THE BALI OUTCOME:
“WHITHER WORLD TRADE NEGOTIATIONS?”

11 April 2014
Burgers Park Hotel, Pretoria

Compiled by Mabutho Xolani Shangase
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Institute for Global Dialogue
3rd Floor Robert Sobukwe Building
263 Nana Sita Street
Pretoria

Tel: +27 12 337 6082
Fax: 086 212 9442
info@igd.org.za
www.igd.org.za

Editor: Beth le Roux
Design and layout: Andri Steyn


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“The event was made possible by Friedrich – Ebert – Stiftung”
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Africa Pacific Caribbean</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil Russia India China South Africa</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>DTI</td>
<td>Department of Trade and Industry</td>
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<td>FES</td>
<td>Friedrich Ebert Stiftung</td>
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<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>NEDLAC</td>
<td>National Economic Development and Labour Council</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SDTs</td>
<td>Special Directional Treatments</td>
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<td>SAIIA</td>
<td>South African Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<td>TTIP</td>
<td>Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<td>US</td>
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE SPEAKERS

Mr Xavier Carim is the Deputy Director General (DDG): International Trade and Economic, Development, at the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Mr Carim holds a Bachelor of Arts Specialist Honours Degree in International Relations and Development Economics from the University of Toronto, Canada; a Master of Arts Degree in International Studies from Rhodes University, Grahamstown. He was a Research Fellow at the Centre for Southern African Studies and Lecturer in International Studies at University of the Western Cape, from 1993 to 1995. Mr Carim joined the DTI, multilateral trade section, in November 1995. He served as South Africa's representative to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in Geneva, from September 1998 to May 2002. He was appointed Chief Director in International Trade and Economic Division, DTI, responsible for Foreign Trade Agreements (FTA) and WTO trade negotiations from May 2002. In March 2007 Mr Carim was appointed Deputy Director-General for International Trade and Economic Division in March 2007.

Ms Memory Dube is Senior Researcher, at the South African Institute of International Affairs Economic and Diplomacy Programme, working on the Institute’s Global Economics project. The project that she works on considers economic governance as broadly defined, looking at key institutions and groupings such as the G20; Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS), G7/8, India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA), the World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) etc. Ms Dube’s areas of research interest include trade policy reform, WTO policy, regional economic integration, as well as trade and sustainable development. She holds an LLB (cum laude) from the University of Fort Hare, an LLM from Rhodes University and an LLM (cum laude) in International Trade and Investment Law from the University of Pretoria.

Ms Liepollo Pheko is the Executive Director at The Trade Collective. Ms Pheko is a renowned policy analyst, lecturer, social activist and development practitioner and has worked in the public and development sectors for around twenty years. Pheko serves as Executive Director at a progressive research and advocacy think tank called the Trade Collective. Pheko writes a monthly online column and has contributed to books entitled From Slave Trade to Free Trade, Gender and Politics and Mobilising Social Justice in South Africa. Pheko is also a member of the Association of Women in Development, the board of the Business Women's Association, the steering committee of South African Women in Dialogue and the steering committee of the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution.
1. INTRODUCTION

The Bali meeting has been hailed in some quarters as a historical achievement that would tilt the balance in favour of the Doha Development Round of World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations, raising hopes that this will smooth the way for multilateral trade negotiations that have faced many difficulties in the past decade. In this context the Institute for Global Dialogue in partnership with Friedrich Ebert Stiftung convened a roundtable on 11 April 2014 to reflect on the outcomes of the Bali meeting. It considered among others, the following questions: What precisely in the Bali outcome is thought of as particularly ground-breaking or laudable? What is the state of the WTO negotiations in general, and the development round in particular? What implications will the Bali outcome have for the interests of developing countries, and in particular Africa and South Africa?

These discussions were aimed at clarifying the implications of the outcomes of Bali, charting the way for the period after the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that expire in September 2015, which focus on a range of issues, from climate change, health, education, and culture, to economic development. The roundtable was attended by members of government, academia, civil society and the diplomatic corps. This report is a synthesis of the inputs from the speakers and the interactive discussion that followed.

From Left to Right: Dr Siphamandla Zondi, Mr Xavier Carim, Ms Memory Dube and Ms Liepollo Pheko
Mr Xavier Carim, began his address by questioning whether there had been a breakthrough at Cancun. Mr Carim contended that if the question was whether the Bali outcome signified a move towards a just world, the answer would be in the negative. Since 2008, following the Doha Round, there has been an impasse. While it is argued that the Doha Round put forward a comprehensive and balanced mandate, whereby different interests could all find something in it for themselves, reflecting coherence, from 2001 to 2008 a steady erosion of the developmental dimensions of the mandate had marked the course. The erosion of the developmental mandate was characterised by negotiations on agriculture on one side, and industrial tariffs and services on the other. There was no reform in terms of agriculture. On the contrary, there was a removal of tariffs and subsidies, increasing pressure on developing countries, especially the larger countries, to remove industrial tariffs. An imbalance has thus been unfolding.

In a paper by Rob Davies, South Africa’s Minister of Trade and Industry, it was noted that the negotiations and proposals on the table were unmandated, anti-developmental, and unfair for developing countries – thereby creating an impasse. It was observed that for the first time over the course of the negotiations, developing countries had formed alliances, and had evolved and forged much stronger ties. Then the group of 90 emerged, including the Africa Caribbean Pacific (ACP), the Africa group, and the major emerging economies in the form of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). This form of coalition were unprecedented. Indeed, these new countries came together to form a resistance to this purportedly unfair mandate, as well as to support effective interaction and engagement. Numerous attempts to restart the negotiations and find ways forward were crafted but none of those efforts amounted to anything. Consequently, the stand-off has been at the core of the impasse since 2008.
By 2011 the DTI was preparing for a ministerial conference in Geneva. At this juncture a series of proposals were made, mainly from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members. Three papers were floated calling for new ‘pathways’, new ‘approaches’ to negotiations, as well as new ‘issues’. It was suggested that issues of the last century were no longer important. This meant turning away from the multilateral approach, articulating a new position, and deciding on specific issues with some countries and not on inclusive issues with all countries. As an example, agriculture was perceived as one of those issues of the previous century, whilst new issues such as climate change and energy emerged. The negotiations were no longer proceeding on a multilateral basis, and were now plurilateral, with smaller groups focusing on government procurement. This development was critical as it symbolised a turning away from the multilateral Doha approach suggesting that the comprehensive approach was no longer going to work. The argument was that the only way to move forward was to decide on specific issues on the negotiating agenda, and especially on certain issues with certain countries. For most developed countries the new issues were international investment and competition, which is not necessarily a priority for many of the developing countries.

What has been observed is that, to the detriment of developing countries, there has been an outgrowth, a move with a new mandate, such as the establishment of the US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) as well as the new deal between Asia-Pacific with the United States. Indeed, the latter new developments pointedly exclude developing countries especially Africa. Following the Doha failures, non-adherence has been advanced at the bilateral level, such as the TTIP, more recently, with some serious problems. With the rise of plurilateral negotiations at the WTO, there has been a loss of interest in the Doha Round. Now there is more cherry-picking on issues, for example, services and IT, with more negotiating on a small scale about specific issues. Interestingly there is no plurilateral approach emerging in agriculture. These moves towards plurilateralism are again said to exclude most developing countries, such as Africa, Russia, and India, whilst China is participating. It is unclear if China will be part of the final outcome. Of the issues that concern Least Developed Countries (LDCs), most have been put on the backburner. It was asserted that the trend is towards fragmentation and not integration in the global system.

Since western countries have to provide a rationale, a narrative to give credence to this, a whole academic industry has emerged on global value chains. However, global value chains that are emerging are actually not necessarily new. What is of significance is empirical data on practices on global value chains. The problem of these value chains is that they come with policy prescriptions: Liberalise! Reduce tariffs at the border! Be efficient! Open your services sector! Thus in order to participate in these global value chains a country must liberalise, introduce trade facilitation and make it easier for goods to move across the border. A closer look thus suggests that trade facilitation was the priority for the major economies in the Doha Round. The challenge is that the argument for global value chains does not take cognisance of where a country is overall located within the value chains. For example, Africa as a continent is at the bottom of the value chains, supplying raw materials, without mention of industrial policy and moving up the ladder.
Two factors are important: the rise of plurilateralism alongside a stronger and more aggressive push for bilaterals at regional level. The conclusion can only be that there is a reduction in interest in the Doha Round.

Having an outcome in Bali after 13 years was a major milestone. It was stated that enormous benefits to developing countries would accrue, although this has attracted criticism. It has been proffered that trade facilitation would deliver enormous benefits to developing countries. Trade facilitation was not, however, a demand by Africa or developing countries in general; it was advocated for by OECD countries. It is not that trade facilitation is unimportant. South Africa had pursued it at Southern African Customs Union (SACU), but at WTO it was not the country’s priority. South Africa’s priorities at this forum were agriculture, a reform aimed at addressing cotton subsidies, and LDCs’ duty free and quota free requests.

Developing countries’ concerns remained marginalised at Bali. Indeed, India had negotiated hard in Doha, supported by Africa but there was little result. Nevertheless, a legally binding outcome was attained. The first imbalance in Bali was that issues high on the agenda of the OECD countries found a legally binding outcome whilst developing country concerns were left for future consideration. The second imbalance is in the trade facilitation agreement itself; here there is no progress or new gains for developing countries as the agreement requires of them what they are already engaged on at domestic level. For example developing countries have already submitted to lowering tariffs. It is argued that it would be hugely costly for African countries to meet the standards set out in the new agreement. It was concluded that there is an unfair sharing of the burden of implementation of the trade facilitation agreement.

It was noted that there is also a new mechanism for special and differential treatment. Indeed, the structure at the WTO is new. Countries are expected to make commitments in three categories, e.g. in category A, these are the commitments a country is prepared to undertake today; in category B these commitments would follow in the coming years; Category C entails commitments that the country would undertake once it has attained capacity and has infrastructure in place. But it is not that simple, since a country does not make decisions alone, it has to consider other countries. It also raises serious issues of capacity. Flexibility is built into the agreement but not unconstrained. It begins to narrow the scope of special and differential treatment as understood in the WTO historically. A country therefore could take a lower level of commitment; secondly it could take a lower level of commitment and do that over a period of time. The only flexibility is then time.

From Bali, two parallel processes are being observed:

• The process to finalise the trade facilitation agreement, the legal aspect of the agreement by July 2014;
  • Countries have to specify where they fit within the three categories, A, B, or C.

The latter scenario is deeply contested. South Africa as a country is still deciding on its position. This entails new approaches and new pathways. The starting point should be the 2008 documents.
South Africa must restart the Doha Round on the basis of an all-inclusive African mandate. The question remains, is the mandate still relevant? The country has been arguing on the timeframes. South Africa’s partners in SACU are expected to support the regional integration agenda. It has been noted that the world has changed since the last discussions. The priority for South Africa is making progress on the regional agenda. South Africa is still trying the way forward on that, working in SACU, Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC), and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Tripartite work is of importance to South Africa.

Following from Mr Carim, Ms Memory Dube, Senior Researcher at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) remarked that massive cuts are being made in developing countries in exchange for symbolic concessions in agriculture and that is a concern. Bali is an alternative voice to the resolution of Doha where the erosion of the developmental mandate is noted. There are concerns about development when cosmetic applications are being witnessed. An observation was made that it was a mistake from the word go to call Bali a Development Round without having come to an agreement on the definition of development. The argument is that part of the problem is that developed countries think that the way to attain development is to liberalise trade. On the other hand, developing countries look at development and trade as having to be exempted from commitments in the agreements that are concluded at the WTO. Bali focused on trade only, whilst developing countries were expecting something more comprehensive. Developing countries look at exemption and the element of less than full reciprocity. If an observation is made though, one realises that the underlying principle is that of trade liberalisation and there is a fundamental disjuncture there. There is a single undertaking that facilitates agreement on certain issues with difficult issues likely to be left out.
The size of the Doha agenda itself acts as a constraint. Developed countries’ issues continue to take precedence over developing countries’ priorities. The question is how developing countries could work to reverse these constraints? Bali would not work for agriculture broadly as well as for the services sector. The crux of the matter here is the failure to implement the Uruguay Round resolutions. This essentially means that the previous dispensation did not work; in short Bali has so far been ineffective. Moreover, it has been opined that Bali does not address the constraints at the centre of the Doha Round impasse. “Whither”, to quote, is not an easy question one may argue. What remains glaring for most observers is that it is still a challenge to detach countries away from their national interests and agendas and point them towards an egalitarian agenda for all. As an example, the United States government would not abandon subsidies to its farmers. No country simply abandons its domestic priorities and concerns. “There is no answer to a fair world”. The choices for developing countries are restricted, it is either one leaves the agenda as broad as it is, or narrows it. Some questions stand out though, how can developing countries make themselves stronger? Unity amongst developing countries is a rarity. It therefore depends on how developing countries realistically believe in the need for the WTO.

It may be concluded that there is nothing to lose from the plurilateral. They are arguably the only alternative at the present. There cannot be mega regionals to take away the centrality of the WTO. However, there still should be new rules out of the purview of developing countries. Parties could keep the WTO agenda as broad as it is or streamline it and make it smaller. It is difficult to discern how the impasse could be resolved. There is an incoherent and conflicting interest amongst developing countries themselves. It is rare that one finds unity amongst developing countries, e.g. on the trade facilitation agreement there were African countries such as Rwanda that were supportive of the agreement. That is a source of concern; Africa must therefore find a consensus on issues that are of priority to all of them. It remains difficult to say if that is possible though. At the moment plurilateral appears as the only alternative.

Ms Liepollo Pheko noted in her response that there are two intersections that are important to the WTO and the political economy, these are regionalism and plurilateralism and what this means for Africa.

With regards to the usefulness of multilateral, Ms Pheko contended that Doha had not been meant to be developmental, it was a cynical naming of a very problematic process, nor was the round interested in promoting a new wave of regional blocs. It was problematic and superfluous. It was argued that developed countries are not interested in shifting the agricultural architecture and promoting a development agenda which is not in their self-interest. Its construction and conception was not in the interest of Africa. This is linked to the so-called new issues. There is a whole new wave of regional blocs which are trying to negotiate issues outside of the purview of the WTO.
Twenty years ago, at the outset of the WTO, there were approximately 800 bilateral, multilateral and plurilateral agreements around. Two decades later there are some 4 500 agreements that are difficult to monitor. These often work at cross purposes with each other; a plethora of trade agreements that fundamentally disagree with each other. It is a challenge to assess and evaluate the efficacy of these trade agreements and disagreements in some cases, which seem to be part of our international trade architecture. In agreement with Mr Carim on Special Directional Treatments (SDTs), it was highlighted that there are SDTs that have failed to deliver. It was noted that from the very outset these agreements were not in the interest of Africa. Therefore the Bali meeting has not been able to advance the agenda sufficiently. Indeed, there are new economies and a new bullishness that has shifted the global balance of power fairly significantly. There are also new geo-political configurations. India and China alone represent at least two billion interests of global potential trade nodes on the planet. The extent to which South Africa has been able to leverage the potential that obtains from the relations with China and India remains debatable and problematic. With the BRICS configuration, India and China are detracting from the importance of the WTO. The WTO remains South Africa’s pivotal anchor of international trade with a host of caveats around the power relations and the balance of power.
The road to Bali was paved with shadow and smoke, promises and half promises. That shadow and smoke have to be located within the Doha agenda. The first interest of the Doha Development Round would have been to place the needs of the developing countries at the heart of the work programme. There is no quantifiable evidence as to whether Bali has been able to advance this. Secondly, the negotiations were supposed to attend to outstanding implementation issues. Thirdly the talks were supposed to highlight a clear mandate on the implementation of Article 20, the agreement on agriculture in terms of liberalising agricultural trade. There seems to be a consensus that the liberalisation agenda of agriculture has been hampered and hamstrung by very narrow and myopic domestic interests notably of countries such as Japan, the United States and the EU. It may be argued that the latter parties have absolutely no interest on resolving challenges faced by developing countries, particularly with their collectively depressed economies. These countries are now trying to ameliorate their own situation through subsidies at domestic level.

With regard to issues of access, duty free, and quota free market access, there are still outstanding matters since the discussions at the Singapore meeting. The concern is that within the WTO framework these are bound to emerge under the economic partnership agreements (EPAs) and under other instruments. The coherence agenda in the last twenty years has become far more absolute, definitive, and significant than it was in the past two decades. This is mainly because it enables the interests of particular countries, the major players, to entrench key interests using a multiplicity of fora and avenues. Thus countries such as the EU, the US, Japan, and to a lesser and diminishing extent China as an emerging power, are able to carve multiple pathways. African countries as a collective have not been able to replicate the same with great effect. In fact they have neglected many of the negotiations taking place around SACU for more coherent regionalism, issues around a single currency, easier market access, and a form of a single economy that would make their negotiating power far more tangible. Countries such as Rwanda, Swaziland and Botswana, have often used (as well as been used) their single country issues such as cattle, and sugar products to actually destabilise and undermine what could have been a very cogent and potent collective bargaining position at WTO level. It is therefore not only developed countries which have narrow national interests, although the costs for this narrow nationalism are a lot higher for the developing world.

From Bali, Africa as a continent has emerged with less gains than what it had previously. The pretext on trade facilitation is the opposite of what many African countries need and called for. The text imposes an obligation and customs procedures which are standard in large and advanced countries. Most advanced countries have “voluntarily” adopted these standards, which are actually commensurate with their own economic trajectory. Africa needs massive policy and legislation amendments and infrastructural challenges and changes to live up to these alterations and standards. On policy prescriptions, South Africa and other African countries have to deal with their own sovereign space. In common with many previous WTO meetings, the US, as an example, reserves the right to put on hold any major issue, using the platitude that says “we have to refer to Congress”. This has become an effective way for them to make decisions, or do nothing and hold all progress to ransom.
National interest and sovereignty are often lost in the panic and pressure of needing to comply as quickly as possible. It is a paradox that some African ministers have welcomed this package as meeting all their needs. All in all there has been a dilution of the WTO and the development agenda with serious implications for Africa. For example numerous issues remain unresolved. This has affected a number of issues, e.g. mobility between borders of labour, skills, finance, and trade in services, amongst others. What is pernicious with the so-called new issues, Singapore issues, corporations are able to be treated as governments, taking states to court, holding them to account. Indigenous businesses are adversely affected. Issues of competition policy remain unaccounted for within Africa and South Africa.

One of the key controversies relates to the transatlantic partnerships, this is negotiated by 12 countries, a hodgepodge, ragtag, comprised of the US, Peru, Australia, Vietnam, Brunei, and Japan. The US and Japan underline the talks but with a geopolitically superior voice. These include all areas already in the WTO as well as several additional others, notably the investment environment, labour conditions, but the new proposals go beyond the WTO. These new developments are viewed as WTO-plus but with compound interest and have serious domestic implications for developing countries. According to Stieglitz, this freezes into a binding trade agreement, many of the worst features, worse laws, in these TTIP countries which will make reforms extremely difficult if not impossible.
In the discussion session that followed a number of questions were raised. For example, it was enquired whether it was possible or realistic to have an agreement that excludes agriculture and subsidies. The American example emerged again as domestic American politics shape the discussions, Congressmen have to please and attend to the interests of their constituents, whereas it is not the case with other countries. The WTO is thus a huge lobby group. The argument amongst some participants was that the WTO was now antiquated and no longer has a place in international trade talks. Others opined that Bali is not a success story, as narrow nationalism is a problem and thus Africa has to negotiate as a collective voice. There was a suggestion that there has been a shift in the last decade as emerging countries have claimed more space. The issue is not about trade liberalisation mechanisms but the prevailing structural mechanics or hardware of trade. Thus a new dispensation is necessary. Each country and region has to report to the same governing authority in terms of trade and equal compliance is expected.

In responding it was argued that it is difficult to envision a WTO agenda with no agriculture. The difference now is that developing countries are more powerful, they can work effectively in coalitions. Within BRICS, the interests of developing countries are taken into account in order to move forward. Simultaneously, it may be argued that a scenario whereby concerns on agriculture are dropped whilst the services sector remains on the agenda is unimaginable. Developing countries are in a position to negotiate, with this being a litmus test for developing countries. Current rules affect negotiations and bring distortion. Development is defined by reform in agriculture and not exemption from rules. Developing countries stand a better chance of getting a good deal out of the WTO than within plurilateral
On the question of the devaluation of the currency, where currency hurts exports, it was indicated that this is not a WTO matter but one for the Reserve Bank. With regard to the issue of lobbying, members of the WTO represent governments and not interest groups. However, the last assertion contradicts what was stated about the role of Congressmen in the WTO as they advocate for farmers in the US. There was agreement that Africa should negotiate with one voice instead of going the plurilateral route. It was argued that in the absence of a viable alternative plurilaterals seem the only way forward and thus Africa should not take them lightly. Africa would not, however, get an agreement on agriculture through plurilaterals, and this also applies to other issues such as dumping which are of interest to developing countries. The African agenda remains critical.

Some have contended that with the emergence and growth of China and by extension BRICS, there has been a global shift in power especially with regards to international trade. However, the latter view has been challenged as one discussant pointed out and probed as to why there is still no alternative emerging if certainly there is a shift of power as some commentators have claimed. The contention is that if there is indeed such a shift of power amongst the parties, then tangible developments should have already facilitated a new move by the Global South. The developing countries have arguably not submitted a proposal in order to resolve the stasis. The centrality of the WTO should be preserved and the organisation cannot be made redundant. If there are any alternatives they should be put forward.
One participant lamented the extent to which development in general to the benefit of developing countries, remains on the back burner. It was also highlighted that assumptions have been made about BRICS having a broad-based agenda whereas the reality is that they individually have narrow national interests like all other parties. For example, China and India have vast internal markets and their main pivot in Bali is market access. The framework has to be multilateralism. Plurilaterals are about dealing with the hegemony. The main argument is that for Western countries such as the US, domestic constituents put pressures on their government, which becomes defensive about agriculture on their behalf. Their government strives to create market access for the respective constituents. South Africa and other developing countries on the other hand, are being asked to open up their markets and reduce tariffs. In South Africa the negotiation process is inter-departmental; the country position is formulated at NEDLAC. These processes vary from country to country. There is, however, a shift in the world economy as well as in negotiations. Developing countries cannot accept unfair deals as occurred in the Uruguay Round. The problem is that developing countries are not sufficiently strong to push for a balanced outcome.

Depending on the country concerned, there are cases of domestic lobbies. There is a need for tenacity as well as academic diplomacy. Certainly there has been a mobilisation of communities in the past 15 years. By July there should be a SADC position in place and not just a South African position. This is a protracted and technical legal process and it should be persuasive as to what it means for countries such as South Africa. There are a number of problematics to consider, self-interest, cohesion, and architecture of negotiations, setting of the agenda in the 21st century, exclusion of the neediest, fragmentation in issues such as prioritising the green economy and global value chains over other issues. There needs to be a catalytic dialogue where there are committed institutions since a dearth in institutions that are focussing on trade diplomacy is apparent.

In conclusion, the motif of the discussion has been that the proceedings at Bali have resulted in a regression for the developing countries. Following Bali, developing countries appear more fragmented and divided along their respective singular and narrow national agendas. The WTO seems unable to provide a pluralistic and egalitarian plane for the world of trade. Mutually beneficial alternatives seem ever elusive. It may be safe to conclude that through plurilaterals, developing countries have been insidiously subjected to a new approach of ‘divide and rule’, where they are increasingly integrated into global value chains as sources of raw commodities and this has been at the deficit of a unified agenda of the global south. In the meantime the need for meaningful alternatives remains urgent.

**Session Concludes**
## PROGRAMME

**"The Bali Outcome: Whither World Trade Negotiations?"**

**Venue:** Burgers Park Hotel, Pretoria  
**Date:** Friday, 11 April 2014  
**Time:** 09:00 for 09:30 – 12:30

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<td>09:30 – 10:00</td>
<td>Welcome</td>
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<td>Dr Siphamandla Zondi, Director, <strong>Institute for Global Dialogue</strong></td>
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<td>10:00 – 11:30</td>
<td>Session: The Bali Outcome: Whither World Trade Negotiations?</td>
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<td><strong>Speaker:</strong> Mr Xavier Carim, DDG: <strong>International Trade and Economic Development,</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Discussants:</strong> Ms Memory Dube, Senior Researcher: <strong>Economic Diplomacy Programme,</strong></td>
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<td>Ms Liepollo Pheko, Executive Director, <strong>The Trade Collective</strong></td>
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**Discussion Session**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>12:30</td>
<td>Closure and vote of thanks</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Xavier Carim, DTI
Memory Dube, SAIIA
Liepollo Pheko, The Trade Collective
Siphamandla Zondi, IGD, UNISA
Catherine Grant, SAIIA
Christopher Wood, SAIIA
Francis Kornegay, IGD, UNISA
Lesley Masters, IGD, UNISA
Kenny Dlamini, IGD, UNISA
Anna Xoyane, IGD, UNISA
Wayne Jumat, IGD, UNISA
Mabutho Shangase, IGD, UNISA
Romi Reinecke, FES
Levy Motebejane, UNISA
Lesiba Teffo, UNISA
Colin Mashikinya, TMALI Unisa
Mzi Ndelemane, TMALI Unisa
Samuel Oloruntoba, TMALI Unisa
Mthandazo Ndlovu Hlahla, OXFAM
Johan Delport, South African Reserve Bank
Craig Zaayman, South African Reserve Bank
Elnari Potgieter, Nedlac’s Trade and Industry Chamber
Sharna Johardien, Nedlac’s Trade and Industry Chamber
Axel Pougin de la Maisonneuve, Delegation of the European Union to SA
Misabeni Khosa, MK Associates
Norman Tabane, ANC IR
John Mare, Worldonline
Carlos Sersale di Cerisano, Embassy of Argentina
Rumbidzai Biza, British High Commission
Hitoshi Hatta, Embassy of Japan
Bastian Dohmes, Embassy of Germany
Falk Bömeke, Embassy of Germany
Joris Jansen, Netherlands Embassy
Radu Gabriel Safta, Embassy of Romania
Heinrich Maurer, Embassy of Switzerland
ABOUT THE INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL DIALOGUE

The Institute for Global Dialogue associated with UNISA is an independent foreign policy think tank dedicated to the analysis of and dialogue on the evolving international political and economic environment, and the role of Africa and South Africa. It advances a balanced, relevant and policy-oriented analysis, debate and documentation of South Africa’s role in international relations and diplomacy.

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3rd Floor r Robert Sobukwe Building
263 Nana Sita Street
Pretoria
South Africa

PO Box 14349
The Tramshed, 0126
Pretoria
South Africa

+27123376082
+27862129442
info@igd.org.za
www.igd.org.za