu have on various occasions emphasised that it cannot always be the big South African businesses that go out into Africa but also the small and medium enterprises.

In terms of going forward, although South Africa has decreased in development diplomacy, the lead is still big, bigger than South Africans and the government know and this is due to the fact that every department in South Africa is engaged in cooperation with partners in Africa and the rest of the world through one form or another. There is a lot of international
cooperation going on, however, there is no central coordination or registry of this. What is very important is that South Africans can measure what these engagements are and many South African academics have done different exercises that have shown that South Africa’s support to other African countries is huge and is comparable to the OECD countries and even China and India.

In conclusion, South Africa is chairing the BRICS this year and it has always been seen as a junior partner in this group and not on equal footing with the other members. However, once we start counting our development efforts it will come out in the billions putting us in the same league as China and India in terms of supporting Africa.

Mrs. Susana Caputi: Senior Associate on Latin America and the Caribbean, IGD associated with UNISA

Argentina’s G20 presidency will emphasize continuity in process and policy substance while turning to innovation in incorporating Latin American and Caribbean perspectives into the G20 agenda. Pertinent to issues of the Global South, Argentina will continue with the G20 partnership with Africa launched under the German presidency in 2017, looking to broaden the Compact with Africa (CWA) to encompass Latin America and the Caribbean. Building on macro-economic, business and financing frameworks, the CWA entails a focused approach to country-specific compacts aimed at coordinating investment programmes, promoting investor-friendly domestic resource mobilization, providing risk insurance and fostering long-term public-private partnerships.

The CWA, which operates on a voluntary basis, currently has 10 African countries which have committed to improve their framework conditions for private investment, including infrastructure. With close linkages to the AU Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the CWA’s emphasis on investment and sustainable development agendas is attuned to relevant issues for Africa’s economic transformation. However, the sustainability of the G20-Africa partnership is also dependent on the ability of G20 policies to match the needs and priorities of ordinary Africans. For instance, evidence-based policy research shows African priorities include generation of employment, improved education and public health and increased attention to food security.

Argentina’s G20 2018 priorities, include a focus on:

• The future of work: Access to quality training, developing new skills in the age of digital revolution;
• Infrastructure development: Sustainable projects as the bedrock for national well-being; and
• Food security: Quality food management in the face of rapid population growth and climate challenges.

All the above dovetail with the priorities of African citizens. Argentina’s presidency is an opportune moment to maintain the momentum in the G20-Africa partnership, to follow-up on the implementation of the CWA and to broaden the partnership by integrating Latin-American comparative advantages in cross-cutting areas such as energy, trade and climate action.

Argentina has invited the 2018 chair of the AU (Rwanda) and NEPAD (Senegal) to attend G20 meetings. Ambassador Pedro Villagra Delgado, Argentina’ G20 Sherpa visited the AU headquarters in February before coming to South Africa to engage continental leaders and listen to their priorities. This unprecedented step has been welcomed. This is the first time the G20 has had a Sherpa hold a meaningful dialogue with African and South African officials in order to gather views on the G20 agenda, and hear what we, in Africa would like to see the G20 focus on. The AU officials’ concern was with the sustainability of external foreign debt and the need for the Compact with Africa (CWA) to start rolling out projects with deliverables.

Furthermore, it is important that the engagement of the South African government, who is a pivotal participant as co-chair alongside Germany in the G20 Africa Advisory Group and also as co-chair in the Development Working Group, highlight strategic options for African stakeholders in bringing African perspectives to the G20 agenda and capitalizing on initiatives proposed by G20 policy makers in alignment with African needs, priorities and mechanisms. Such agency is crucial in ensuring the fit, relevancy and eventual institutionalisation of the G20 partnership with Africa in the long-term. On the international front, 2018 is significant for Argentina in several multilateral forums. In addition to the G20 presidency, Argentina will also host the annual meeting of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in March 2018. This is the second time that Argentina will host the IDB annual meeting since 1996, bringing together finance ministers and central bank governors from 48 member states as well as representatives from multilateral finance institutions, development institutes and the private banking sector.
The meeting presents a platform for the exchange of ideas and deliberation of key policies pertinent to multilateral development finance including the funding of infrastructure, social development projects and climate mitigation. Preparations are also underway in Buenos Aires as the city looks to host the UN High-Level Conference on South-South Cooperation in 2019, marking 40 years since the adoption of the 1978 Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (BAPA). Consequently, Argentina will also prioritise the G20 working groups on Energy Sustainability, Development (whose main goal is implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development), and Employment. A key element of addressing Africa’s development priorities in the G20 is dovetailing African needs and priorities with the G20 partnership.

This means moving beyond a wax and wane approach to African needs so that the G20 partnership with Africa becomes institutionalised and systemized. Achieving the Africa-G20 synergy means not only incorporating African voices and perspectives in G20 work streams and task forces, but also in matching G20 initiatives with the realities and needs of African citizens. With close linkages to the AU Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the CwA’s emphasis on investment and sustainable development agendas is attuned to relevant issues for Africa’s economic transformation. Though laudable, the CwA omits the emphasis on quality basic education, which is crucial to securing the base for Africa’s economic transformation.

Argentina’s prioritisation of the future of work and development of skills is very important; the reality of the situation on the ground in many African countries is the need to improve on basic education. In terms of the involvement between the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), also known as the Southern Common Market, and South Africa, a preferential trade agreement (PTA) comprising of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay was concluded and signed back in 2009. While the scope of the market opening is more limited, once ratified, the PTA will create a legal and institutional framework for managing South Africa’s trade relations with these important countries of the South and offer further opportunities to improve South Africa’s export growth in the coming years.

All these negotiations have been pursued alongside South Africa’s partners in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), comprising of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, following the entry into force of the SACU Agreement in 2004 that requires the customs union to negotiate all trade agreements as a bloc. Over the last five years the importance of building trade and investment relations with the new poles of economic growth in the world, that is countries of the South have become ever more compelling. This inexorable change in the economic geography of the world economy requires more purposeful effort to diversify South Africa’s trade and investment relations to benefit from the rapid and dynamic economic growth in the South. The South African Department of Trade and Industry, along with other departments in government, have made an ongoing contribution, particularly in negotiating PTAs with MERCOSUR.

**Question and answer session**

In the question and answer segment of the panel, the audience raised three distinct areas of discussion; firstly, as some BRICS members are known for having particular views on human rights, how could South Africa approach the human rights agenda as BRICS chair? In the BRICS context, the human rights agenda is just not there and this is for obvious reasons whereas IBSA was normatively more aligned. It would thus be important to understand how BRICS countries position themselves within existing human rights norms, which involve more than individual human rights depending on country and region.

Next, the discussion turned to the perception that South Africa is often considered a junior partner in the BRICS partnership and if there was an aim to renegotiate its position in BRICS. The panel observed that South Africa has been fortunate to be part of this grouping because it is not in the same league as the other members in economic or demographic terms. Being a part of this group already gives South Africa more mileage in terms of foreign policy and international credibility.

Lastly, the audience explored the notion of foreign policy further, particularly relating to peacekeeping and peace building on the continent. Considering that South Africa is long overdue a military upgrade, it was highlighted that the money for the upgrade would have to be spent on things such as weapon upgrades, logistical deployment, and rations for soldiers to name a few.
Vote of thanks and closing remarks

Ambassador Prof. Iqbal Jhazbhay

There will be a lot to talk about in future, including the Commonwealth Leaders' Summit, which President Ramaphosa will be attending from the 16-20 April 2018, in London. The discussions here today have provided us with much to debate and discuss in other spheres and platforms. Amb. Jhazbhay also added that there are a number of sub-committees that have been set up to begin the process of implementing the national resolutions of the ANC conference on international relations, which will be another subject for future discussion in terms of framing the national priorities in international relations.
IGD - HSRC Roundtable
Programme, 22 February 2018
Forum 150, Ground Floor, HSRC Building, 134 Pretorius Street, Pretoria
South Africa & the World 2018

9:00 – 9:30  Arrival and registration

9:30 – 9:45  Welcome and opening remarks by Dr. Philani Mthembu (Executive Director, Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD)) and Mr. Aziz Pahad (Council Member, South African Council of International Relations)

9:45 – 11:00  Panel 1 – Foreign Policy & Geopolitical Landscapes

Panel Chair: Mr. Francis Kornegay (Senior Research Fellow, IGD)
Ms. Sanusha Naidu (Senior Research Fellow, IGD)
Dr. Garth L. le Pere (Extraordinary Professor, University of Pretoria)
Prof. Gilbert Khadiagala (Head, African Centre for the Study of the United States, University of the Witwatersrand)
Dr. Mabutho Shangase (Senior Research Fellow, IGD)

Q & A Session

11:00 – 11:30  Tea break

11:30 – 13:00  Panel 2 – Global Engagement & South-South Cooperation

Panel Chair: Ms. Arina Muresan (Researcher, IGD)
Ms. Faith Mabera (Senior Researcher, IGD)
Prof. Narnia Bohler-Muller (Executive Director, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery Programme, HSRC)
Dr. Neissan Besharati (Senior Research Fellow, IGD)
Ms. Susana Caputi (Senior Associate, IGD)

Q & A Session

13:00 – 13:10  Vote of thanks and close by Amb. Prof. Iqbal Jhazbhay (Board member, IGD)

13:10  Lunch
About the Institute for Global Dialogue, associated with UNISA

The IGD is an independent foreign policy and diplomacy think tank dedicated to the analysis of and dialogue on global dynamics that have a bearing on South Africa in Africa. It advances a balanced, relevant and policy-oriented analysis, debate and documentation of South Africa’s role in international relations and diplomacy.

The IGD’s research agenda has three broad programmatic focus areas: foreign policy analysis with special reference to the making and management of foreign policy and diplomatic tools like economic, developmental, and public diplomacy; African studies focusing on the role of regional and continental integration in African politics and development as well as the study of peace diplomacy; and international diplomacy, analysing dynamics in international diplomacy that have a bearing on African peace and prosperity.

In 2010, following a strategic review the institute entered into its strategic partnership with the University of South Africa, the biggest university in the southern hemisphere to pursue through research, publications and community engagement the shared vision of a prosperous and peaceful Africa in a progressive global order.

3rd Floor Robert Sobukwe Building
263 Nana Sita Street
Pretoria South Africa
PO Box 14349
The Tramshed
0126
Pretoria South Africa
+27123376082
+27862129442
info@igd.org.za
www.igd.org.za